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Abstract 
In the early 1930s, approximately seven thousand North American Finns, many of whom 
were born in Canada and the United States, left for Soviet Karelia, an autonomous republic in 
north-western Russia, bordering on Finland. Through the case study of the Karelian fever (a term 
by which North American Finnish migration to Soviet Karelia is now known), this work 
analyzes processes of identity construction at individual, regional, and national levels. My 
argument is that transnational migrant labour became a means by which diasporic, regional, and 
national leaders defined and redefined the cultural and political borders of their imagined 
communities. Whereas the movement of people was physically and psychologically 
transnational, national and diasporic imaginaries on both sides of the Atlantic were engaged in a 
perpetual effort to include, and in other instances reject, the cultural, social, economic, and 
political memberships of these migrants in their communities. The study focuses on a specific 
community, but transcends geographical boundaries in a period of less than a decade and shows 
a vibrant, tumultuous historical process of identity formation, both structural and subjective.  
 In addition to analytical frameworks of nation and diaspora, my work looks at immigrant 
lives in dissimilar and competing versions of modernity, western capitalism and Soviet 
socialism. Finns on the move across the Atlantic in the 1920s and the 1930s were transnational 
agents, who by virtue of their mobility infused elements of western modernization into the Soviet 
society. As a result, these Finnish migrants who moved across land and sea borders in search of a 
social, economic, and political haven, became embroiled in the process of modern nation-state 
construction, but also found themselves within a larger, global contest of alternative modernities, 
that is between competing notions of what the new subject of the modern nation-state should 
look like. What follows is a multi-sited ethnographic analysis of the way immigrants’ ethnic 
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identities were forged, and contested in different social contexts and varying levels of scale. In 
other words, what were the ways by which social spaces such as diasporas (locally), nations 
(regionally), and modernities (globally) were culturally produced.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Overarching Argument 
In the early 1930s, approximately seven thousand North American Finns, many of whom 
were born in Canada and the United States, left for Soviet Karelia, an autonomous republic in 
northwestern Russia, bordering on Finland. Through the case study of the Karelian fever (a term 
by which North American Finnish migration to Soviet Karelia is now known), this work 
analyzes processes of identity construction at individual, organizational, regional, and national 
levels. My argument is that transnational migrant labor – a subaltern force consisting primarily 
of nuclear and extended family units on the move in the late 19th and early 20th centuries in 
search of economic and social security – became a means by which diasporic, regional, and 
national leaders defined and redefined the cultural and political borders of their imagined 
communities. Whereas the movement of people was physically and psychologically 
transnational, national and diasporic imaginaries on both sides of the Atlantic were engaged in a 
perpetual effort to include, and in other instances reject, the cultural, social, economic, and 
political memberships of these migrants in their communities. While my study focuses on a 
specific community, it nonetheless transcends geographical and ethnic boundaries in a period of 
less than a decade and shows a vibrant, tumultuous historical process of identity formation both 
structural and subjective.  
 That said the process of identity construction through the theoretical prisms of imagined 
communities,1 imagined geographies,2 and imagined futures,3 is not the only focus of this 
                                                
1 On the concept of imagined communities, see Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the 
Origin and Spread of Nationalism. London and New York: Verso, 1991. 
2  The concept of imagined geographies was developed based on the works of Edward Said, particularly his critique 
of Orientalism. See, Edward Said, Orientalism. Penguin Books, 1995. 
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dissertation. Given that the migratory group and pattern under scrutiny involves analysis of 
socio-political and cultural discourses of nations outside the western hemisphere, i.e. the Soviet 
Union, my work looks at immigrant lives in different nation-states, but also in dissimilar and 
competing versions of modernity, western capitalism and Soviet socialism. The migratory group 
under investigation – Finns on the move between Canada, the United States, Finland, and the 
Soviet Union in the 1920s and the 1930s – were transnational agents, who by virtue of their 
mobility infused elements of western modernization into the Soviet society. As a result, these 
Finnish migrants who moved across land and sea borders in search of a social, economic, and 
political haven, became embroiled in the process of modern nation-state construction, but also 
found themselves within a larger, global contest of alternative modernities, that is between 
competing notions of what the new subject of the modern nation-state should look like. What 
follows then is a multi-sited ethnographic analysis of the way immigrants’ ethnic identities were 
forged, and contested in different social contexts and varying levels of scale. In other words, 
what were the ways by which social spaces such as diasporas (locally), nations (regionally), and 
modernities (globally) were culturally produced. 
Immigration Historiography 
 
 In the 19th and early 20th centuries, a transatlantic movement of previously unseen 
proportions took place between the European continent and the New World. From 1815 to 1930 
about 54 million people left the Old World for the United States, Canada, South America, and 
Australia.4 This transnational movement consisting primarily of peasants and wage workers 
                                                                                                                                                       
3 On imagined futures see Alan Simmons, “Immigration Policy: Imagined Futures”, Immigrant Canada: 
Demographic, Economic and Social Challenges, eds., Shiva Halli and Leo Driedger. Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1999. 
4 Dudley Baines and Economic History Society, Emigration from Europe, 1815-1930 (Cambridge University Press, 
1995), p. 2. 
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coincided with the rise of modern states, and particularly modern nation-states. In this period, 
when governments across the Atlantic were engaged in active nation-building, a process 
involving delineation of the state’s political, economic and social contours, the relationship 
between the state and the individual was taking on new forms. New institutions of power, in 
particular in the fields of education and culture, aimed to “discipline” the states’ new subjects. 
Imperial and subsequently national imaginaries began to compete with each other by promoting 
seemingly universal meanings and versions of the modern state and the modern subject. In this 
context, migrants between Europe and the Americas, who were constantly on the move, became 
subjects of contention between different visions of nations and modernities. Making headway 
between national imaginaries and alternative modernities, migrants became agents of change, 
local to global, but at the same time were subjectified by the regional, national, and imperial 
conceptions of nations and modernities.  
 Historiography on North American, or rather transatlantic, migration, as it is known 
today, has changed significantly in the past fifty years. In many ways the literature on themes of 
immigration and ethnicity in the North American context has shifted in concert with conceptual 
and rhetorical changes in the field of social sciences in general.  From the 1930s to the 1960s the 
so-called national building school produced writers who glorified immigration to North America 
as a flight of desperate and destitute people from the decay that befell the failed European states, 
and their ascent to the land with a progressive, free, democratic, egalitarian, and in essence, 
exceptional American society. Perhaps the most celebrated and later the most criticized work5 
was Oscar Handlin’s The Uprooted. For Handlin, immigrants were desperate, needy, and 
obedient workers, who constructed cultural institutions against the strange world.  
                                                
5 See Rudolph Vecoli, “Contadini in Chicago: A Critique of the Uprooted”, Journal of American History 5 
(December 1964): 404-417. 
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This historiographical orientation, heavily influenced by political history and the place of 
the great men in it, gave way in the 1970s and the 1980s to a new wave of historians, practicing 
in the fields of social and cultural history.  Preoccupied with narratives from below, exploring 
the histories of the subaltern groups in society, such as workers, women, and racial and ethnic 
minorities, scholars in the field of immigration and ethnicity began to look at the local, rather 
than the national, at the culture of everyday life, rather than the high culture of the elites.6 
Although such literature contributed invaluably to the field, nonetheless, the term immigration in 
the North American context still implied a static state of affairs, where it was assumed 
immigrants never left the New World (or at least did not desire to do so), unless deemed by the 
state totally unfit for society and were deported to their place of origin.7 
 It was only in the early 1990s that transnational cultural and social history came to 
complement, as well as challenge national-centered historiographies. Transnational history, 
although discussed by such historians as Marc Bloch as early as 1928, became a primary target 
of historical analysis only with the changing international political situation in the late 20th 
century. In particular, it was the collapse of the Soviet Union and the rise of globalization which 
                                                
6 Discussion of ethnicity and class see, John Bodnar, The Transplanted: A History of Immigrants in Urban America. 
Bloomington. Indiana University Press, 1985; Roberto Perin and Franc Sturino, eds., Arrangiarsi: the Italian 
Immigration Experience in Canada. Montreal: Guernica, 1989. Franca Iacovetta, Such Hardworking People: Italian 
Immigrants in Postwar Toronto. McGill-Queens University Press, 1992; Donald Avery, Reluctant Host: Canada’s 
Response to Immigrant Workers 1896-1994. Toronto: M&S, 1995. Discussion on ethnicity and gender see, Varpu 
Lindstrom, Defiant Sisters: A Social History of Finnish Immigrant Women in Canada. Multicultural History Society 
of Ontario, 1988; Donna Gabaccia, From the Other Side: Women, Gender, and Immigrant Life in the U.S., 1820-
1990. Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1994; Ruth Frager, Sweatshop Strife: Class, Ethnicity and Gender 
in the Labor Movement of Toronto, 1930-1939. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992. 
7 A discussion on Canada’s immigration policy throughout the 20th century see, Gerald Dirks, Canada’s Refugee 
Policy: Indifference or Opportunism. McGill-Queens University Press, 1977; Reg Whitaker, Double Standard: The 
Secret History of Canadian Immigration Policy. Toronto: Lester & Orpen Dennys, 1987; Barbara Roberts. Whence 
They Came: Deportation  from Canada 1900-1935. University of Ottawa Press, 1988; Ninette Kelly and Michael 
Trebilcock, The Making of the Mosaic: A History of Canadian Immigration Policy. Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 2010. 
5	  
	  
prompted some historians to query the effectiveness of nation-states as frameworks of analysis.8 
In North America, first attempts at transnational and transatlantic immigration history were 
represented in the writings of Bruno Ramirez, Dirk Hoerder, Walter Nugent, and Rudolph 
Vecoli.9 This transnational approach, although not novel on many levels,10 revealed a pattern that 
involved perpetual migration across the Atlantic, rather than one-way immigration, and as a 
result questioned the whole issue of exceptionalism of American nation-states.   
 The advent of post-colonial studies, partly based on the works of Frantz Fanon and 
Jacques Derrida, took critical analysis in the social sciences and humanities to a different level. It 
emphasized that academics could not examine the dominant (colonial, imperial) and the 
subaltern knowledge independently, because such an approach inevitably perpetuated these 
homogeneous entities.11 Instead of colonial-local vertical and horizontal relations, the emphasis 
now lay with hybrid socio-cultural spaces. Hybridity, which came to stress authenticity in forms 
of ambiguity, recently became one of the most potent challenges to colonialism, and a mantle for 
post-colonial academic discourses.12 In turn, theoretical concepts of “hybridization” made 
inroads into the field of immigration studies in North America and shifted some of the focus on 
the migrant’s cultural mixed identity rather than on forces of assimilation. Thus, in addition to 
                                                
8 Ian Tyrell, Transnational Nation: United States History in Global Perspective Since 1789. Palgrave MacMillan, 
2007. 
9 See Bruno Ramirez, On the Move: French-Canadian and Italian Migrants in the North Atlantic Economy. Oxford 
University Press, 1991; Dirk Hoerder, People on the Move: Migration, Acculturation, and Ethnic Interaction in 
Europe and North America. Providence, 1993; Walter Nugent, The Great Transatlantic Migrations, 1870-1914. 
Indiana University Press, 1992; Rudolph Vecoli and Suzanne Sinke, A Century of European Migrations, 1830-1930. 
Urbana, 1991. 
10 See Nancy Fonner, From Ellis Island to JFK: New York’s Two Great Waves of Immigration. Yale University 
Press, 2000, who argues that transnational movement of people and ideas has not changed in the past century or so, 
but what did change was the technology and the pace with which people now could travel and exchange ideas. 
11 See Homi K. Bhabha, The Location of Culture. Routledge, 1994; Edward Said, Orientalism. Vintage Books, 
1978; Gayatri Spivak, “Can the Subaltern Speak”, in Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture, eds., Carry Nelson 
and Lawrence Grossberg. University of Illinois Press, 1988. 
12 Bhabba, The Location of Culture, p. 113. 
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exploring the transnational nature of migratory patterns and everyday life, researchers began to 
re-discover migrants’ transcultural, or hybrid identity.13  
Engaged in post-modern analysis, migration historians have also begun to look at the way 
the nation-state not simply “oppressed” or exploited the immigrant, but rather how the 
immigrant, as well as the society at large, were managed through the application of bureaucratic 
procedures and categories. The advent of modernity, described by many as the rise of liberal 
democracy and industrial capitalism, can also be seen through the method of social 
interventionism “by which state officials and nongovernmental professionals sought to reshape 
their societies in accordance with scientific and aesthetic forms”.14 Social interventionism, as 
argued by many theorists, became the defining aspect of modernity.15 Franca Iacovetta’s recent 
work Gatekeepers: Reshaping Immigrant Lives in Cold War Canada is reflective of the post-
modern literature in that it attempts to examine the way dominant bourgeois and Cold War 
ideologies, transmitted by the “gatekeepers” – state officials, as well as nongovernmental 
organizations run by middle class individuals – shaped the immigrant experience, as well as 
public attitudes towards newcomers.16 
In this equation of transnationalism, post-colonial studies, and modernity, the migrant as 
a transnational agent comes to play a pivotal role in the history of modern nation-states, and, by 
                                                
13 See Nancy Green, “The Comparative Method and Post-structural Structuralism: New Perspectives for Migration 
Studies” Journal of American Ethnic History 13,4 Summer 1994; Women, Gender and Transnational Lives: Italian 
Workers of the World, eds Donna Gabaccia and Franca Iacovetta. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005. 
14 David Lloyd Hoffman, Stalinist Values: The Cultural Norms of Soviet modernity, 1917-1941, (Cornell University 
Press, 2003), p. 7. 
15 See Anthony Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age. Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 1991.; Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and Ambivalence. N.Y, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1991. 
16 Franca Iacovetta, Gatekeepers: Reshaping Immigrant Lives in Cold War Canada. University of Toronto Press, 
2006. 
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extension, in the construction of alternative modernities.17 Given the role of the immigrant as a 
“stranger” who is a person present yet unfamiliar, the society’s undecidable18 who constantly 
threatens its borders, he/she becomes an agent of change, a transmitter of ideas, capital, and 
experience, a local actor, who imposes transformation on national and global scales, while 
simultaneously being shaped and reshaped by social, cultural, and political forces. While 
himself/herself an agent of metamorphosis, an immigrant is always, whether willingly or not, at 
the forefront of national building projects, valued for the necessary economic contributions 
he/she makes to the host country.  
Agency and structure cannot be conceived of as separate from one another, and as a result 
the immigrant’s identity, whether real or perceived, is often used by the dominant groups in the 
society to delineate the contours of what they perceive to be the social, cultural, and political 
norms of that entity. An immigrant’s identity in the public mind is often bestowed with negative 
imageries. As it is only through “crystallizing and solidifying what they are not, or what they do 
not wish to be,” can the dominant groups in society assert “what they are, what they want to be, 
and what they want to be thought as being.”19 In other words, the creation of the ‘stranger’ – the 
outsider, or the ‘enemy’, helps to create and define the ‘insider’ or the ‘friends’ in a society.  
Karelian Fever Historiography 
Until recently the Karelian fever received scant attention in scholarly research. With the 
exception of Reino Kero’s 1983 monograph20 in the Finnish language, there were but a few 
                                                
17 For a discussion on alternative modernitites, see Alternative Modenities. Edited by Dilip Parameshwar Gaonkar. 
Duke University Press, 2001; Bill Ashcroft, “Alternative Modernities: Globalization and the Post-Colonial”, ARIEL 
– A Review of International English Literature, vol 40, no. 3, pp. 81-105. 
18 Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and Ambivalence, (Cornell University Press, 1991). 
19 Ibid., p. 143. 
20 Reino Kero, Neuvosto-Karjalaa rakentamassa: Pohjois-Amerikan suomalaiset tekniikan tuojina 1930-luvun 
Neuvosto-Karjalassa [Building Soviet Karelia: North American Finns as the Introducers of New Technologies in 
Soviet Karelia in the 1930s] (Helsinki: SHS, 1983). 
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memoirs in Finland and North America on the subject.21 In the Soviet Union, a few related 
academic articles appeared in the 1960s.22 However, written in the Soviet historical paradigm, 
they viewed immigration of North American Finns to Soviet Karelia in terms of world 
proletarian solidarity with the USSR, and failed to address other central features of the 
movement, let alone provide a discussion about the tragic fate of the immigrants.23  
 It was only in the late 1980s, when social and political changes were sweeping the Soviet 
Union that people in Karelia began to speak on themes previously considered taboo in the public 
realm. Varpu Lindstrom, a Canadian academic and one of the pioneer researchers in the field, 
recalled that on her trip to Soviet Karelia in 1989, she heard a story of a man whose grandfather 
witnessed the shooting of several men by NKVD (People Commissariat of Internal Affairs) 
agents in the late 1930s, but kept the story a secret within the family. Fifty years later his 
grandson decided to share this story, which led to the uncovering of a mass grave at Sandarmoch, 
where many of the bodies found were those of North American Finnish immigrants.  
 With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the opening of previously restricted archives, 
research on the topic was launched on both sides of the Atlantic.24 However, it was only in the 
                                                
21 See Kaarlo Tuomi, “The Karelian Fever of the Early 1930s: A Personal Memoir,” Finnish Americana. Vol. 3 
(1980), 61–75; Christer Boucht, Karjala kutsuu [Karelia calls] (Helsinki: Kirjayhtymä, 1988); Sylvia Hokkanen, and 
Laurence Hokkanen with Anita Middleton, Karelia: A Finnish-American Couple in Stalin’s Russia, 1934–1941 (St. 
Cloud: North Star Press, 1991); Ernesti Komulainen , A Grave in Karelia (New York: Braun Brumfield, 1995). 
22 Andrei Andriainen,, “Zamechatelnyi primer internatsionalnoi solidarnosti [A formidable example of international 
solidarity],” Voprosy istorii KPSS [Problems of history of the CPSU] (Petrozavodsk: Petrozavodsk State University 
Press, 1968), 87–101; Andrei  Andriainen,, “Dvizheniie proletarskoi solidarnosti zarubezhnykh finskikh 
trudiashchikhsia s Sovetskoi Kareliei [Movement of proletarian solidarity between Finnish workers abroad and 
Soviet Karelia],” in 50 let Sovetskoi Karelii [Fifty years of Soviet Karelia] (Petrozavodsk: Karelia, 1969), 180–198. 
23 Alexey Golubev and Irina Takala, Golubev, Alexey and Irina Takala, The Search for a Socialist El Dorado: 
Finnish Immigration to Soviet Karelia from the United States and Canada in the 1930s. University of Manitoba 
Press, 2014. 
24 On early accounts of the Karelian fever see Varpu Linstrom and Borje Vahamaki, “Ethnicity Twice Removed: 
North American Finns in Soviet Karelia,” Finnish Americana, vol 9 (1992), pp. 14-20; Alexis Pogorelskin, “New 
Perspectives on Karelian Fever: The Recruitment of North American Finns to Karelia in the Early 1930s”, Journal 
of Finnish Studies, vol.1, no. 3 (1997), pp. 165-178; Michael Gelb, “Karelian Fever: The Finnish Immigrant 
Community During Stalin’s Purges”, Europe-Asia Studies, vol.45, no.6 (1993), pp. 1091-1116; Auvo Kostiainen, 
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2000s that research assumed an international character, born in the collaborative initiatives 
among scholars in Canada, the United States, Finland, and Russia. By sharing invaluable 
information and experience, academics approached the topic through an international 
perspective, which allowed them to delve into domains of global, national, regional and local 
histories, through the case study of the Karelian fever.25 
However, the majority of these accounts, in tandem with the broader trend within 
immigration and ethnic history, are still being written in the context of national historiographies 
with powerful celebratory and filiopietistic narratives. Historians’ ethnic background, political 
views and ideological creeds often dictate the nature of their work. North American Finnish 
migration to the Soviet Union is treated as a fiasco, given its tragic outcome and the high rate of 
return.  Researchers in the west tend to analyze these “extraordinary” immigrants’ lives against 
the “backwardness” of Soviet society. Two refreshing accounts of the Karelian fever are recent 
works by Nick Baron, “Constructing Immigrant Identities in Stalinist Russia”, and by Alexey 
Golubev and Irina Takala In Search of Socialist Eldorado. Baron argues that the structural 
approach to studying the Karelian fever and its preoccupation with climate and landscape is 
outdated given that it provides an account of a tale structured in binary oppositions: “the honesty 
                                                                                                                                                       
“The Finns of Soviet Karelia as a Target of Stalin’s Terror”, Ethnic and National Issue in Russian and East 
European History. Selected Papers from the Fifth Congress of Central and East European Studies. Warsaw 1995, 
edited by John Morrison, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), pp. 214-219. Mayme Sevander, Red Exodus: 
Finnish American Emigration to Russia. Duluth: Oscat, 1993. Mayme Sevander, They Took My Father: A Story of 
Idealism and Betrayal (Minneapolis: Pfeiffer-Hamilton, 1991). И.Р. Такала "В поисках Ельдорадо: 
Северноамериканские Финны в Довоенной Карелии." [In Search of Eldorado: North American Finns in Interwar 
Karelia] Вопросы Истории Европейского Севера: Международный сборник научных статей. Петрозаводск 
1991. 
25 Cooperation began in 2004 in Thunder Bay, Canada, followed by a conference in Eskilstuna, Sweden in 2006, and 
Petrozavodsk, Russia in 2008. It produced three collections, which became an important contribution in the field: 
Ronald Harpelle, Varpu Lindstrom and Alexis Pogorelskin (eds.), Karelian Exodus: Finnish Communities in North 
America and Soviet Karelia during the Depression Era (Beaverton: Aspasia Books, 2004); Ilya Solomeshch and 
Irina Takala (eds.), North American Finns in Soviet Karelia in the 1930s (Petrozavodsk, Petrozavodsk State 
University Press, 2008); Markku Kangaspuro and Samira Saramo (eds.), Victims and Survivors of Karelia, a special 
double issue of Journal of Finnish Studies, vol. 15, No. 1&2 (November, 2011). 
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of the immigrants versus the corruption and thievery of the native Russians, industry versus 
idleness, cleanliness versus dirt, organization versus chaos, self-assertion versus subjugation of 
the self, ultimately democracy versus tyranny.”26 These accounts lapse into simplistic 
determinism, which at times are racist and clearly demonstrate writers’ prejudice on the 
subject.27 In turn, Golubev and Takala’s work is a balanced account of migrants’ everyday 
experiences in this Soviet border region with a long history of cross-border contact and conflicts, 
characterized by the interconnectedness of local ethnicities, cultures, and bureaucracies.28  
So far, researchers in the field approached the Karelian fever from national and diasporic 
perspectives. Researchers in the west lament the exodus as a tragedy, while Russian academics 
note the invaluable contributions immigrants made to Soviet Karelian economy and culture. A 
common theme that unites all researchers is the question of the causes of migration. Were those 
immigrants ardent socialists given the fact that they chose the Soviet Union as their new home? 
Was Karelia’s proximity to Finland an important factor in immigrants’ decisions to move? Or 
was it the Great Depression in the west and the availability of work in the Soviet Union that 
made migration an attractive option for American and Canadian workers and their families? 
Although a balanced answer will account for the majority of historiographical versions, 
economic factors were most important in making several thousand immigrants relocate to a 
different country, continent, and live under an alternative form of political and economic 
governance.  
                                                
26 Nick Baron, “Constructing Immigrant Identities in Stalinist Russia” Explorations in Theory and Practice” 
Integraph: Journal of Dialogic Anthropology, Vol. 1, No. 3, 2000. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Golubev, Alexey and Irina Takala, The Search for a Socialist El Dorado: Finnish Immigration to Soviet Karelia 
from the United States and Canada in the 1930s. 
.	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Accounting for its causes, Lindstrom explains the Karelian fever primarily in economic29 
terms. She stresses that the Great Depression had severe economic and socio-political 
repercussions on the immigrant communities. In particular, it negatively affected those Finnish 
immigrants who arrived on the eve of the economic depression in the 1920s. Immigrants from 
this cohort were first to be laid off work and the last to get rehired.30 They were also the first to 
sail off to Karelia. The economic turmoil led to increased unemployment, poverty, nativist 
intolerance and, thus, a general sense of vulnerability and despair among new settlers.31 
Lindstrom concludes that by the early 1930s, driven by economic insecurities and persecuted by 
the state for association with communist organizations, many Canadian Finns found migration to 
Karelia an attractive change of scenery. 
Other writers emphasize ideological forces as the stimulus for the out migration. Mayme 
Sevander, who immigrated to Karelia with her parents at a young age, and whose father was one 
of the leading recruiters of American Finns to Karelia, has consistently stressed in her books that 
the ideology of utopian communism and North American Finnish roots in communist and 
socialist organizations were the primary factors that propelled the Karelian exodus. Essentially, 
Sevander suggests that Finns’ decisions to emigrate were dictated by the prospects of socialism 
in Karelia rather than by availability of gainful employment.32 In defense of her argument 
Sevander mentions several wealthy individuals, who despite their relative socio-economic 
                                                
29 On economic causes of migration see, Evgeny Efremkin, Карельский проект или карельская лихорадка? 
(‘Karelian Project or Karelian Fever’?), [Ученые записки Петрозаводского Государственого Университета] 
(Academic Notes of Petrozavodsk State University: Social Sciences and Humanities), N.3 (95) October 2008. The 
rise and decline of the Karelian fever coincided with the advent and passing of the Great Depression in North 
America. 
30 Varpu Lindstrom, “The Finnish Canadian Communities During the Decade of the Depression” in Karelian 
Exodus: Finnish Communities in North America and Soviet Karelia during the Depression Era, edited by Ronald 
Harpelle, Varpu Lindstrom and Alexis Pogorelskin, (Toronto: Aspasia Books, 2004), p. 17. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Mayme Sevander, Skitaltsi (Wanderers), (Petrazavodsk: PetrGU, 2006). 
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security in North America, nonetheless, opted for a new life in the first workers’ state.33 In her 
book Skitaltsi she attributes the Karelian fever to what she terms “ideological fanaticism.”34  
Oiva Saarinen, an expert on Finnish settlements in the Sudbury area in Northern Ontario, 
considers specific regional factors that accelerated the emigration flow. For example, Aato 
Pitkanen, the hero of Lindstrom’s Letters From Karelia project35, was impelled to leave by the 
alleged murder of two Canadian Finnish union leaders in Thunder Bay in 1929. Saarinen stresses 
that causes of the Karelian fever are to be found in the mixture of economic and ideological 
paradigms that affected Finnish Canadian workers. He suggests that Canadian Finns were not 
exposed to radicalism by simple communist or socialist agitation, but rather that radicalization 
occurred in response to the inhumane working condition these immigrants faced during the Great 
Depression.36 In other words, ideology served merely to reinforce and rationalize radicalism, 
otherwise created by harsh working conditions and fostered by the economic crisis.  
 Scholars in the field also tend to stress the centrality of culture and nationalism in the 
Karelian exodus. Susan Harris points out that those new Finnish immigrants were never able to 
understand the American concept of the individual vis-à-vis the group.37 Harris describes Finns 
as trees on a hill that stand separately, but whose roots are interwoven beneath the earth. In other 
words, writes Harris, “Finns as a people were more important than any individual within the 
group.”38 As a result, many Finns sensed that the American dream evaded them. Socialism and 
                                                
33 Ibid., pp. 46-47. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Directed by Kelly Saxberg Letters from Karelia, a documentary about an idealistic Finn who went to Soviet 
Karelia is based largely on Varpu Lindstrom’s research on the Karelian fever. 
36 Oiva Saarinen and Gerry Tapper, “Sudbury in the Great Depression: The Tumultuous Years” in Karelian Exodus: 
Finnish Communities in North America and Soviet Karelia during the Depression Era, edited by Ronald Harpelle, 
Varpu Lindstrom and Alexis Pogorelskin, (Toronto: Aspasia Books, 2004), p. 55. 
37 Susan Harris, Nilo’s Journey: Finnish American Migration to the Soviet Union in the 1930s, (M.A. Thesis, 
Norwich University, April 2000), p. 246. 
38 Ibid. 
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cultural group identity better fitted their needs. Finns felt rejected by America. At the same time, 
ethnic pride and national identity lay at the heart of invitation to Karelia. Karelia’s leaders, 
Edward Gylling and Kustaa Rovio made an offer that many North American Finns could not 
refuse.39 Irina Takala writes that for North American Finns Karelia was almost Finland, almost 
home. Thus, she suggests, “continuing the search for the lost paradise was utterly natural for 
those who had previously tried to find it but failed.”40 America simply could not replace the 
motherland, especially in times of economic crisis.41 
For Borje Vahamaki, North American Finns were driven to leave for Karelia for a 
multitude of reasons.42 Many left because of discrimination in the labor force and political 
persecution. Others were captivated by communist ideological fanaticism and strove to build a 
workers’ paradise in the Soviet Union. Yet others felt that the “land of opportunity” failed them, 
and they undertook a quest for their fortune elsewhere. Geographical and cultural proximity to 
Finland, as well as a share in the stocks of the first workers’ state were the factors that appealed 
to depression-stricken Canadian and American Finns.  
Alexis Pogorelskin points out that the Soviet executive decision to officially recruit North 
American Finns for labor and settlement in Karelia had a more profound impact on the patterns 
of migration than did any of the North American domestic push factors. Pogorelskin argues that 
three major groups were highly interested in recruiting North American Finns to work and settle 
in Karelia. First, there were Kremlin leaders who, following the launch of Stalin’s first Five-Year 
                                                
39 Susan Harris quotes Alexis Pogorelskin in Nilo’s Journey: Finnish American Migration to the Soviet Union in the 
1930s, p. 254. 
40 Irina Takala, “From the Frying Pan into the Fire: North American Finns in Soviet Karelia” in Karelian Exodus: 
Finnish Communities in North America and Soviet Karelia during the Depression Era, edited by Ronald Harpelle, 
Varpu Lindstrom and Alexis Pogorelskin, (Toronto: Aspasia Books, 2004), p. 109. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Borje Vahamaki, ‘Memoir Accounts of Finnish North Americans in Soviet Karelia in the 1930s’, in Irina Takala 
and Ilya Solomeshch (ed.), North American Finns in Soviet Karelia in the 1930s. Petrozavodsk: Petrozavodsk State 
University Press 2008. 
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Plan in 1928, sought to exploit Karelia’s lumber resources by bringing skilled workers into the 
republic. Second, there were the leaders of Karelia, Gylling and Rovio, who since the October 
Revolution tried to preserve Karelia chiefly Finnish in social and cultural forms.43 When the 
ethnic makeup of the republic was threatened with an influx of Russian speaking workers after 
1928, Gylling lobbied the Kremlin to recruit skilled Finnish workers from North America. He 
aimed to satisfy the Kremlin’s demands for rapid industrialization of Karelia and, at the same 
time, bolster Karelia’s Finnish heritage. Given the permission to bring in foreign workers, 
Gylling and Rovio employed Matti Tenhunen in the United States and John (Jussi) Latva in 
Canada to carry out the recruitment of North American Finns and arrange their transportation to 
Karelia.  
This third group had a largely financial motivation to send Canadians and Americans to 
the Soviet Union. Pogorelskin argues that Tenhunen and Latva treated the recruitment process as 
a business, i.e. they were the padrones of the Finnish immigrant communities. They made 
personal fortunes through the commissions they received for each recruited worker. Moreover, 
they allegedly misused workers’ collective funds, such as the Machine Fund, collected by 
emigrants for the industrialization of Karelia. In essence, Pogorelskin suggests that without the 
above mentioned interest groups and the particular political and economic developments within 
the Soviet Union, the Karelian Exodus would not have been possible.  
Writers such as Markku Kangaspuro and Peter Kivisto concentrate on the Soviet 
economy and politics in attempts to explain the Karelian exodus. Just like Pogorelskin, they 
                                                
43 Alexis Pogorelskin, “Communism and the Co-ops: Recruiting and Financing the Finnish-American Migration  to 
Karelia” in Karelian Exodus: Finnish Communities in North America and Soviet Karelia during the Depression Era, 
edited by Ronald Harpelle, Varpu Lindstrom and Alexis Pogorelskin, Toronto: Aspasia Books, 2004. 
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argue that the main impetus for migration came from the Soviet Union and Karelia in particular, 
rather than being generated as a spontaneous action in North America. Kivisto points out that the 
decision to emigrate was “carefully orchestrated by Soviet officials.”44 Kangaspuro argues that 
the “Karelian Project” would not have materialized without the approval from the Kremlin. In 
order to understand the Soviet decision to bring in foreign skilled workers, one must explore the 
tenures of Soviet economy Karelia’s national politics.  
Kangaspuro suggests the Soviet economic depression that occurred in 1927-1928 resulted 
in fractured relations between Soviet authorities in Moscow and the peripheral autonomous 
regions such as Karelia. Moscow began to undermine Karelia’s autonomy in 1927 when it took 
over the timber company Karelles, the largest trust of Karelia’s government.45 By 1930, 
Karelia’s budgetary autonomy was already non-existent, although politically Karelia’s governors 
still wielded considerable power. Moscow’s intention to centralize economy and governance 
reflected a common pattern in Russian/Soviet history in times of crisis.46 Consolidation of 
economic and political authority began in 1927-1928 with the Five-Year Plan; in the process it 
was used by Moscow to accuse republics in separatism in the mid-1930s. Such an approach 
eventually led to the cleansing of the Karelian state apparatus and to the political persecution of 
Karelia’s Finnish population. 
The Soviet depression resulted in labor shortages and hunger waves. Karelia's economy 
was not in a condition to meet the industrial quotas set by the Five-Year Plan. According to 
                                                
44 Peter Kivisto and Mika Roinila, “Reaction to Departure: The Finnish American Community Responds to 
“Karelian Fever”  in Irina Takala and Ilya Solomeshch (ed.), North American Finns in Soviet Karelia in the 1930s. 
Petrozavodsk: Petrozavodsk State University Press 2008. 
45 Markku Kangaspuro, “The Soviet Depression and Finnish Immigrants in Soviet Karelia” in Karelian Exodus: 
Finnish Communities in North America and Soviet Karelia during the Depression Era, edited by Ronald Harpelle, 
Varpu Lindstrom and Alexis Pogorelskin, (Toronto: Aspasia Books, 2004), p. 133. 
46 Ibid. 
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Moscow’s calculations, Karelia had to employ 101,000 seasonal workers by 1931 to meet the 
production requirements.47 Gylling argued that 15,000 skilled permanent workers could be as 
efficient as 101,000 seasonal workers demanded by Moscow.48 For these reasons, although not 
for these reasons alone, Gylling lobbied Moscow, and Moscow agreed for a plan to bring 10,000 
skilled workers from North America.  
Alternative Modernities 
 Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the advent of globalization, scholars had 
shifted the focus from the discussion of modernity – a singular universal model of western 
development – to debates about alternative modernities, the non-western reaction to modern 
forces of industrialization and urbanization. Modernity spans the entire symbolic, political, and 
economic universe; it is about the relationship between power, society and the subject. With the 
advent of industrialization, and agricultural and political revolutions, which rocked Europe in the 
17th and 18th centuries, a period of construction of “modern” states was underway. In the process, 
fundamentally changed was the relationship between the state and the person, where the state 
aimed to make its people into subjects.49 New modern institutions of power were erected and, in 
part, they aimed to discipline the population, in the process cultivating a productive labor force. 
Through education and cultural enlightenment the modern state strove to create the kind of 
subject that internalizes and appropriates values, norms, and perspectives of power, which in turn 
takes on the function of subject formation. 
 The concept of alternative modernities emerged in reaction to western capitalist 
modernity. It implies with it different conceptions of ideologies and frameworks of thinking; all 
                                                
47 Ibid., p. 135. 
48 Ibid. 
49 See Michel Foucault on “subjectification”, and Karl Marx on “false consciousness.”  
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related to the question of what the modern state and the modern subject should look like. 
Without question, all political modernities, namely the rule by modern institutions of the state, 
bureaucracies, and capitalist enterprise, have their roots in the intellectual and theological 
traditions of Europe.50 Although classical theorists of modernization – Marx, Webber, Durkheim 
– predicted that one type of modernity would engulf the rest of the world, this turned out to be 
not the case.51 Authors such as Francis Fukuyama systematically contribute to the discourse of 
capitalist modernity as an inescapable conceptional option before humanity. In an infamous 1989 
essay “The end of History?” he argued that the “triumph of the west, of the western idea, is 
evident first of all in the total exhaustion of viable systematic alternatives to Western 
liberalism.”52 Cultural analysis however, has demonstrated that while modernity was diffused 
from the west, usually by ways of colonization and imperialism, new forms of modernity 
developed around the world, typically predicated on specific local contexts.  
The advent of alternative modernities into the study of Soviet history prompted many to 
interrogate the received intellectual constructs such as modernity.53 Historians began to question 
the ways different societies responded to industrialization and urbanization by looking at key 
elements such as forms of expertise, material and institutional apparatuses, norms, values, and 
different forms of labor organization. A cultural approach to modernity also allowed the 
examination of local agency, and the way it appropriated, adapted and transformed differing 
forms of political and socio-economic modernity.54 The presence of North American Finns in the 
                                                
50 See Samuel N. Eisenstadt, “Multiple Modernities,” Daedalus, Winter 2000; 129, 1. 
51 Eisenstadt argues that the progress of modernization revealed that “modernity” could not be equated to 
“westernization” or “Europeanization.”  
52 See Francis Fukuyama, “The end of History?” The National Interest, Summer 1989.  
53 See Mkhia Harbans, “Alternatives to Modernity or Multiple Modernities – what else?” Pakistan Perspectives 
July-Dec: 1-10. 
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Soviet Union presents an opportunity, as we will see, to study the convergent points of 
alternative modernities, as embodied and expressed by immigrants themselves on the move 
across national boundaries.   
As Michael David-Fox notes, the discussion around alternative modernities divided the 
English-language Soviet and Russian historians in the west into two camps and dominates the 
historiographical discussion in the field.55 While both the “modernity group,” espoused by the 
likes of Stephen Kotkin and David Hoffman, and the “neo-traditionalists”, led by Sheila 
Fitzpatrick, agree that the Soviet Union presented an alternative form of modernity, the latter 
group rejects comparison between liberalism and communism.56 Discussion of any type of 
Soviet modernity implies a discussion of a “shared modernity” with the west, which neo-
traditionalists deny. There was nothing shared according to them, as it was distinctive – Stalinist. 
The “modernity group,” on the other hand, is convinced of the shared characteristics between 
western and soviet modernities. In some way neo-traditionalists espouse a certain parallel of a 
sonderweg thesis in German Historiography – applicable to Russian history it is the osobiy put’ 
(a special path) historical development.57 
In the west modernity was at the center of social scientific research throughout the cold 
war. Since the 1990s, academics have also begun to grapple with the concept of alternative 
modernities, and its significance in western modern history. Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, a renowned 
                                                
55 Michael David-Fox, “Multiple Modernities vs. Neo-Traditionalism: On Recent Debates in Russian and Soviet 
History,” Jahrbucher fur Geschichte Osteuropasm, Bd. 54. H. 4. 2006. 
56 For discussion of Soviet modernity see, David Hoffman, Stalinist Values: The Cultural Norms of Soviet 
Modernity, 1917-1941. Cornell University Press, 2003; Stephen Kotkin, “Modern Times: The Soviet Union and the 
Interwar Conjuncture,” Kritika Explorations in Russian and Euroasian History 2 (2001) No. 1, pp. 111-164; Sheila 
Fitzpatrick, “Introduction,” Stalinism: New Directions. Ed Sheila Fitzpatrick. New York: Routledge, 2000; Peter 
Holquist, “State Violence as Technique: the Logic of Violence in Soviet Totalitarianism,” Amir Weiner ed., 
Modernity and Population Management, (Stanford University Press, 2003), pp. 19-45.   
57 Michael David-Fox, “Multiple Modernities vs. Neo-Traditionalism: On Recent Debates in Russian and Soviet 
History.” 
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American sociologist and anthropologist is often credited with coining the term in the late 1980s. 
Since the publication of “Early Modernities” and “Multiple Modernities” in Daedalus in 1998 
and 2000 respectively, the term multiple, the alternative, and entangling modernities spread all 
across the social sciences.58 In general, the alternative modernity paradigm counterpoises Francis 
Fukuyama’s concept of the “end of history” and is at odds with the modernization literature of 
the postwar era which equated modernization with westernization and Europeanization. 
However, although proponents of alternative modernities conceptual frameworks argue that it 
allows one to understand the contemporary world as a story of “continual development and 
formation, constitution and reconstitution of multiple, changing and often contested and 
conflicted modernities,”59 many historians in fact tend to slide back into grand national 
narratives, masking extreme forms of cultural relativism in alternative modernity language.  
 For example, in a collection of articles of the edited 2002 volume Globality and Multiple 
Modernities: Comparative North American and Latin American Perspectives, scholars came 
together to adapt the discussion of alternative, or multiple modernities to the Americas. In the 
end result, most of the alternative modernities described in the volume become nationally 
oriented, although the editors suggest this to be merely a coincidence. According to Dougals 
Francis for example, for Harold Innis, the nation, civilization, and modernity were essentially all 
the same: 
This essay explores the ideas of Harold Innis only, looking at his ideas on 
modernity and civilization through an analysis of his views on how Canada 
evolved within Western civilization and yet emerged, as he believed, with its own 
version of that civilization – what Innis referred to as a “Canadian civilization,” 
                                                
58 See Daedalus. Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences 129-1 (2000): Mutliple Modernities; 
Daedalus. Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences 127-3 (1998): Early Modernities. 
59 Shmuel Eisenstadt, Jens Riedel and Dominic Sachsenmaier, “The Context of the Multiple Modernities Paradigm,” 
Reflections on Multiple Modernities: European, Chinese and Other Interpretations, eds Dominic Sachsenmaier and 
Jens Riedel, (Boston: Brill, 2002), p, 2. 
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one that was different not only from the European but also from the American 
version of civilization.60 
 
The reconstitution of the national building school is also accompanied by the 
reconfiguration of history from above. As Louis Roniger and Carlos Waisman note in the 
aforementioned volume: “the social models and transformation institutionalized in these regions 
were the direct result of explicit political and intellectual [my italics] projects carried out by the 
intellectual and political [my italics] elite. These trends shaped the distinct institutional patterns 
that set out American societies apart from each other and from the metropolis in relation to 
which they constructed their early identities.”61 This is not far off from the history of the great 
men approach. The role of the masses, agency, and many other key elements established in the 
field of bottom-up social history of the 1970s and the 1980s is seemingly brushed aside. Ignored 
are the unintended consequences of the grand plans of the political and intellectual elites, the in-
betweeness, and the dialectical relationships between the actions of the elites and the masses.  
 While the multiple modernities paradigm provides social scientists with an indispensible 
framework to analyze the points of convergence in modern history, the addition of a 
transnational approach to multiple modernitites will allow researchers to stay away from 
returning to the archaic ways of considering national history as the epitome of the past, the 
present, and the future. There are detectable links between the debates about alternative 
modernities in Soviet historiography and the discussion of multiple modernities in the Americas’ 
context. Indeed, writers, such as Douglas Francis, Louis Roniger, and several other contributors 
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to this new field may be labeled neo-traditionalists who see the United States, English Canada, 
Quebec, Brazil, etc. as having their own osobiy put’ to modernity. We in fact may be witnessing 
the re-affirmation of sonderwegs, staple theses, frontier theses, and the advent of new special 
paths to nationally oriented historiographies. 
 The present study considers alternative modernities as conditioned by radically different 
economic and political ideologies, and the entangling relations between them made possible by 
the transnational movement of information and human capital. Mary Nolan for example has 
demonstrated that Weimarian Germany played with the ideas of adopting both Americanism and 
Soviet models.62 One was not exclusionary of the other as it might have seemed. Nolan shows 
that for many politicians in Germany, Americanism offered technological and organizational 
innovations that were considered compatible with socialism. If modernities, as the present study 
tries to argue, were in fact entangling in their connections between Canada, the United States, 
and the Soviet Union, then the concept of alternative modernitites – as alternative forms of 
economic and political governance, rather than as thinly veiled culturally conditioned differences 
between nations such as the United States and Canada – must also be placed at the center of 
contemporary debates in Canadian history.  
There are numerous studies on the structural changes inflicted on societies and nations 
from above as a result of the importation of foreign experience and technology. For example, 
Marc Raeff analyzed the way the Petrin state in the 18th century imported 17th century central 
European cameralism – the German science of administration into Russia.63 On the other hand, 
                                                
62 See, Mary Nolan, Visions of Modernity: American Business and the Modernization of Germany. Oxford 
University Press, 1994.  
63 See Marc Raeff, “The Well-Ordered Police State and the Development of Modernity in Seventeenth- and 
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there are very few studies64 that concentrate on the structural changes immigrants inflicted on 
societies from below, or from the “side”. North American Finnish immigrant experience on both 
sides of the Atlantic forms the foundation for the present transnational paradigm approach to the 
study of entangling, or converging modernities. The movement of migrants between differing 
modernities brought significant changes to both societies. Immigrants in this way become the 
protagonists in the story of entangled modernities.  
The fact that migrants, as agents of one particular modernity, could profoundly shape 
entire socio-economic and political discourses of another body politic, in many ways empowers 
the individual migrant as an agent in history. North American Finns enjoyed a privileged status 
in the Soviet Union throughout the 1920s and the first part of the 1930s primarily as a result of 
Soviet leaders’ propensity to import the best features of bourgeois modernity to industrialize the 
agrarian state and enlighten Lenin’s “semi-Asiatic” masses. However, by the mid-1930s, when 
Soviet socialism and the Soviet culture were declared superior,65 North American Finns’ fortunes 
reversed, and during the purges “those previously treasured foreign contacts generated waves of 
xenophobic terror and mass physical annihilation.”66 The rejection of certain elements of western 
modernity partially accounts for the demise of the North American Finnish communities in 
Soviet Karelia by the late 1930s – the point where the present story ends.  
 
 
                                                
64 For an example of an alternative account of Canadian history see Dirk Hoerder, Creating Societies: Immigrant 
Lives in Canada, McGill University Press, 2000. This work is most important in the way it deconstructs the 
Canadian myth of a dichotomy between national unity and ethnic diversity. Instead, Hoerder emphasizes the long-
standing complex relationship and interaction between members of different ethnic groups in Canada. 
65 Michael David-Fox, “Multiple Modernities vs. Neo-Traditionalism: On Recent Debates in Russian and Soviet 
History.” 
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Migration and Modernity 
Migration is a fundamental process that shapes human communities, social structures, 
and polities. It diffuses material, spiritual, political, social and economic culture wherever, 
whenever and whoever it comes in contact with.67 Globalization and migration are 
interdependent phenomena. Migration of human capital and experience began several centuries 
ago; however in the context of migration and modernities, we could signal the 18th century as the 
start of modern globalization. We in fact can explain this modern globalization, which partially 
resulted from recent transnational and transoceanic migration of human capital and experience, 
in terms of multiplicity of its modernities.68 Globalization then can be seen as a process of a 
diffusion of western modernities and its encounters and its dialogue with its alternative forms. In 
other words, modernity is diffused by migration of human capital, ideas and experience, is in 
turn adapted and recreated in the local context. The effect of migration on modernities brings to 
the fore the question of the local versus the global, of the fluid interaction between the two, of 
the process of localization and hybridization, which in turn produce new forms of social 
relations. The Soviet experiment is indeed a distinct moment in the history of modernity and is 
perhaps the best case study for alternative modernity.  
 Although Soviet history, in particular under Stalin, is usually considered an anomaly in 
the history of the western world, on a par with that of Hitler’s Germany, there are too many 
similarities between western capitalist modernity and socialist soviet modernity. Historiographies 
using solely national frameworks are impotent to explain trends both local and global, aside the 
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context of international relations. They are also futile when it comes to the analysis of different 
frameworks of modernitites, and the way alternative ways of thinking shape and reshape 
alternative global societies. Alternative modernitites help us to explain forms of social and 
cultural organization whose ambition is to transcend the boundaries of the nation state.69 The 
present study aims to demonstrate the way local and global are interconnected, often to a degree 
where separation is impossible. The local no longer can be discarded, and its dialogue with 
modernity is in fact what constitutes alternative modernitites. As Roland Robertson suggests, the 
term “glocalization” better depicts the relationship between the local and the global as one of 
interaction and interrelation. It makes no sense to define the global as if it excludes the local.70 
 Interrelation between the local and the global is then best exemplified through the process 
of migration and is so diverse and intense that it becomes difficult to pinpoint agency to 
individual actors, who become both subjects and objects of multiple modernities.71 In the process 
of migration, actors find themselves in between states and modernities, or “in between the 
positives by which subjectivity is normally constituted.”72 Migration process is the inbetweeness 
moment in the history of identity of actors, the diapsora, and the state, where all three are 
constituted and reconstituted through the process of adoption, adaptation, and reformulation. The 
movement of people thus affects the formation of diasporas, states, and modernities. To better 
understand the processes that underline the formations and practices of modern day states and 
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diasporas, one must make sense of the movement of human capital and experience across 
national borders.  
On the Move: Finnish Migrants in Transnational Currents 
 
Contemporary transnational theory holds that transmigration is a recent phenomenon 
dating back to the 1980s. It involves an ongoing transnational movement, made possible by the 
rapid improvements in communication and transportation over the past several decades, where 
the forces of globalization are undermining the powers of the nation state. The theory relegates 
old patterns of migration to a type of directed movement with a point of departure and point of 
destination. Several scholars, however, have convincingly demonstrated that transnationalism is 
not a novel phenomenon and has historical precedents.73 In tandem with these findings, my study 
orbits around a group of migrants who in the first three decades of the 20th century continuously 
moved between Finland, Canada, the United States, and the Soviet Union. The fact that this 
movement was transnational explains the absence of its comprehensive story from the annals of 
North American and European national historiographies.  
Between the 1860s and the 1920s approximately 375,000 Finns migrated to the United 
States (315,000) and Canada (60,000).74 A the turn of the 20th century, Finnish economic 
development caught between its traditional agricultural economy, demographic metamorphosis, 
and the advent of industrial capitalism, destabilized long established social structures. Nearly 70 
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percent of Finland’s population at the time still made their living through agriculture.75  
Furthermore, between 1810 and 1870, the population of the Grand Duchy of Finland had 
doubled, from 863,000 to 1,770,000.76 The rise in production of cash crops for the market rather 
than for subsistence, coupled with outdated legislation that demanded the land not be divided 
among children, made migration from rural areas to towns and cities in Finland and abroad 
inevitable. Economic fluctuations on global, regional and local scales, coupled with initiatives in 
the United States and Canada to recruit labor and populate its uninhabited lands, resulted in a 
mass transatlantic movement of Finnish farmers and workers to North America. Initially, few 
migrants intended to stay and, as sojourners in the classical sense, intended to return to Finland. 
However, for a myriad of reasons, including marriage, job security, availability of land, inability 
to pay for a return trip, familial ties, or fearing the embarrassment of return, many chose to settle 
in North America.  
Celebratory narratives – those of acculturation, adaptation and assimilation – have long 
been practiced by Canadian and Finnish-Canadian historians. Although written from “below”, 
these works, in sync with the larger trends in North American social and cultural history, were 
still composed within national, and by the virtue of the topic, also diasporic frameworks. Spurred 
by the official policy of multiculturalism researchers, with an agenda to give ethnic minorities a 
‘proper’ place, or a third voice within the official bi-cultural and bi-lingual national paradigm, 
celebrated, and in the process constructed the histories and identities of ethnic communities in 
Canada. However, as Roberto Perin writes, “the reality of immigrant experiences is far from the 
celebration of ethnic revivalists, or governments’ new cultural policies based on such intangibles 
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as subjective perceptions, private preferences, or the importation of metropolitan cultures.”77 
Communities were far from static, as people came and left. As a result, the application of fixed 
identities, whether national or diasporic, to the analysis of the spatial process of transition, can 
lead to erroneous assumptions and conclusions. On the contrary, the heterogeneity of identity, 
generated by transnational and transcultural contact, makes it possible to analyze societies and 
groups in flux, and thus reveals the process of their social construction.     
The term immigration assumes a static state of affairs. At the same time, return 
movements have been ignored by most historians because they fall outside the parameters of 
national historiographies. Going home is considered an “anti-progressive, illogical and illusory” 
practice and is depicted by researchers as “unproblematic and natural insertion of migrants into 
‘home countries’”.78 Between 1870 and 1930 approximately 60,000 American-Finns and 13,000 
Canadian Finns returned to Finland.79 Their movement is automatically canonized by researchers 
as return migration, dismissed in the process as either a failed North American venture, or as a 
triumphalist return to the homeland. In the same time period about 7000 North American Finns 
migrated to the Soviet Union. All these numbers however are static and not indicative of the 
constant movement that characterized immigrant lives in this period. One can read these figures 
in a different way: out of 375,000 immigrants to the United States and Canada, at least 81,000 
(21.6%) crossed international borders again, and this is without taking into consideration the 
internal migration within North America and the Soviet Union.  
A collection of archives assembled on both sides of the Atlantic reveals a perpetual 
transnational movement of Finnish labor throughout the 1920s and the 1930s. For example, 
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Finns who arrived to work at the railroads in Ohio eventually migrated to work in Ontario’s 
mines, and subsequently to the forest camps of Northern Ontario and Michigan.80 In the 1920s 
August Aalto traveled through most of the U.S., and then migrated to Karelia in 1933, only to go 
back to Finland in 1934.81 Toivo Meronen was born in Finland in 1897. In 1927, he arrived in 
Canada, and remained there until 1931, when swept up by the Karelian fever he found himself in 
the Soviet Union in 1931. In 1932 he left Karelia for Sweden and from there to Finland, where 
he remained until 1937, when he departed for New York, where he stayed until he crossed the 
border to Canada in 1938.82   
National historiographies have little room to incorporate actors who leave the political 
contours of the nation-state. Unless of course they are members of the charter groups who are on 
the move.83 In this study I look at a transnational movement between North America and Europe 
throughout the first part of the 20th century, and examine the way migrants’ identities were 
dialectically constituted, negotiated, shaped, and reshaped by coming into direct and indirect 
contact with diasporic and national imagined communities. Migrants’ identity became a terrain 
where national and diasporic imaginaries were constructed to consolidate and maintain the 
physical and psychological domains of the nation-state and the diaspora – its political and 
cultural borders.  
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Sources  
In addition to an extensive literature review required for such an undertaking, my analysis 
is based on a close reading and evaluation of quantitative and qualitative data extrapolated from 
Canadian, American, Finnish, and recently opened Russian archives. The present work has made 
the most of the available sources, some of which have previously been untouched by historians. 
For example, I have examined lists of all North American Finns who were recorded upon 
arriving in Karelia in the first part of the 1930s. Based on Karelia’s Resettlement Agency 
records, and the lists compiled by Eila Lahti Argutina,84 I have produced an extensive statistical 
analysis of the immigrants’ gender, age, marital status, place of origin, profession, and work 
location in Karelia.85 In addition, examination of the transatlantic ships manifests (passenger 
lists) paints a picture of the scope of North American Finnish mobility throughout the 1930s. The 
manifests also allow us to glimpse the operations of border officials at Canadian entry ports. 
Their scribbling on the lists, where they indicated who was to be detained, or if the form was 
completed improperly provides a rich ground for analysis. What the border agents saw as proper 
and improper does not necessarily reflect the government’s policy at the time, but rather the way 
that immigrants and different segments of the population were represented by the state in the 
dominant discourse. Similarly, registries of the returning migrants coupled with the records of 
the arrested and executed in the Great Purge, and its comparison to the lists of immigrants who 
                                                
84 An investigative journalist, Argutina collected the names of North American Finns departing to Karelia from 
Finnish-Canadian and Finnish-American newspapers. The lists are stored in the Varpu Lindstrom Archives in Clara 
Thompson Archives at York University. 
85 See Evgeny Efremkin, “Recruitment in North America: An Analysis of Emigrants to Soviet Karelia”, Victims and 
Survivors of Karelia, ed. Markku Kangaspuro and Samira Saramo, Special Double Issue of the Journal of Finnish 
Studies 15 (2011): 103-126; Evgeny Efremkin, Переселение североамериканских финнов в Советскую Карелию 
в 1930-1933 годах: статистический анализ [Resettlement of North American Finns in Soviet Karelia 1930-1933, 
Statistical Analysis] Труды Карельского научного центра РАН № 6. 2011. С. 97–105 (Proceedings of Karelian 
Research Centre of Russian Academy of Sciences). 
30	  
	  
arrived in Karelia in the early 1930s, offer an array of possibilities for demographic analysis of 
those who arrived, departed, were arrested, were executed, or survived.  
The compilation of qualitative sources includes interviews with survivors, immigrant 
memoirs, letter collections; Finnish-Canadian and Finnish-American, mainstream Canadian, 
Canadian communist, and Soviet Karelian newspapers, records of the Finnish Organization of 
Canada (FOC), minutes of the Communist Party of Canada (CPC) meetings, correspondence 
between leaders of the CPC and Karelian representatives in North America, Royal Canadian 
Mounted Police (RCMP) reports and notes, minutes of the presidium of the All Union 
Communist Party (Bolsheviks) (VKP (b)), resolutions of the Council of People’s Commissars 
(SNK) of the VKP (b), minutes of the meetings of the SNK of the Russian Soviet Federative 
Socialist Republic (RSFSR), reports and memos of the State Political Directorate of the 
Autonomous Karelian Soviet Socialist Republic (AKSSR), reports and notes of the Soviet 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, correspondence between SNK VKP (b) and SNK AKSSR, and 
technical literature on North American Finns published in the 1930s by Soviet experts. This 
array of sources allows me to engage critically with the experiences of North American Finnish 
migrants in North America and the Soviet Union from the official perspectives – as recorded and 
documented by national, regional and local organizations and institutions. On the other hand, 
interview compilations, memoirs, and letter collections offer a projection of immigrants’ gaze on 
the story. The North American Finns who migrated to Karelia in the early 1930s serve as the 
main focus of this study. Analysis of the group’s demographics, their physical movement across 
national borders, psychological contact fostered through correspondence, and everyday life 
experiences are central to the present narrative.  The study also investigates the actions and 
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responses of national, regional, and local symbolic elites on both sides of the Atlantic to 
migrants’ movement within and between national borders. 
Research material for this project was gathered from a wide range of sources. One of the 
difficulties for my investigation was my lack of knowledge of the Finnish language. I was able to 
bypass this problem in several ways. First, Varpu Lindstrom, an expert on the Karelian Exodus, 
presented me with translations of piles of articles from the Vapaus (a Finnish-Canadian 
newspaper), documents from the reports of the Finnish Organization of Canada (FOC), and 
letters sent from Karelia back to the continent. In addition to these translations, Lindstrom herself 
was a rich source, replying to my questions on Finnish language, culture, and social life. Second, 
Samira Saramo of Lakehead University, Alexei Golubev of the University of British Columbia 
(who previously taught at the Petrozavodsk State University), and Professor Irina Takala of the 
Petrozavodsk State University generously offered their help with the translation of numerous 
documents, including government records, immigrant letters, and immigrant interviews. Finally, 
I have secured the translation of other important documents, for example, the extensive 
correspondence between the Karelian recruiters in North America with Karelian authorities and 
representatives of the FOC.  
 Whereas lack of proficiency in the Finnish language stalled my research on several 
occasions, my Russian language skills allowed me to navigate archival waters where many 
Finnish American and Finnish Canadian scholars would have been lost. At the Archives of 
Ontario in Toronto I was able to examine CPC documents seized by the RCMP in 1931 for the 
arrests and trials of Canadian communist leaders. These documents point to the financial and 
political relationship between the CPC, the VKP (b) and the Comintern, and between the CPC 
and the FOC. At the National Archives in Ottawa I had the opportunity to examine Comintern 
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archives.86 The series consists of records created by the CPC, by its various agencies, 
organizations and units. These records deal with matters pertaining to development in Canada 
and also reflect on the relationship between the CPC and the Comintern. The documents, most of 
which are in Russian, include correspondence, minutes, reports, proceedings, conference 
materials, circulars and appeals, membership records, and financial records. These records 
allowed me to develop new insights into the dynamics of the Karelian Exodus. Finally, I was 
fortunate to have access to invaluable records found at the archives in Petrozavodsk, Karelia’s 
capital.  These collections are extensive in their scope. They include detailed lists of arriving 
Canadian and American immigrants in Soviet Karelia, documents pertaining to the places of 
employment of Canadian and American Finns, lists of those who returned to North America, lists 
of those who were arrested, imprisoned, and executed, minutes of the local communist cells 
where Canadian and American Finns lived in large numbers, correspondence between Karelian 
leaders and the central authorities in Moscow, records of the ministries of internal and external 
affairs, and the list goes on. For the most part in the past seven years I was trying to get my 
hands on any material that had anything remotely to do with the Karelian fever.  
Methodology 
The thesis aims to fill gaps in the historiographies but not through a structuralist-
comparative approach between immigrant experience in North America and the Soviet Union. 
Instead, subscribing to post-modern theories of social constructionism, and transnationalism, it 
offers a multifaceted interpretation of sources based on a variety of perspectives. It exhibits 
immigrant identities shifting in relation to certain variables, depending on the authors and the 
origin of the sources. In turn, the conceptual framework which allows the examination of such a 
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diverse range of sources is transnationalism and the parallel dismissal of national building school 
theoretical approaches. Narratives are identities. To decipher the process of identity formation of 
individuals, diasporas, and nations, is to tell their story. This study seeks to understand how and 
why North American Finns were courted or rejected by different institutions, governments, and 
organizations. How were their experiences/narratives/identities appropriated or discarded in the 
process of national and diasporic identity formation?  
The present work is preoccupied with themes of modernization of society and 
nationalism, relentlessly researched by Ernest Gellner, Eric Hobsbawm, Terence Ranger, 
Benedict Anderson, and Grigor Suny. Anderson, for example has convincingly demonstrated that 
through the facility of literacy, mass media and improved methods of communication, symbolic 
elites managed to infuse commonly shared values, beliefs, norms, and identities, despite the 
contradictory internal divisions (along the lines of ethnicity, religion, class and gender) within 
the assumed national entities.87 Suny similarly persuasively applied this theoretical method to the 
study of national formation in the Soviet Union’s constituent republics.88 He argues that the 
Soviet government artificially created some of the union’s constituent republics in the attempt to 
keep the Soviet state intact.  
To complement the nation-state building process outlined by these historians, this effort 
also draws on the works of Michel Foucault and Antonio Gramsci. I use the Foucauldian concept 
of governmentality and its emphasis on the population as an object of governance to explain the 
processes of national identity formation in Canada and the Soviet Union. The bureaucratization 
of these fast modernizing societies allowed governments to observe, evaluate, document and 
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classify their populations. The production of knowledge, argued Foucault, and its association 
with power, produced subjects who embodied dominant discourses through organized practices, 
such as mentalities, rationalities and techniques. The dominant discourses in turn channel the 
ideologies shared by the ruling elite. In Gramsci’s opinion, the prevailing worldview becomes 
the dominant ideology and perpetuates the social, cultural and political status quo. His theory of 
cultural hegemony explains that cultural norms in a society are dictated by the symbolic elites, 
and must not be considered natural or inevitable, but distinguished as artificial social constructs. 
The media and the education system, for example, are among the most potent instruments that 
allow consistent propagation of the received ideas.  
 The investigation of national and diasporic identity formation is undertaken through the 
prism of transnationalism – the economic, political, social and cultural interconnectedness 
fostered by migrants through an international movement of bodies, capital, ideas, and experience. 
As Rainer Baubok suggests, transnational life existed for a long time but was not seen as such. 
Thus the transnational lens provides a new analytical framework to evaluate what has not been 
seen before.89 Migrations of individuals belonging to national and diasporic entities comprise 
heterogeneous groups of people with diverse personal and social characteristics. The uncovering 
of the process of the homogenization of these diversities is the principal aim of the present 
investigation. Imagined community construction – the mobilization of migrants’ experiences 
under national, ethnic or ideological banners – is achieved through psychological and physical 
exchange within but also across national borders.  
 Pioneered in the early 1990s by Nina Click-Schiller, Linda Basch, and Cristina Szanton-
Blanc, immigrant transnationalism allows the study of the dialectical process of identity 
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formation: first, as influenced by hegemonic processes of social construction and classification 
of immigrants according to race, ethnicity, and gender; second, the way immigrants transform 
these social constructions through response and resistance strategies, in the process altering 
collective identities and conceptions of citizenship.90 As transmigrants embody new meanings 
and forms of representations in one society, they transmit and contribute to hegemonic social 
constructions in other places to which they physically or psychological “belong”. In other words, 
immigrants have all the tools necessary to fundamentally transform societies with which they 
come into contact. 
Terminology 
 Some of the terms used in this work warrant definition and contextualization. Discourse, 
a term used extensively throughout the dissertation, can be defined as a system of thoughts that 
systematically constructs the subject of which they speak, and is the site where social 
construction takes place. It informs social practices and defines the social world. While discourse 
can be understood as a dialogue articulated in written, spoken and symbolic forms (i.e. texts, 
language, policies and practice), it is also dominant because of its connection to the symbolic 
elites and its power to be ‘heard’ and ‘seen’ in the society.91  As Van Dijk put it  
It is the symbolic elite and its discourses that control the types of discourses, the topics, 
the types and the amount of information, the selection of censoring of arguments, and the 
nature of rhetorical operations. These conditions essentially determine the contents and 
the organization of public knowledge, the hierarchies of beliefs, and the pervasiveness of 
the consensus, which in turn are potent factors in the formation and reproduction of 
opinions, attitudes, and ideologies.92  
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Social reality then is contextual, historically produced through discourses, whose main aim is the 
legitimization of power and the formulation of some universal truths to sustain the dominance of 
the symbolic elites. As Michel Foucault suggested, power and knowledge (discourse production) 
are interrelated and form the basic foundation of human relationship – struggle and negotiation 
for power.93  
 The idioms of ethnicity and nationality in my work are almost interchangeable. My 
understanding of these concepts is informed by the social constructionist strand of 
postmodernism. Both ethnicity and nationality are unending building projects of worldviews by a 
group of individuals in a dialectical relationship with the society. Fredrick Barth and Max 
Weber94, in contrast to primordialist theories of ethnicity that stressed the universal existence to 
ethnic identity, came to demonstrate that ethnicity was socially constructed, and perpetually 
negotiated and renegotiated by external forces and self-identification. The fundamental element 
in the process of ethnic construction is the process of exclusion and incorporation in a perpetual 
process of mobility and contact between ethnic groups.    
 The main difference between the two terms is that nationality is a more crystallized and 
institutionalized version of ethnicity. Both are supported by mythology, religion, ideology, and 
philosophy, and subjectively internalized by upbringing and education to become part of the 
identity of social citizens. Eric Hobsbawm95 and Benedict Anderson have convincingly argued 
that ethnicity and nationalism (the notion of ethnic pride) are modern inventions and that prior to 
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the emergence of modern nation-states in the 18th and 19th centuries, ethnic homogeneity was not 
a pre-requisite in forging large-scale societies. “Nation is not a fixed, tangible entity” writes 
Anderson, “but a mental construct that is continuously defined and redefined.”96 While the term 
nationality can denote a legal relationship between a person and the state, national identity 
however can also symbolize a person’s subjective sense of belonging to a national entity.  
 Imagined community, a term coined by Anderson, refers to a process of cultural 
construction of a nation. Although members of the community will likely never meet each other, 
they nonetheless bask in the same national identity and share common interests, language and 
symbols, which were fortified through means of mass communication.97 The ability of the 
symbolic elite to control the means of communication and engage in the manufacturing of public 
opinion is the driving force behind imagined community building. Although the term was coined 
to denote the process of national construction, in this work I utilize it to denote the social 
construction of ethnic identities within and between national entities.  
 The term alternative modernities refers to the way different societies responded to the 
processes of industrialization, urbanization, secularization, rationalization, all of which fostered 
new forms of labor and social relations. The term modernity is also closely associated with the 
construction of modern nation states in Europe in the 17th and 18th centuries, which brought a 
fundamental change in the relationship between the state and the individual. New modern 
institutions of power (i.e. schools, bureaucracies) strove to discipline the population in order to 
cultivate a productive labor force. One of the main functions of the modern state became subject 
formation – the kind of subjects that internalized and appropriated values, norms, and 
perspectives of power. The present work analyzes migrant movement between two, at times 
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radically different, conceptions of modernity – western capitalism and Soviet socialism. Soviet 
modernity implied different ideas about industrial discipline and labor organization, as well as 
diverse conceptions of ideologies and frameworks of thinking, related to the question of what the 
modern state and the modern subject should look. As a result, migrants in this study are analyzed 
within, but also at the intersection of, nation-states, diasporic entities, and modernities. 
Finally, it should be noted that terms immigrant, emigrant, migrant, and transmigrant 
have different meanings. While immigrants and emigrants are familiar figures in the 
methodological national narratives, migrants are those who make up migration chains that 
include both immigration and emigration as one continuous international process. As for 
transnational migrants, they are those who maintain interconnections through physical and 
psychological communication across national borders. I use all these terms depending on the 
situation and author of the sources. The same individual can be labeled immigrant, emigrant, 
migrant, or transmigrant in differing contexts, places, and times.  
Outline  
 The first chapter, “A Re-Imagined Community”, looks at the involvement of the 
symbolic elites, or “active” elements in the left-wing North American Finnish communities, in 
persuading the rank and file, the “passive” elements, to leave Canada and the United States for a 
better and a brighter future in Soviet Karelia. While emigration was undeniably spurred by the 
deteriorating economic conditions in North America, the role of the recruiters in attracting large 
numbers of workers with families to move across the Atlantic was equally important. Inspired by 
the grand vision of the head of the Karelian government to make the republic a socialist and 
Finnish homeland, leaders of the North American Finnish left became convinced that Karelia 
was now the homeland of socialist-minded Finns. Their conception of this new Finnish 
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homeland would however be void of any meaning if the rank and file did not subscribe to it. 
Thus, when Karelian-sponsored recruiting offices opened in New York and Toronto in 1931, 
leaders of the communities launched a full-scale propaganda campaign in the press and in the 
socialist halls to “sell” Karelia to the public. 
 The second chapter, “The Artificial Republic”, takes the reader to the Soviet Union, 
where under the new nationality policy that promoted indigenous culture, Karelia’s leadership 
was actively involved in endorsing the Finnish language and culture in a place where Finns 
constituted less than one percent of the population. The arrival of North American Finnish 
specialists in Soviet Karelia was crucial to the success of the project. Immigrants, it was thought, 
would solve the economic problem and also offset the demographic imbalance in the republic 
dominated by Russians and Karels. The local government’s vision of Karelia was reflected in the 
future it imagined for Karelia, and by assigning North American Finns a privileged economic, 
social, and cultural status in the republic, the Karelian leadership made it clear whom it 
considered the ideal citizen.  Finnish cultural and social norms, promoted through official 
channels and the media, glorified North American Finnish working methods and living standards 
as a model to be emulated by others. In the process, the Karelian government appropriated 
migrants’ identity in its own public discourse, and the merger became the foundation for the 
construction of a new, Finnish socialist Soviet Karelian identity. 
 The third chapter, “Canada’s Nationality Policy”, analyzes the reaction of the Canadian 
state and the public to the departure and return of Canadian Finns throughout the 1930s. 
Examination of Canadian newspapers, customs declaration forms (transatlantic ship manifests), 
and Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) files denote a process of national identity 
construction. The Canadian bureaucracy, informed by social Darwinist views of race and 
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ethnicity, and the Anglophone bourgeois concern over modernization brought about by the 
forces of industrialization and urbanization, both consciously and subconsciously developed an 
elaborate system of categorization of Canada’s population according to prescribed criteria of 
ethnicity, nationality and race. In other words, a rigid, albeit invisible nationality policy was 
developed. By making the populations recognizable in the official discourse, border officials, 
just like the census makers, constructed specific representations of Canada’s ethnic populations. 
In order to control the population of a rapidly modernizing society, the Canadian community had 
to be made “knowable” and familiar. Rigid classification of Canada’s “ethnic” populations also 
contributed to the construction of diasporic identities in Canada.  
 The fourth chapter, “At the Intersection of Modernities”, analyzes the infusion of North 
American ideas, culture, and experience into Soviet society, and depicts immigrants as agents of 
social and cultural change. Having embodied North American representations of modernity, they 
introduced new working methods, values and routines, as well as novel forms of labor 
organization to Soviet Karelia. With the help of imported machinery, tools and equipment, 
immigrants drastically increased the production rates of Karelia’s industries. Glorified and 
publicized by the Karelian government and the media, their labor shops and farm communes 
became models to be emulated in Karelia and throughout the Soviet Union. North American 
Finns also came to play an important part in Soviet elites’ attempt to modernize the Soviet 
society both economically and culturally. Although they were agents of cultural and 
technological change in their own right, immigrants’ social and ethnic identities were subsumed 
and appropriated by the Soviet state and Karelia’s cultural producers in attempts to promote a 
Soviet version (an alternative) of economic and cultural modernity. Their physical and 
intellectual movement across national borders shaped and reconstituted the Soviet path to 
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modernization, even if for a short period of time. In the process, concepts of the local, the 
national and the modern (i.e. the global), became increasingly entangled.  
 In the last chapter, “The State and the Stranger: The Purges and the Deconstruction of an 
Imagined Community”, I examine the role of the state, local sections of the communist party, 
and general populace in the persecution of North American Finns during the Stalinist purges of 
the late 1930s. The contradictory nature of Soviet nationality policies which reversed a full 180 
degrees in the mid-1930s changed the public perception of North American Finns from hard 
working, modernizing and enlightened, to people who were strange, unfamiliar, and alien. 
Hailing from bourgeois nationalist states like Finland, the United States and Canada, immigrants 
were represented as a potential fifth-column. The turnaround of the nationality policy made 
Finnish cultural and social norms obsolete, and led to the downfall of the republic’s Finnish elite 
and the persecution of North American Finnish specialists. Newly uncovered archives reveal 
first, that local communists and the general populace participated in the purges with enthusiasm, 
with causes for such rigorous support ranging from fear to personal gain to ignorance. Second, 
the modernization of the Soviet state introduced new methods of documenting and categorizing 
the Soviet population, and in many ways facilitated the logistic side of the purge.  
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Chapter 2:  
 
A Re-Imagined Community: The Finnish North American Left and the Karelian Fever 
 
It turned out that eternity existed only as 
long as Tatarskiy believed in it, because nowhere 
outside this faith, did it exist. To truly believe in 
eternity, it was necessary that this belief was shared 
by others – because faith which is not shared by 
everyone is called schizophrenia.98  
 
 In the early 1930s tens of thousands of North Americans migrated to the Soviet Union in 
search of work and a better life.99 For the most part, it was the Great Depression in the west and a 
promise of a utopian socialist future in the Soviet Union that propelled this transnational 
movement. Emigration of North American Finns, although similar in many ways to this broader 
trend, was nonetheless significantly different. Their destination was Soviet Karelia in particular, 
rather than the Soviet Union in general. Given Karelia’s proximity to Finland and its centrality to 
the Finnish national folklore and Finnish ethnic identity, factors of nationality and ethnicity, not 
solely ideological predisposition and economic considerations, played a major part in the exodus. 
The Karelian fever then can be conceptualized in terms of ethnic or diasporic identity 
construction, where leaders of the North American Finnish left in concert with the Finnish 
leadership of Karelia aimed to sell Karelia to the North American Finnish public. Engaged in 
cultural production and diffusion, leaders of the Finnish left fostered a new, reconstituted ethnic 
and national identity, whose ideological center was to become Soviet Karelia.  
                                                
98 Victor Pelevin, Generation P, Vagrius, 2004. 
99 So far there is only one attempt to study this phenomenon:  see Tim Tzouliadis, The Foresaken: From the Great 
Depression to the Gulags – Hope and Betrayal in Stalin’s Russia, (London: Little, Brown, 2008). This is a rich field 
that awaits research and analysis. Records of British passenger lists, easily accessible through ancestry.ca reveal that 
tens of thousands of North Americans were on the move to the Soviet Union, often already under labor contracts 
with various Soviet trusts. 
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German historian Reinhart Koselleck argued that at any given time political concepts 
embody in themselves a certain interpretation of the past, understanding of the present, and 
visions for the future.100 Most North American Finnish emigrants did not belong to Canadian or 
American communist parties. Only a small portion of emigrants (roughly about 10-15 percent)101 
were “active” contributors to socialist or communist movements, whereas the rest merely 
sympathized with international socialism, and as a result were reactive participants in left 
politics. These “passive” elements embodied, with their own bodily practices – through the 
process of migration to Soviet Karelia – certain interpretations of the past, understandings of the 
present, and future visions promoted by leaders of the North American Finnish left. Without the 
bodies transmigrant Finnish workers and their families provided, ideology and ethnic identity 
preached by diaspora leaders could not be turned into something real – the Karelian fever. The 
aforementioned theoretical approach allows me to study the movement as a dialectical process, 
where both the elite and the rank and file became involved in cultural production and diffusion, 
conditioned by ideology and ethnicity. In the end, the dynamics of the recruitment process 
reinforced by the actual process of migration gave birth to an alternative imagined Finnish 
socialist community with its cultural headquarters in Soviet Karelia.  
Although the main focus of this chapter is diasporic identity formation, I utilize aspects 
of transnational theory to examine the social construction of ethnic and national identities, a 
process which diaspora theories, with its static vision of the migrant, cannot decipher. They treat 
                                                
100 See Reinhart Koselleck. Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time. Translated with an introduction by 
Keith Tribe. New York: Columbia University Press, 2004.  
101 Both the CPC and the CPUSA were against the emigration of North American Finnish communists to Soviet 
Karelia. Tim Buck and the executive committee of the CPC placed a limit on the number of party members to be 
granted transfers to the Soviet Union. In several memos, Tim Buck indicated party members should represent no 
more that 10-15 percent of the entire migration to the Soviet Union. Moreover, lists of the arrested North American 
Finns during the Great Purge reveals a similar ratio of communists among the immigrant communities, despite the 
fact that party members were targeted more consistently than the general population. Irina Takala for example also 
finds that the percentage of communists among North American immigrants to Karelia did not exceed 15 percent. 
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the diaspora as a single unit, not taking into consideration that diaspora, just as the nation, is a 
social construct, an imagined community, behind which one can detect motivation, interests, and 
visions. Diaspora theories are not able to account for those who are positioned on the margins of 
ethnic identity, can only deal with the communal aspects of migrants’ lives, and are at a loss 
when migrants disassociate or distance themselves from their presupposed ethnic and/or national 
community. They render diasporas as something real, rather than imagined, concrete, rather than 
intangible, natural, rather than constructed. Generalizations about diasporas as specific ethnic 
and national immigrant groups obscure the degree of migrants’ mobility. Diaspora, just as ethnic 
distinctiveness, is then both a construct and a process. 
The framework of transnationalism on the other hand considers migrants as 
transmigrants, whose identities are perpetually reconstituted, be it in the context of a diaspora, a 
nation, or other socio-cultural and political formations. Whereas national paradigms envision the 
nation as the final destination or as the initial departure point for the migrant, transnationalism 
examines migration as a continuous practice. Where a national oriented historian might lament or 
celebrate a migration trend, be it incoming or outgoing, a transnationalist is concerned with the 
individual migrant, as well as with the larger international and transnational processes that allow 
the movement, and in the context of which migrants’ individual and collective identities are 
forged. Transnationalism enables historians to paint a more complete picture of migratory 
patterns and migrant experiences, but also allows researchers to sway away from canonizing 
migrant workers and families as exclusive members of exclusionary national units.  
Diaspora is a re-imagined community, in most cases by the symbolic elites, and as 
suggested by Benedict Anderson not in the sense that it is false, but in that it is a psychological 
creation. Although conventionally it is characterized as a stable entity, it should be understood in 
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terms of social and cultural processes of movement and change, of transnational forces imagined 
into communities.102 The present chapter aims to unveil the process of diaspora formation from 
above by examining the initial stages of ethnic and national imagined community construction. 
What were the methods and venues through which leaders of North American left-wing Finnish 
communities in concert with the agents commissioned by the leaders of Soviet Karelia, utilized 
political ideology, national mythology, and ethnic organizations, to recruit Canadians and 
Americans of Finnish origin to work and settle in Soviet Karelia? In other words, how was 
culture appropriated, re-produced, and diffused within and between national and diasporic 
borders? With the help of a transnationalist approach, which warrants the concept of hybridity 
and allows one to appreciate the dynamics of a community that has points of reference in 
multiple cultures and nations, this chapter also addresses the process of collective identity 
formation from below. The concept of hybridity provides for a multidimensional view of a 
system through which human capital, experience, and ideas flow across borders real or imagined, 
and the process of their formation and reformation into larger – local, regional, and global social 
constructs.  
Sustained by a complex transnational network, marked by a flow and interaction of ideas, 
individuals, and cultural artifacts across and within national borders, it is impossible to 
comprehend migrants’ stories through national or diasporic centered historiographies. The 
following analysis shows that migrants’ identities became a terrain where national and diasporic 
imaginaries were constructed to consolidate and maintain the physical and psychological 
                                                
102 See James Clifford, “Diasporas,” Cultural Anthropology, vol. 9 (3), 1994; Roger Rouse, “Mexican Migration and 
the Social Space of Postmodernism,” Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies, vol. 1 (1), 1991. The authors 
argue that old localizing strategies of studies bounded by community, organic culture, region, center, etc. in fact 
obscure more than they reveal. 
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domains of the diaspora – its political and cultural borders. Through the case study of the 
Karelian fever I argue that transnational migrant labor – a subaltern force consisting primarily of 
nuclear and extended family units on the move in the late 19th and early 20th centuries in search 
of economic and social security – became a means by which diaspora leaders defined and 
redefined the cultural and political borders of their re-imagined communities.  
Migration Demographics, Statistical Analysis, and Economic Causes of Migration 
Who were these North American Finns? Were they all workers? Was there a specific 
pattern to their migration? Was it mostly men or women who migrated? Were they young or old, 
single or married? The following analysis is based on the records of nearly 4,000 North 
American Finns that immigrated to Soviet Karelia between 1930 and 1933.103 This is a 
substantial and representative sample in many respects. Sources vary on the total number of 
emigrants, hovering between 5,500 and 10,000. Therefore, my sample is at the very least 
representative of 40 percent of the movement, and in the best case scenario it accounts for 7 out 
of every 10 that went to Soviet Karelia. According to Irina Takala’s calculations, by mid-May 
1932, 3,228 North American Finns went to Karelia.104 The sample used in this paper numbers 
2319 individuals that arrived by the same period of time, which is also representative of 7 out of 
every 10 North American Finnish immigrants. Further, according to the Joint State Political 
Directorate (OGPU), a de-facto Soviet secret police agency, by November 1932, 4,399 North 
                                                
103 Based on the Karelian Resettlement Agency records, the lists were compiled by Eila Lahti-Argutina, and 
deposited in the Clara Thomas Archives (from here on referred to as CTA), Varpu Lindstrom Fond F-0558. I had the 
privilege of translating these documents from Russian to English. Translated copies can be found in the same fond.  
104 Irina Takala, “Североамериканские финны в довоенной Карелии” (“North American Finns in pre-war 
Karelia”) in [Североамериканские финны в Советской Карелии 1930-х годов: Сборник научных статей и 
источников] (North American Finns in Soviet Karelia in the 1930s: Academic Essays and Sources), (Petrozavodsk: 
PetrGU, 2007), p. 40. 
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American Finns made their way to Karelia.105 My sample accounts for 3,344 immigrants arriving 
in Karelia by November 1932, accordingly representative of 76 percent of the movement. 
Upon arrival, the Karelian Resettlement Agency recorded immigrants’ first, last, and 
patrimonial names, year of birth, professional occupation, place of employment and the date of 
arrival in Karelia. These registries allow me to extract information such as the number and size 
of families that arrived in Karelia, to trace individuals who came as part of extended families and 
to calculate the number of single men and women. I was able also to draw on gender, age, and 
family status disparities in the movement. In addition, the compiled statistics provide data for the 
type of professions immigrants practiced and the location of employment assigned to them, thus 
allowing me to trace migrants’ movements in Karelia. Further, these records make it possible to 
trace the rise and decline of the Karelian fever by year, month, and day of arrival. I was able to 
draw a direct correlation between the “fever” rates and the rise and the decline of unemployment 
numbers in Canada and the United States.  
North American Finnish migration to Karelia was largely a family oriented movement 
and, in some respects, a chain migration, albeit an explosive and a short one.106 Nearly 75 
percent of immigrants came as part of an immediate family – as husbands, wives, mothers, 
fathers, children, brothers and sisters. As shown in graphs 2.1 and 2.2, only one of every four 
immigrants was single. I had indicated in my previous work that given the large composition of 
families, the Karelian fever could not have been as ideologically motivated as argued by some 
                                                
105 Ibid. 
106 See Evgeny Efremkin, Карельский проект или карельская лихорадка? (“Karelian Project or Karelian Fever”? 
in [Ученые записки Петрозаводского Государственого Университета] (Academic Notes of Petrozavodsk State 
University: Social Sciences and Humanities), N.3 (95) October 2008, p. 48. 
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scholars. It seems hardly plausible, that “ideological fanaticism” was a primary factor for 
migration when workers with their families first and foremost had to secure employment security 
in the most uncertain economic period of the twentieth century. It is difficult to argue that 
couples with children, whose percentage was high among immigrants, were fanatics of any kind. 
It is not to deny immigrants’ left-leaning beliefs or their role in the decisions to go to the Soviet 
Union. However, there is a vast difference between simply sharing in political and ideological 
convictions on the one hand, and manifesting them in radical and practical ways on the other. 
North American immigrants were also predominately male; women represented only a 
third of the movement. Numerical superiority of men can be explained by the labor market 
conditions in North America. In Canada, for instance, Finnish women found themselves in more 
favorable financial positions than Finnish men. Most Finnish women were employed as domestic 
workers, a sector that had not suffered as severely from the depression, as had lumber, 
construction, and farming, where the majority of Finnish men were employed.107 
Based on my sample, only 25 single women arrived in Karelia, as opposed to 1064 single 
men. The ratio of single men to single women in the movement was forty two to one. Finnish 
socialist women, although restricted by economic and social factors, were in many respects no 
less radical than their male compatriots. If we take this premise as a point of departure, we can 
draw a direct link between the economic effects of the depression on North American socialist 
Finns and the fundamental causes of the Karelian fever. In other words, one of the main reasons 
why more men than women went to Karelia was because the depression did not affect women as 
                                                
107 Varpu Lindstrom, Канадские Финны и десять лет Великой депресии (“Canadian Finns and Ten Years of the 
Great Depression”) in [Североамериканские финны в Советской Карелии 1930-х годов: Сборник научных 
статей и источников] (North American Finns in Soviet Karelia in the 1930s: Academic Essays and Sources), 
(Petrozavodks: PetrGU, 2007), p. 12.  
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harshly as it did men. Nearly 75 percent of Canadian lumberjacks were single men.108 If we 
assume that radicals were unattached single men and women, and take the lumberjacks out of the 
equation, we are left with just over 10 percent of Canadian immigrants who fit the profile of an 
ideological fanatic.109 Many Finns were left leaning, however only 5 to 10 percent were in any 
respect radical – to the point of Bolshevization.110 If we follow this logic, then ideological 
considerations had to take a second place to economic factors in the decision to migrate to Soviet 
Karelia. 
Among North American male Finns who migrated to Karelia 48% were lumberjacks, 
18% carpenters, 8% construction workers, 5% drivers, and 4% sawyers.111 Women were, for the 
most part, registered under a husband’s occupation and place of employment. Only in a few 
registries was occupation and place of employment indicated for women. Among American 
immigrants, thirty-eight women were registered as officially employed and only seven on the 
Canadian side. There are reasons, however, to suspect that some of the workers did not have the 
expertise in the occupations indicated upon registration. For example, Takala finds in case 
studies of Segozero and Tungudu areas that only 50 and 15 percent respectively had experience 
working in the woods, although the majority were listed as lumberjacks.112 However, Takala’s 
                                                
108 Karelian Resettlement Agency records, Varpu Lindstrom Fond F-0558. 
109 Evgeny Efremkin, Переселение североамериканских финнов в Советскую Карелию в 1930-1933 годах: 
статистический анализ [Resettlement of North American Finns in Soviet Karelia 1930-1933, Statistical Analysis] 
Труды Карельского научного центра РАН № 6. 2011. С. 97–105 (Proceedings of Karelian Research Centre of 
Russian Academy of Sciences). 
110 See Evgeny Efremkin, Карельский проект или карельская лихорадка? (‘Karelian Project or Karelian Fever’?), 
[Ученые записки Петрозаводского Государственого Университета] (Academic Notes of Petrozavodsk State 
University: Social Sciences and Humanities), N.3 (95) October 2008. 	  
111 See graphs 6.1, 6.2 
112 Irina Takala, “Североамериканские финны в довоенной Карелии”, p. 44.   
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findings are most likely representative of American immigrants, given that Canadian immigrants 
were well known worldwide as experienced and technologically superior lumbermen.113 
The pace, the rate, and the pattern of immigrant arrivals in Karelia leave aside any doubt 
the phenomenon was in fact a “fever”. As graph 10.1 clearly demonstrates the exodus coincided 
with the rise of unemployment in Canada and the United States. In 1930, when the 
unemployment rate hovered between 7 and 12 percent, only 77 Finns (2 percent of the sample) 
made the transatlantic journey to “workers’ paradise.”114 On the other hand, in 1931, when by the 
end of the year unemployment had risen to 18 and 22 percent in Canada and the United States 
respectively, the flow of immigrants to Karelia increased to 1853 (45 percent of the sample). In 
1932, the worst year of the Great Depression, as unemployment rates reached their peak in North 
America, the exodus sustained its 1931 rate, with slight gains in Canadian, and small losses in 
American, numbers. Overall, 1702 North American Finns (or 41 percent of the sample) went to 
Karelia in 1932. In 1933 the unemployment rates remained similar to the previous year, however 
exodus numbers drastically declined, with only 507 North American Finns (or 12 percent of the 
sample) immigrating to the U.S.S.R. 
The Karelian fever broke out in autumn of 1931 and lasted until the closing months of 
1932. Graph 8.1 shows its rise and decline. In August 1931, eight weeks following the opening 
of Karelian Technical Aid (KTA) offices in New York and Toronto, more than 100 people 
arrived in Karelia. During the next month the influx soared to 226, or 12 percent of those who 
arrived in 1931. In October and November, the ‘fever’ hit North American Finnish communities. 
In these months more than 1,000 made their way to Karelia, representing 26 percent of all those 
                                                
113 Sari Autio, “Soviet Karelian Forests in the Planned Economy of the Soviet Union, 1928-1937” in Rise and Fall 
of Soviet Karelia, edited by Antti Laine and Mikko Ylikangas, (Helsinki: Kikimora Publications, 2002). 
114 See graphs 8.1, 10.1. 
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who arrived between 1930 and 1933. For the next several months the ‘fever’ continued 
fluctuating, and the immigration flow was significantly reduced by spring of 1932. However in 
summer and autumn of 1932 the number of emigrants increased again. In the sixteen months 
spanning September 1931 to December 1932, 3,376 North American Finns had gone to the 
Soviet Union, or 84 percent of the sample. The last large wave of immigrants arrived in the fall 
of 1933. However, its volume was significantly smaller than in previous years.   
Recruiting the North American Left-wing Finnish Diaspora 
The official campaign to recruit North American Finns to work and settle in Soviet 
Karelia began with the opening of the KTA offices in New York and Toronto in May 1931. The 
effort however was not without precedent. North American Finns began providing aid to Soviet 
Karelia soon after the Russian Revolution, and Karelia’s Finnish leadership launched a 
propaganda campaign to generate financial support in the North American Finnish communities 
in the 1920s. Already in 1920 the Finnish section of the American Socialist Party in Duluth 
organized a so-called ‘Russian Aid Committee’.115 In the early and mid-1920s similar 
organizations mushroomed across the country.  In charge of the first ‘Soviet-Karelian Aid’ 
Committee in the United States was Matti Tenhunen, who later would spearhead the Karelian 
recruitment in New York and Toronto in 1931. 
The 1920s also witnessed the first trickles of North American Finns to the Soviet Union.  
In 1921 several American groups arrived in Kuzbass and Kniajia Guba.116 In 1922 a group of 88 
American Finns arrived in the Soviet Union to establish a cooperative agricultural commune 
Kylväjä. In the next several years groups of Canadian Finns from Northern Ontario and 
American Finns from Wisconsin and Illinois would establish similar communes, Säde and Työ 
                                                
115 Mayme Sevander, Skitaltsi, (Petrozavodsk: PetrGu, 2006), p. 31. 
116 Mayme Sevander, Red Exodus: Finnish American Emigration to Russia, (Duluth: Oscat, 1993), p. 35. 
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respectively.117 This early movement was small, and in large part politically and ideologically 
motivated, and would differ substantially from the mass movement of the early 1930s, the 
driving force of which would become the deteriorating North American economy.  This early 
migration was in some aspects successful, both from the migrants’ perspective and from the 
point of view of Soviet authorities. Although there were many disgruntled returnees, the Finnish 
socialist press in North America concentrated mainly on the success stories in Karelia bearing, 
for the most part, only positive news about the Soviet Union and the achievements of North 
American immigrants in the ‘workers’ paradise’. These reports would come to play a significant 
role in the decisions of North American Finns to go to Soviet Karelia in the early 1930s.118 
Recruiters 
Although efficient, the press was not the key way to disseminate information about 
prospectives in Soviet Karelia. Recruiters, all members of the Finnish section of their respective 
communist parties, and paid by the Karelian government, were most persuasive. They were 
clearly instructed to target only the North American Finnish community, and promote Soviet 
Karelia as a worker’s republic where one could live immersed entirely in Finnish culture and 
language.119 Endorsing “new Finland”, recruiters painted an idealized image of Karelia. It was 
socialist, they claimed, it was Finnish; there were jobs, free education and medicare, as well as 
hefty pension plans for all workers. The message was clear – Karelia was the place to be for 
Finnish workers and their families: “it is much better to build socialism with your hands in 
                                                
117 Ibid. 
118 Evgeny Efremkin, “Recruitment in North America: Analysis of Emigrants to Soviet Karelia, 1931-1934, in 
Victims and Survivors of Karelia, ed. Markku Kangaspuro and Samira Saramo, Special Double Issue of the Journal 
of Finnish Studies 15 (2011). 
119 Comintern and CPC archives reveal that there were scores of people, most of whom were not Finns, who applied 
for transfers to the Soviet Union, however got rejected. Last names of the applicants were Anglo-Canadians, and of 
Eastern European descent, mostly Ukrainians and Russians.  
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Karelia than to suffer of hunger and unemployment in the exploiters' country.”120 Karlo Ranta, 
who at the age of ten was taken from the United States to Karelia by his parents, later recalled 
the arguments put forward by recruiters at public meetings: “In the USSR, everybody has equal 
opportunities. Here you won't find a beggar, no one goes to bed with an empty stomach, and 
there are no lines for bread. Medical care is free, old people get pensions, and workers can go to 
sanatoriums and recreation centers.”121 Aino Streng, who immigrated to the Soviet Union from 
Canada in 1932, mentioned that recruiters placed emphasis on the predominance of the Finnish 
language and culture in Karelia, and thus made many believe that they were going to ‘another’ 
Finland: “We were very glad that we were going to Eastern Karelia where Finnish was spoken. 
We were satisfied, as we knew that Finland was so close. Only a large forest divided us.”122 In 
1935, during an interrogation by the Soviet secret police, in answer to a question about the 
reasons for his arrival in Karelia, Niemi, an American Finn said “I by nationality am a Finn and I 
came to Karelia as the homeland of the Finns.”123 
Led by124 the grand vision of Edward Gylling, the leader of Soviet Karelia 1920-1935, to 
settle Karelia with Finns from North America, recruiters depicted a utopia, in contrast to the 
dystopia in which actual life was lived. Gylling’s leading recruiter in North America, Matti 
Tenhunen, called on Finns to help the Soviet Union to implement its Five-Year plan.125 
Tenhunen consistently utilized the North American Finnish socialist press to promote the Soviet 
Union. He urged that Soviet Karelia would fail without assistance: “help is needed in lumber 
                                                
120 Nevalainen P. Punaisen myrskyn suomalaiset. S. 277. 
121 Interview with Karlo Ranta, June 2003. 
122 Boucht C. Onnea esttimassa. Helsinki, 1973. S. 41. 
123 Alexis Pogorelskin, “New Perspectives on Karelian Fever: The Recruitment of North American Finns to Karelia 
in the Early 1930’s,” in Journal of Finnish Studies 1, no. 3 (December 1997), p. 167. 
124 Edward Gylling was formerly an important member of the Social Democratic Government in Finland. 
125 Vapaus February 5, 1931. 
54	  
	  
camps, river runs, saw mills, paper factories, fishing, agriculture, and construction.”126 Recruiters 
like Tenhunen invited Finnish workers to participate in the construction of both Finnish Karelia 
and of the larger socialist project, the Soviet Union. They made potential migrants feel that they 
were needed. Karelia was advertised in Finnish-Canadian and Finnish-American newspapers as 
early as 1929,127 when several articles appeared asserting that Finns could enjoy the public use of 
Finnish language in Karelia in ways unimaginable in Canada or the United States. 
Recruiters targeted families. Free education was a message that fell on many attentive 
ears. Emphasis placed on Finnish language accessibility and richness of cultural activities also 
played a significant role in attracting recruits.128 Niilo Kaano recalls that KTA representatives 
made countless promises and one recruiter, Jeannei Jokela, even claimed that Karelia was an 
independent entity. 129 Many interviewed survivors also mentioned the role recruiters played in 
their parents’ decisions to move to Karelia.130 Niva Erwin for example, who arrived in Karelia at 
the age of 14 with his parents, two younger brothers and a younger sister, heard Matti Tenhunen 
speak at a hall.131 Niva’s father, who was a Bolshevik agitator in South Dakota, would eventually 
be arrested, charged with counterrevolutionary agitation, and executed in January 1938. Susan 
Harris, writing about her uncle Niilo Kaano who perished in Stalin’s purges in the late 1930s, 
mentions that for her parents’ generation, Karelia was like Mecca, and all that was Finnish began 
in Karelia.132  
                                                
126 Ibid. 
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129 Susan Harris., Nilo’s Journey: Finnish-American Migration to the Soviet Union in the 1930s, Montpelier, 
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As Alexei Golubev suggests, the more ridiculous agitators’ arguments were, the more 
impact they sometimes had, especially on children and youth: “In one Finnish school, an agitator 
delivered a lecture about the future realm of workers, with equality and justice for all. When 
children asked where he got this information from, the agitator responded that he learned about 
that from Karl Marx who came to Finland during summer vacations of 1930.”133 Such stories had 
a profound impact, in particular on children who would later vividly recall the whirlpool of 
events that would take them away to Karelia. One of the leading recruiter’s daughters, Mayme 
Sevander, who moved with her family to the Soviet Union at the age of 11, later would write in 
all her books that ideological fanaticism was the main reason for the Karelian fever.  
 Throughout the first half of the 20th century Finnish socialist community halls were the 
cultural and social centers of North American Finnish communities. Dances, parties, art and 
theater classes, as well as workers’ meetings were held at these centers. In the 1920s they came 
to serve as sites of agitation for the Soviet cause, and by the early 1930s also became a central 
venue through which KTA agents relayed the recruiting message. Matti Tenhunen, Oscar 
Corgan, Kalle Aronen, and Jussi Latva, the four heads of the KTA offices, frequented these halls 
to propagandize Karelia. Stories about social, political, and cultural life in the Soviet Union were 
also spread by official delegations sent to Soviet Karelia by ethnic community organizations. 
After their return delegations usually embarked on cross-country tours to share their experiences, 
promote Karelia, and further spur recruitment. Public lectures and speeches given at these 
gatherings often attracted hundreds of spectators and were also usually published in the socialist 
press. An example of this typical occurrence is a series of lectures given by John Virta on a tour 
                                                
133 Reino Kero, Suureen Lanteen: Siirtolaisuus Suomesta Yhdysvaltoihin, (Turku: Siirtolaisuusinstituutti, 1996),  p. 
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across Northern Ontario after his return from Soviet Karelia in late 1931,134 where he 
accentuated good living conditions in the Soviet Union, and denied the increasing immigrant 
return rates from Karelia, despite evidence to the contrary. American and Canadian communist 
party members with public speaking talents met with people at local halls, but also frequented 
people’s homes to attract additional recruits to Karelia.135  
Farewell parties organized for those departing for Karelia also served as sites of 
propaganda. For example, on 27 May 1931 a crowd of 3,000 gathered at Port Arthur to see sixty 
Canadian lumberjacks off to the Soviet Union.136 These colorful and well-attended events 
became a form of a celebration of class struggle and provided an ideological link between North 
American and Soviet workers. Locals of the Finnish Organization of Canada (FOC) were in fact 
encouraged to give farewell parties.137 Its leaders believed that extensive media coverage of these 
spectacles would help the FOC advertise itself and attract new members. For example, a left-
wing Finnish community in Kirkland, Ontario was particularly concerned about people leaving 
for Karelia. By the early 1930s immigration from Finland to Canada virtually halted, and 
depleting membership in ethnic organizations became a concern for leaders of the FOC who 
thought the community was in danger of losing its cohesiveness.138  
Nonetheless, the FOC was actively involved in the recruiting process and even sent 
several delegations to the Soviet Union to counter ‘lies’ spread in the Finnish press by returning 
immigrants about miserable living conditions in the Soviet Union. One such group was 
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organized and headed by Gus Sundquist, head of the FOC.139 Returning speakers’ public 
appearances drew large crowds (up to 600 people) in cities like Port Arthur and Fort William. 
This shows that interest in Soviet Karelia among North American Finns was high. In a letter 
addressed to New York, dated March 1932, John (Jussi) Latva, the head recruiter in Canada, 
referring to the large influx of people to the KTA offices, mentioned the term Karelian fever for 
the first time. He wrote that in the previous two days he had received 60 immigrant applications, 
and expressed concern about the danger of a looming war that could halt this exodus from 
Canada.140   
North American Finnish community leaders were enthusiastic about sending Finnish 
workers to buttress the republic’s Finnish demography, language, and culture, and were also very 
particular and selective about the kinds of people they would allow to migrate to Soviet Karelia. 
The FOC, for example, sent only its most outstanding members. The fact that leaders of the 
organization were responsible for screening applicants allowed them to restrict emigration of 
‘undesirable’ elements of the North American Finnish society. Grounds for rejection included 
womanizing, addiction to alcohol, passivity in community work, and refusal to subscribe to 
socialist newspapers.141 The truth that the FOC expected ‘proper’ Finns to subscribe to socialist 
newspapers demonstrates the importance placed by the leadership on the media as means of 
organizing North American Finnish communities. 
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Karelia presented an opportunity, a gateway to a possible return – a triumphant 
‘homecoming’ to the soon to become socialist version of Finland. Finnish socialist leaders had 
been disappointed by defeat during the Finnish Civil War, but were reinvigorated by the 
Bolshevik Revolution in Russia. Most red Finnish activists fled to Russia and established there a 
new Finnish Communist Party. As a result, Russia became a focal point for many left-wing Finns 
in North America. Developments in Karelia, and the promise of the republic becoming a socialist 
Finnish entity, with an eventual (or as certain as the logic of historical determinism of Marxism-
Leninism dictates) incorporation of the rest of Finland under a Great Red Finland banner, meant 
that Karelia was becoming a hub of attention for left-wing Finns abroad.  
Recruiters, affiliated in one way or another with the leadership of North American 
Finnish organizations, played a crucial role in selling Soviet Karelia to North American Finns. 
The fact is that with the opening of KTA offices in New York and Toronto in 1931 the number 
of Finns leaving North America increased exponentially. Whereas in 1930 only about 100 
immigrants departed to Karelia, in 1931 the number would skyrocket to almost 2,000.142 In the 
next two years, over 6,000 North American Finns would make their way to Soviet Karelia, a 
number many times larger compared to the trickles of North American Finns to Soviet Karelia 
throughout the 1920s. Although it is true that Soviet immigration policies were more relaxed in 
the early 1930s, as well as the fact that the Great Depression encouraged many to look for 
employment elsewhere, nonetheless, the large number of emigrants can only be explained by the 
persuasive rhetoric of recruiters.  
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Role of the Finnish-Socialist Press 
The press played a central role in fostering a utopian image of both the Soviet Union and 
Soviet Karelia. The North American left-wing Finnish press, in contrast to the ethnic 
conservative/right wing one, was well coordinated in its attempts to reach wider audiences.143 
Organs such as Tyomies in the United States, Vapaa Sana and Vapaus in Canada, and Punainen 
Karjalan (Red Karelia) published both in Karelia and North American Finnish communities, 
continuously celebrated Soviet Karelia. This relenting propaganda campaign contributed 
substantially to the increase in the popularity of socialism and communism in North American 
immigrant communities throughout the 1920s and the 1930s.  
In Canada for example, the circulation of Vapaus in the period between 1911 and 1939 
was at its highest in 1932, at 5,000 subscribers.144 Coincidentally membership in the FOC also 
reached its peak in 1932 and 1933. As a result, in the early 1930s, in the midst of the Karelian 
fever, the popularity of socialist ideals in the North American Finnish communities was at an all 
time high. A reading of the Vapaus in the early 1930s is revealing. In January 1931, the 
newspaper announced that the Soviet Union was to recruit workers to Soviet Karelia, that 30 
people had already departed, and given the acute labor shortages in the Soviet Union, especially 
in the lumber industry, many more were needed.145 A common feature in many issues were 
celebrations of international communist figures such as Lenin, Rosa Luxemburg and Karl 
Liebknecht; praise of Finland’s 1918 revolution; and a systemic slander of the Finnish 
government.  
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The newspaper also kept track of unemployment numbers and at any opportune moment 
highlighted and celebrated organized labor protests across Canada. Headlines such as “With the 
help of Leninism, fight against imperialist war, social fascism, against right wing and left wing 
digressions and for the revolution and a Soviet Canada”146 were common phenomena. Vapaus 
was dominated by visually attractive symbols of socialism and communism, with hammers and 
sickles decorating several pages of every issue. The same pages often contained Finnish poems 
and stories of the Finnish civil war.147 A collage of such symbols, it seems, offered an easy way 
to interpret the relation between Finnish culture, socialism, North American communities, and 
Soviet Karelia. 
One of Vapaus’ editors even called Karelia “unelmien todelisuus”, a place where dreams 
come true.148 He urged the unemployed to go to Karelia, where Finnish people had forsaken the 
slavery of capitalism.149 “The Soviet Union” exclaimed another author “is the only fatherland for 
workers.”150 In February 1931, an article reprinted from the New York Times, questioned if the 
world’s emigration movement was shifting to the Soviet Union, as many automobile workers had 
moved there and approximately 13,000 technicians and engineers signed special work 
contracts.151 
 Vapaus often came to the defense of the FOC endorsed Karelian initiative. When 
unsympathetic reports about life in Karelia surfaced in the press in September 1931, Vapaus was 
quick to denounce them. A certain Kemppainen had gone from the United States to Karelia, and 
upon return wrote a critical commentary of life there that was published in Sault St. Marie News 
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and the Upper Michigan Farm Journal, and then reprinted in the Canadan Uutiset.152 The public 
response and criticism of Kemppainen was swift and fierce. Letters arrived from both within 
Canada and Karelia to denounce Kemppainen and others like him. Among many things, he was 
accused of being a drunk and a lazy socialist. Many it seems shared the belief that people like 
Kemppainen misinformed the public about the living conditions in the Soviet Union as did 
mainstream Canadian bourgeois newspapers, which at that time widely reported about the 
existence of brutal labor camps throughout the Soviet Union, including Karelia.153  
 Vapaus was in fact at the forefront of the recruiting process. The newspaper supported 
and advertised policies of the Comintern, bolstered the relevance of Karelia to Finnish national 
culture, provided detailed instructions on how to apply for work overseas, and even suggested 
what to take along to the Soviet Union.154 Its caricatures ridiculed the failing capitalist system in 
North America, graphically depicting unemployment, riots, and hunger marches, while at the 
same time praising the Soviet Union, where work and social care appeared guaranteed for all.155 
One of the tactics contrasted negative images of closing factories and large unemployed striking 
crowds in North America and the glorified images of the hammer and sickle in the background 
of healthy and physically strong workers fulfilling the first five-year plan in the Soviet Union. 
Finnish communities in North America and Karelia were connected by Punainen 
Karjala. As a matter of fact North American Finnish and non-Finnish socialist publications were 
available in Karelia throughout the 1930s. Sources indicate that successive waves of immigrants 
often brought copies of the Daily Worker and the Tyomies with them, or they were sent by 
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friends and relatives from Canada and the United States via mail. The reverse was also true and 
North American Finns’ economic and political achievements in Karelia were followed in the 
Canadian and American Finnish communities. From the early 1930s, the town of Matrossi, along 
with other timber industry settlements where North American lumberjacks constituted the 
majority of the workforce, such as Vilga, Interposiolok and Lososinskiy logging camps, became 
centers where the latest technologies for forest harvesting and transportation were taught to local 
workers.156 Karelian authorities even established a special school in Matrossi to teach local 
workers North American working methods.157 These places were meant to become model 
communes and settlements, from which Canadian and American Finnish experience was to be 
disseminated throughout the Soviet Union in efforts to increase production on farms and 
factories. These schools and settlements were portrayed in the North American Finnish socialist 
media as model societies, where culture, ideology, nationality and skill came together to create a 
sense of a Finnish socialist utopia.  
Constant efforts in Tyomies and Vapaus to depict life in Karelia on the verge of utopia 
were in many ways reflective of socialist realism – an official Soviet art form institutionalized by 
Stalin in 1934. In the discourse of socialist realism, consistent with Marxist-Leninist ideology “a 
true representation of society that was in the process of building socialism involved the depiction 
not only of ‘life as it is’ but also ‘life as it is becoming’. If life as it was in the 1930s lacked 
culture and consumer goods, the socialist future promised both to all Soviet citizens.158 In the 
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words of Sheila Fitzpatrick the basic trope of socialist realism is “the superimposition of a better 
‘soon’ on a still imperfect ‘now’.”159  
The Finnish-socialist press in Canada and the United States was a site where conflicting 
claims of belonging, and frameworks of identity, were articulated and renegotiated. Prompted by 
particular visions of the future, leaders of the left-wing Finnish Diaspora participated in a process 
of cultural production and diffusion of what they perceived as commonly shared political, social, 
and cultural ideals and myths. In their hands, the ethnic press became a crucial component in 
shaping one’s ethnic identity in the Diaspora. While the family unit remained the principle 
producer of culture in the private sphere, immigrant institutions monopolized the process in the 
public one. The arrival of immigrants usually revitalizes the diaspora by providing it with 
additional bodies to legitimize the existence of national or ethnic imagined communities. By 
encouraging migration to Soviet Karelia, the FOC in this way endorsed a new “point of return” 
for the Finnish left. It rendered Karelia the focal point of left-wing Finnish culture and identity. 
Facilitating Comintern Propaganda in North America 
 The Comintern, the CPC, and the CPUSA, combined with the relentless efforts by the 
recruiters to portray the Soviet Union in the best possible light, all contributed to the content the 
socialist media fed North American Finns, and constituted the imperative context and discourse 
in which the Karelian fever took place. It fixated a certain image of work and life in the Soviet 
Union that aimed to appeal to American and Canadian Finnish audiences disillusioned by the 
economic depression in North America.  
  North American English language socialist publications such as The Daily Worker in the 
United States and The Worker in Canada provided continuous coverage on social, cultural, and 
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political developments in the Soviet Union. The radical press in Canada never let an opportunity 
pass to draw the public’s attention to the achievements of the Soviet socialist economy and the 
breakdown of the Canadian capitalist system. In line with the Comintern, The Daily Worker 
often exaggerated the successes of the Five-Year Plan in the Soviet Union. In one article, entitled 
‘Only in the USSR the Living Standards of the Working Class are Being Raised’, the author 
highlights that in the capitalist countries:  
There is unprecedented, widespread unemployment, involving tens of millions, at the 
time when the employers are waging continuous attacks upon the already miserable 
wage-rates of the workers, when in the countries of capital unbearable and cruel slavery 
actually rules, in the Soviet Union the creative initiative of the wide working masses is 
steadily growing, wages are going up, the government social insurance funds increasing, 
unemployment liquidated, the cultural standards of the most backward people being 
raised.160  
 
The advent of the Great Depression in 1929 only intensified press’ attacks on capitalism 
in North America. The socialist media, particularly in Canada, was, like many information 
outlets, far from independent. For example, the Comintern often pressured the CPC to adopt the 
Third Period policy in its agenda.161 In fact, it can be argued that from 1930 on, CPC’s policies 
and programs were determined by narrowly perceived diplomatic concerns of the Soviet 
bureaucracy.162 Policy changes in the Soviet Union also meant a metamorphosis in the itinerary 
of international communism and a subsequent modification of the goals of the CPC. The new 
task of all communist parties, declared the Executive Committee of the Communist International 
(ECCI), was first and foremost the defense of the Soviet Union. In 1929 the Tenth ECCI Plenum 
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assessed the international situation and the impending tasks of the Comintern’s sections as 
follows:  
In the struggle against the threatening war danger, against the capitalist offensive, and 
against the campaign of slander of the reformists, all communist parties must carry on a 
broad enlightenment campaign to explain the gigantic achievements of socialist 
construction in the Soviet Union (the Five Year Plan).163  
In April 1931, the Eleventh ECCI Plenum declared that the immediate task of the Comintern 
sections was to protect the interests of the Soviet Union: “it imposes on all Comintern sections 
the duty of conducting the most active struggle in defense of the Soviet Union…”164  
The Comintern’s pressure on the CPC to adopt the Third Period policy in its agenda had a 
direct effect on the fate of many left-wing Finnish Canadians. Promises of a bountiful future in 
the ‘workers’ paradise’ could not have come at a more opportune moment. The North American 
continent was in economic, social and political disarray. In April 1929, the Comintern bluntly 
intervened in CPC affairs, first by delaying its convention, and then, utilizing the available time 
to entrench the Buck-Smith faction in power. Tim Buck promised Canadian communists’ 
unconditional conformity to Stalinists in Moscow; he would remain the leader of Canadian 
communists well into the 1960s. The Lenin School, established by the Comintern in Moscow in 
the 1920s became a medium through which changes in communist doctrine were conveyed from 
the Kremlin to Canada.165 Stewart Smith, Buck’s right hand in the CPC was the school’s most 
prominent Canadian student in the late 1920s. He was also responsible for a great deal of Soviet 
propaganda that appeared in the Worker, CPC’s official press organ. At the sixth convention of 
the CPC in 1929, Smith’s speech on the international situation, writes Angus, “was as close to 
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the contemporary Comintern orthodoxy as might be expected…everything was predicated on the 
view that the entire world had now entered ‘the third period of capitalist development’.”166 
The Comintern’s program in Canada was spread by the CPC, its branch organizations, 
and the radical press. Dated May 19th, 1931 a letter from CPC’s Central Agitprop Department to 
the Cultural Department of the Profintern reads: 
In connection with the cultural work of our organization here, we request that you try to 
furnish us with a number of suitable plays in the Russian, Ukrainian or Bulgarian 
languages…we have a shortage of suitable revolutionary drama…we also request that 
you send us a popular text-book or guide for our dramatic circles in the Russian 
language.167  
In the early part of 1931, the Comintern issued a 20 page, 46 section paper entitled “Resolution 
on the Tasks of the CP of Canada”. The document was printed in English, French, and Russian. 
The file carries an entire overview of the actions to be undertaken by Canadian communists in 
relation to the Third Period policy in Canada. 
Furthermore, in July of the same year, a report on the meeting of the Central Executive 
Committee (CEC) of the CPC explicitly stated the aims of the propaganda campaign in Canada:  
In our propaganda, we must see that we link up concretely the problems confronting all 
sections of the working class with the war danger. If possible, use local and sectorial 
grievances of the workers and farmers and link them up with the war danger and the 
danger of attack against USSR.168  
 
The task of communist leaders in Canada it seemed was to find commonalities between random 
occurrences in Canada and virtually unrelated policies of the Moscow-controlled Comintern and 
convince the public of the entangling and interdependent relationship between their miseries in 
North America and foreign and internal affairs of the first workers’ state. The first item on the 
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agenda of the Central Agitprop department meeting in summer 1931 was to propagandize the 
centrality of the Soviet Union and of the CPSU to the Canadian proletarian cause:  
When speaking of USSR and its successes, we must state that without the existence of the 
party there would not have been and cannot be any Soviet Union. The success of socialist 
construction is entirely due to the existence and principles of the party of Lenin. This 
must be made clear.169  
The CPC's most advertised slogan in 1931 was “Help the Soviet Union to complete its Five-Year 
Plan without outside intervention.”170  
 Leaders of the CPC were instrumental in spreading pro-Soviet propaganda in Canada. 
Tim Buck drew huge crowds for his speeches. In December of 1934, for example, 3,500 flooded 
Massey Hall to hear and see Buck; another 17,000 gathered at Maple Leaf Gardens several 
months earlier following Buck’s release from prison.171 Mass meetings were held in Halifax, 
Nova Scotia, drawing a crowd of about 600 sympathetic spectators to listen to the speeches of a 
delegation returning from the Soviet Union.172 Two communist meetings in Montreal, one under 
the auspices of the Friends of the Soviet Union and another featuring Tim Buck, attracted crowds 
of 5000 and 10000 respectively.173 It was important for communist leaders to support and 
promote the Soviet Union at least for the fact that the first socialist state by its mere existence, in 
many respects, gave credibility to the North American left. 
The Karelian Fever and the CPC: Transnational Hierarchies 
The next section demonstrates that the actions of communist leaders in North America 
and the Soviet Union were first of all interdependent, and second, were situated within specific 
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transnational hierarchy of power. Tenhunen and Latva, heads of the KTA offices in New York 
and Toronto, both lived in North America. They were employed by the Karelian government to 
which they answered directly, and as a result traveled extensively across the Atlantic. In their 
efforts to recruit left-wing Finns, they had to deal with the opposition of the Canadian and 
American communist parties to the exodus of some of their best members. After all, Finns 
constituted significant percentages of the CPUSA and the CPC memberships.   
 Notwithstanding the fact that Tim Buck and the CPC eventually cooperated with 
Tenhunen and Latva, they did so reluctantly. While to some extent the CPC was ready to support 
those who wanted to move to the Soviet Union, it did not want to give any special preferences to 
Finnish migrants: “we finally can treat the applications from Finnish comrades in the same 
fashion as all other applications and we will not have to take into consideration their special plea 
that they are going to Karelia.”174 In May of 1931 the executive committee of the CPC 
emphasized that although questionnaires for transfers to Karelia would be sent to the districts, 
“they must not be sent out to the units, since many comrades would consider it as an 
invitation.”175 Although Canadian communist leaders adhered to the international communist 
hierarchy and discipline, they nonetheless wanted the “Karelian Project” to be advertised as little 
as possible.176 On several occasions the party’s Central Executive Committee (CEC) issued 
statements reminding that all party members requesting transfer had to get party approval first: 
“again we warn that the question of the ‘run’ to the USSR of groups of Party members and 
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individual comrades, without permission, must stop…we need every fighter here”.177 The CPC, 
like its counterpart in the United States, was worried that the exodus of socialist Finns, who were 
the backbone of North American communist parties, would be detrimental to the labor 
movement in North America.  
A letter from the CEC to Gus Sundquist, the man in charge of Karelian transfer 
applications, shows that there was a stringent limit set on the number of party members allowed 
to leave. “Dear comrade:” reads the letter, “there are dozens of applications coming in steadily 
from Finnish comrades for transfers to the USSR. You remember that the political Bureau 
decided that not more than 15 or 20% are to be Party members.”178 Restrictions on party 
members leaving for Karelia were discussed by CEC as early as 1929. In a letter to Alf 
Hautimaki in Port Arthur, dated November 2, 1929, the Polcom gave the following instructions 
on the matter of the Karelian Lumber Commune: “...also that in selecting the Commune you will 
not draw too heavy on those workers who are valuable to the Party.”179  
 The Party reminded comrades that: “…his or her duty to our class and the USSR is to 
carry on the struggle here and not attempt to solve the personal difficulties by immigrating to the 
country of Proletarian Dictatorship.”180 On several occasions party members disobeyed the 
center:  
However it appears that some Party comrades do not take decision of the centre seriously 
and leave on their own. Often these comrades misuse their party membership. The 
Political bureau dealt severely with the 8 party comrades of Montreal who have 
organized a commune to the USSR behind the back of the Party.181  
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The Canadian communist leadership was also convinced that a number of comrades joined the 
party only in order to facilitate a transfer to USSR. A report of the CEC meeting on Oct 15, 1931 
reads:  
In connection with the emigration to the USSR we receive reports that in some localities 
leading comrades carry around bundles of party materials and addresses saying that if 
they are arrested it will help to get themselves deported to the USSR. This is no less than 
treachery to the Party and strict disciplinary measures are to be adopted in such cases.182  
 
This statement raises doubts about whether some Finns were at all dissatisfied when deported by 
the Canadian authorities. It appears that some of them in fact were anxious to get deported, 
because it was the only way they could get around CPC’s approval and sail off to the “promised 
land.”  
 Despite the opposition to the Karelian venture, both the CPC and the CPUSA nonetheless 
agreed, in one way or another, to facilitate some transfers. What allowed coordination between 
the recruiters, Karelian authorities, the CPC, the CPUSA, and the Finnish socialist organizations 
in North America, was a complex web of transnational interrelations developed throughout the 
first part of the 20th century on individual, organizational and national levels. First, the rigid 
structure of international communism, headed by the Comintern, demanded obedience to the 
decisions reached in Moscow, and as a result secured some form of coordination through official 
transnational communication lines.  
Evidence for the top-down character of the relationship between the recruiters, who 
represented the Soviet Karelian government, and the CPC can be found in the correspondence 
between Matti Tenhunen, Karelia’s main recruiter and agitator in North America, and Tim Buck, 
head of the CPC. In his letters, dated May 1931 Tenhunen asks Buck to be as cooperative as 
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possible in granting Finnish members transfers to the Soviet Union, given that he, Tenhunen. had 
clear instructions from above: “I have very close instructions from otherside [my italics] from 
both political and state offices…and we went on very nicely working out program for this 
[Karelian] work on basis of instructions and general line set from otherside.”183 When Buck 
appeared to be hesitant about giving his blessing to the Karelian venture, Tenhunen bluntly 
replied: “I think it is error from part of [CPC] comrades if they think that this matter of bringing 
over about 3000 workers from US and Canada before end of this year is for discussion.”184 
Tenhunen insisted that the recruitment process was not negotiable. Orders were given and they 
must be executed: “this matter is not nature of party discussion and it has not been practice in the 
past to submit decision of Soviet Union for discussion.”185 Tenhunen was explicit that the CPC 
could only deal with political matters, such as providing background checks on recruits’ political 
and social activities. Tenhunen also assured Buck that any questions regarding his authority in 
matters pertaining to recruitment could be quickly settled by contacting the Kremlin: “questions 
of my right to come and organize staff to work and ask you to give political guidance is very 
easily settled by wiring to other side.”186 
Appropriating Finnish Socialist Identity 
Almost all sources point to the fact that while the leadership of the CPUSA and of the 
CPC was somewhat reserved about emigration of socialist Finns from Canada and the United 
States, leaders of North American Finnish communities supported this migration, often 
enthusiastically. As mentioned, developments in Karelia, and the promise of a socialist Finnish 
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entity, made Karelia the focal point of attention for left-wing Finns abroad. As a result, leaders of 
North American Finnish communities were keen on sending Finnish workers to buttress the 
republics’ Finnish demography, language and culture. For this particular ethnic “elite” the 
survival and perpetuation of the ethnic and ideological ideals and identities they upheld and 
promoted depended in large part on the success of the Karelian fever. Several historians have 
demonstrated convincingly that the FOC was often at odds with instructions received from 
Moscow and was not afraid to resist and disobey the official line of the Comintern.187 Thus, the 
fact that the organization wholeheartedly supported and assisted the recruitment of North 
American Finns to Soviet Karelia, indicates the level of commitment to the Karelian cause, but 
also makes one wonder about the motivations behind such eagerness.  
The minutes of the national convention of the FOC reveal the efforts deployed by its 
leaders to stress the achievements of the U.S.S.R and the role the FOC played in “developing the 
productive energy of Soviet Karelia – the Fatherland of all Finnish workers.”188 Salminen, 
Chairman of the Executive Committee, often referred to the Soviet Union in his speeches as the 
property of the international proletariat. He also claimed that it was the FOC that should be 
credited with sending all the migrants to Soviet Karelia. “The Finnish organization of Canada”, 
he said, “made no mistake by sending over 2,000 Finns to Soviet Karelia helping to execute the 
socialist building program of that country.”189 Salminen argued that the consolidation of Soviet 
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Karelia was of extreme importance given its strategic location in case of a war against 
imperialists: “It is the wall between the latter and ‘butcher’ Finland.”190  
The FOC seemed to be impervious to change in its stance on the Karelian venture. It 
promoted Soviet Karelia as a homeland of Finnish workers until 1936, when Gylling and Rovio 
were already long displaced in Karelia and the Finns’ privileged status was supplanted by a 
gradually rising ethnically based persecution. Even when notable Finnish communists began 
returning to Canada and denounced the actions of Soviet leaders, the FOC remained loyal to the 
Commintern’s line. Salminen for example claimed all those who returned, estimated at about 20 
percent of the total, were allegedly all “becoming tools of the enemies of the Soviet Union.”191 In 
December of 1936, when a Finnish member of the CPC, who was in charge of the local Vapaus 
library in Montreal, returned from Soviet Karelia, the Finnish bureau of the CPC decided to 
expel him, on the grounds that, having been a disciplined member of the party, he should have 
remained in the Soviet Union regardless of conditions there.” 192  
Finnish socialist halls were multipurpose community centers that served many of the 
social, cultural, political and economic needs of their members.193 Some historians have pointed 
out that it was in these halls where the Finnish brand of socialism became closely intertwined 
with the Finnish culture. For their part, Finnish-Canadian leaders knew too well how to exploit 
the alienation immigrants faced in the hostile Anglo-Saxon environment in order to solidify their 
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own position/status in the community.194 To underscore immigrants’ miseries in North America, 
the FOC disseminated publications in Finnish, placing an emphasis on the alleged contrast 
between American and Soviet societies. The FOC conventions called for the “Canadian Finnish 
workers and poor farmers [to mobilize] against the savage terror in Fascist Finland and in 
support of the heroic Finnish Proletariat.”195 Popularization initiatives of achievements in the 
USSR were often among the organization’s top priorities. In particular, the FOC concentrated on 
the achievements of Soviet Karelia, trying to convince its audience that under the Soviet banner 
all workers and toiling farmers, not withstanding race or nationality, could build a new life.196  
The FOC appropriated the Karelian fever in its own folklore, depicting itself as the 
vanguard of the movement. Ethnicity is not value free and carries with it an ideological 
message.197 The dialectical process of politicization of ethnic communities occurs when the rank 
and file embodies the discourses emanating from communication channels that are typically 
controlled by ethnic elites, and then use this information in their own interest. Whereas for 
individual migrants, the move to Soviet Karelia served their immediate economic and cultural 
needs, for leaders of ethnic institutions the Karelian fever gave an opportunity to legitimize their 
leadership, reformulate communal ethnic identity, and strengthen its ideological tenets.  
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Alternative Finlands 
There is a need to explain Finns’ predisposition to left-wing politics in North America. 
The Finnish Civil War of 1918 and its outcome had a significant impact on the way many 
Finnish immigrants defined themselves in Canada and the United States. Finns, like many other 
ethnic groups, strongly identified with national politics of the mother country. Political 
developments in Finland generated the conditions for the ‘Great Divide’ in the Finnish 
community: a division between those who supported the conservative nationalist regime of the 
‘White Guard’ in Finland, and those who defended the cause of the “Red Guard”, composed of 
socialists and communists.198 The ideological split divided localities, communities, 
neighborhoods, and even families into warring camps. The presence of the ‘Great Divide’ and 
the institutional character it bore is central to the history of early Finnish settlements in North 
America.199 In fact, it was only by the late 1980s that the ‘Great Divide’ ceased to be a divisive 
force in the Finnish North American communities.200 
Some scholars suggest that socialist consciousness was inherent to Finnish immigrants 
even before they arrived in the New World. Others argue that it was the leaders of the Finnish 
communities, the labor aristocracy, who injected immigrant neighborhoods with communist 
ideology. Nonetheless, there is a prevalent consensus that the development of socialist 
institutions and organizations was a phenomenon unique to the experience of Finnish immigrant 
communities in Canada and the United States. Therefore, left-wing institutionalization and 
radical politicization of Finnish immigrants in North America was the result of an interaction 
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between the host society and the Finnish community, which created a new social, cultural and 
political Finno-Canadian identity. Arthur Puotinen, for example, argues that Finnish political 
radicalism in the United States developed according to the peculiar social conditions the newly 
arrived experienced in the New World.201 He also credits William Hoglund for capturing the 
unique essence of Finnish North American political radicalism: “if Finland prepared the 
immigrants for socialism, America ripened them.”202 Finns were one of the latest immigrant 
groups to arrive in Canada; they often occupied the most dangerous and low paying positions in 
the Canadian labor force and, thus, were more vulnerable to radicalization. As a result, we can 
suggest with confidence that radicalization of North American Finns occurred as a result of the 
unfavorable socio-economic conditions they encountered in Canada and the United States.  
That said, nothing solidifies the legitimacy and the myth of an imagined community 
better than the triumphant return after an exodus. Migration movements, their meanings, and 
identities are usually canonized by the discursive languages of the national and diasporic entities 
within and between which migrants are in motion. For example, return migration from North 
America to Finland in the early decades of the 20th century was celebrated by the Finnish state as 
well as by leaders of right wing “white” Finnish Diaspora in Canada. Between 1860 and 1920 
about 10 percent of Finland’s entire population immigrated to North America.203 Public reaction 
to emigration in Finland was divided along conservative and left-wing lines, where both camps, 
albeit for different reasons, deemed emigration undesirable, and aimed to discourage the 
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exodus.204 By the early 20th century the rhetoric of public officials in Finland shifted from 
blaming the emigrant for irresponsibility, towards ensuring contacts between Finnish emigrants 
and Finland.205 Following the achievement of independence in 1918 the Finnish state further 
expanded its contacts with Finns abroad. As early as 1908 the state made several attempts to 
improve contact with émigrés by publishing and circulating booklets in North America to 
advertise opportunities in Finland and encourage return.206  
 Links between the Finnish state and the Finnish Diaspora were further solidified in 1927 
with the founding of the Suomi-Seura (Suomi Society) and the Overseas Finns’ Association.207 It 
was hoped that improvements in lines of communication would spur more Finns to return. In the 
1920s there was also a marked increase in organized group visits to Finland. At the same time, 
the Finnish government, interested in return migration both for demographic and economic 
reasons, began targeting a particular type of emigrant - migrants with savings. The government 
hoped that they would benefit the deteriorating Finnish economy.208 The Finnish socialist media 
in North America was quick to denounce the campaign as an attempt to rob migrants of their 
savings.209 It dismissed Finland as a doomed state with a deteriorating economy, and tried to 
discourage return as much as possible. As a matter of fact, the Soviet Karelian recruitment would 
bear a similar, economic character in the early 1930s, as the first rubric on the immigration 
applications would ask to indicate the applicant’s ability to contribute to a so called ‘machine 
fund’, which was supposed to finance the industrialization of Karelia. For the most part, the more 
a potential immigrant could contribute to the fund, the more likely his or her application was to 
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be approved. By that time however it was be the turn of the right-wing press to denounce the 
exodus to Soviet Karelia, with the left-wing radical press wholeheartedly supporting the 
movement. 
In the 1920s two competing versions of a Finnish homeland emerged.210 ‘White’ Finland 
encouraged Finnish emigrants to return to their homeland, and promised those who accepted 
registration with the Finnish government, citizenship, and a passport.211 The Finnish government 
in the 1920s, not unlike the Karelian leadership in the 1930s, attempted to recruit relatively 
wealthy Finns. Émigrés sent remittances back to Finland, while returning migrants it was hoped 
would deposit their savings in Finnish banks. For their part, leaders of conservative Finnish 
communities in Canada and the United States supported increased links with Finland, and 
dubbed return migration a positive phenomenon. Although return migration depleted the 
community’s ranks in North America, nonetheless it reinvigorated national building where, 
according to them, it was most needed – ‘white’ Finland, a bastion for conservative and god-
fearing Finns. 
 While the movement of Finns from North America to Finland is interpreted, in a 
conventional sense as return migration, emigration to Soviet Karelia in the 1930s is dubbed an 
exodus to a ‘promised’, or ‘wretched’, land, depending on the interpretation. Whereas for the 
conservative Finnish leadership and its audience, the Soviet Union and its Russian majority were 
enemies in cultural, ideological, and political terms, for leaders of left-wing communities and 
their followers in Canada and the United States, Soviet Karelia of the 1920s and the 1930s 
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became an alternative, a newer, and a potentially better version of Finland. As mentioned, once 
the exodus began, the right-wing Finnish camp channeled its efforts into stopping the movement. 
For example, the United Empire Loyalist Organization lobbied the Canadian government to ban 
emigration to the Soviet Union from the country altogether.212 Although the Finnish conservative 
lobby enjoyed limited support from Bennett’s government, nonetheless it did not represent a 
powerful enough force to influence the federal government. Moreover, the Canadian government 
had no interest in stopping emigration, and in fact did nothing to prevent the exodus, despite 
being fully aware of the movement. Sources show that the government welcomed the departure 
of left-wing Finns, which seemed to rid the state of undesirable communist sympathizers and 
helped to alleviate rampant unemployment of depression-stricken Canada.  
Writing on issues of mobility, identity, and migration, Donna Gabbacia argues that ethnic 
community organizations can be seen as “local sites of cultural production and exchange”, with 
mobility at the center of the process.213 Seen from this angle, the physical movement of 
transmigrant Finns either to North America, or from Canada and the United States to Finland and 
Soviet Karelia, was an essential element in the process of diasporic and national imagined 
community construction. By the very fact of their material movement, migrants embodied 
specific cultural and ideological values, which in turn were appropriated, refashioned, and 
reproduced by the leaders of the communities preaching those same doctrines. When a Finnish 
migrant moved to Soviet Karelia in the early 1930s, local, regional, and national organizations 
and governments appropriated the migrant’s movement, or in other words the migrant’s 
narrative, or identity in their own diasporic and national folklores, promoting it in exclusive 
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terms, just as the FOC demonstrated that in spearheading the Karelian exodus. This way, the 
migrant became a part of a national or a diasporic story, with his/her identity to be molded and 
refashioned as circumstances allowed or demanded. Thus when Finnish migrants moved back to 
Finland, right-wing conservative groups in Canada interpreted it as their own effort to support 
the homeland, whose mere existence justified their diasporic organizations in the first place. This 
is what I call an on-going appropriation process, where migrants’ movement and identity is 
interpreted by organizations, institutions, and governments in such a way as to fit the appropriate 
national and diasporic discourses.  
Transnational Agents 
 The movement between localities, regions, and across national borders did not occur in 
isolation. The case of the Karelian fever demonstrates that transnational migration was a result of 
an intricate web of interrelations between individuals, organizations, and governments across the 
Atlantic. Transnational ties between left-wing Finns in Soviet Karelia, Finland and North 
America, sustained on both organizational and personal levels, made the recruitment of North 
American Finns to work and settle in Karelia a possibility. For example, in 1929, Kullervo 
Manner came to the United States to sway Finnish-American opinion in favor of communism.214 
Manner, chair of the Socialist Democratic Party in Finland before escaping to Moscow in 1918, 
played a central role in forming the Communist Party of Finland (SKP) in exile.215 Manner’s 
mission in North America was to sway the Finnish cooperative movement to the communist 
cause, thus to allow the CPUSA to appropriate the cooperative’s finances. Although Manner 
failed in his mission, his arrival in the United States demonstrates the interconnectedness 
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between the communist parties in the United States and the Soviet Union, but also a complex 
web of relations between different interest groups, and the desire and ability to influence events 
across the Atlantic.  
 Several other leaders of the Karelian government and the SKP were well known in the 
United States and Canada. Santeri Nuorteva served in the Finnish parliament as a member of the 
Socialist Democratic Party from 1907 to 1910. He immigrated to the United States in 1911 
where he played a significant role in the development of early Finnish socialist organizations. He 
edited magazines such as Sakenia (“The Spark”), and newspapers Toveri (“The Comrade”) and 
Raivaaja (“The Pioneer”), and was influential in the official affairs of the Soviet Russian 
government in the United States. In 1920, while in England, he chose to be deported to Soviet 
Russia rather than return to the United States. In Soviet Russia he headed the Anglo-American 
Division of the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs and between 1924 and 1927 came to 
serve as the chairman of the Soviet Karelian Central Committee. 
 Yrjo Sirola was a prominent elected official in Finland and served as a Minister of 
Foreign Affairs in the 1918 Finnish revolutionary government. He was also one of the founders 
of the SKP and an active functionary in the Comintern. Between 1910 and 1914 Sirola worked as 
a professor of social science at the Finnish Socialist Federation’s Workers People’s College in 
Smithville, Minnesota. From 1925 to 1927 Sirola served as Comintern representative in the 
CPUSA. Sometime in the 1920s Sirola also managed to teach at the Communist University of 
the National Minorities of the West in Leningrad, in the department of Finns and Estonians, 
where he most likely came in contact with Gustav Rovio, one of the founding members of Soviet 
Karelia. In 1930 he left the Comintern to join the Karelian commune as a People’s Commissar of 
Public Education in the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic of Karelia. Although these 
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individuals’ roles were not as central as those played by the recruiters, nonetheless these 
influential individuals generated the necessary pretext for this particular migration. The presence 
of the same leading Finnish left-wing politicians and activists in Finland, Moscow, Soviet 
Karelia, and North America throughout the first three decades of the 20th century suggests the 
existence of a transnational paradigm within which the Karelian fever took place. 
Grassroot Transnational Links: Immigrant Letters 
Transnational theory was at its inception concerned with the economic and political 
interconnectedness that migrants maintained with their home country. Such a view placed 
emphasis on the physical presence of a migrant both in the country of origin and in that of 
settlement, but neglected the ever-evolving nature of communication technologies. Recent 
research however started taking into account the importance of ideas, experiences, values, 
cultural artifacts, and technologies that travel with humans from nation to nation. As 
demonstrated, there was a substantial and perpetual movement of migrants between Finnish 
cultural centers in North America, Finland, and the Soviet Union throughout the 1920s and the 
1930s. In addition to the actual physical movement, one of the main mediums that sustained 
transnational communication and either encouraged or limited further transnational migration 
were immigrant letters. Finns arriving in North America in the late 19th, and early 20th centuries, 
wrote back to Finland, encouraging others to come. Niskanen, for example, remembers that 
when his mother was only five years old, his grandfather left for the United States and later 
wrote letters inviting the grandmother to join him. Niskanen’s father would later join his family 
in North America, when he realized he could not find a job in Finland.216  
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 Immigrant correspondence between friends and families in North America and the Soviet 
Union reveals a fluid exchange of information, ideas, material goods, and experience across 
national borders. In this conversation one can also witness a renegotiation and a reformulation of 
identities. One correspondent mentioned having received Tyomies issues in Soviet Karelia and 
staying up-to-date with news in the American Finnish communities: “It was really good that you 
ordered Tyomies for us. It’s nice to see American happenings.”217 The correspondent also 
mentioned visual representations of her community in North America in the form of personal 
pictures given her by friends, as well as pictures appearing in the newspaper: “It’s so nice to get 
even photos from here since I can’t come see it myself.”218 The same was true of correspondence 
addressed to the American and Canadian communities, as emigrants often included newspaper 
clippings and photographs in their letters from Karelia.  
One immigrant talked about having access to American English-language books in the 
Soviet Union.219 Another mentioned listening to American records on a phonograph: “Here I am 
listening to the phonograph and writing this letter. Remembering being on the farm and listening 
to it makes me feel sad.”220 One girl thanked her correspondent “for the two calendars, a pocket 
calendar, and the issues of Punikki” (“The Red One” – Finnish socialist magazine published in 
the U.S).221 North American Finnish journals and newspapers appear to have been widely 
available in Karelia in 1933. At least one respondent urged her family members not to send 
anymore issues of newspapers and journals, as apparently they were widely available in her 
community in Petrozavodsk: “if I want to read Punikki I just have to stretch my neck in this and 
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that direction and some here get it.”222 She did however ask her relatives in the United States to 
send her old school books on Canadian and British history with anyone who would travel to 
Karelia in the near future. The North American youth it seems was also active as many were 
engaged in organizing English speaking clubs in Karelia: “we also organized here a little while 
ago an English language youth club…we write handwritten newspapers, study all kinds of 
subjects…”223  
In their correspondence immigrants often mentioned specific cultural artifacts brought 
over from North America: “I also received those three books, candy and chewing gum, darning 
needle, and that very fine underwear…and then I have received greetings from everyone.”224 The 
particular cultural and psychological association of material things with their past seem to have 
bridged immigrants’ daily experiences in North America and the Soviet Union: “The alarm clock 
that mother and Sofia Puolakka bought as a birthday present for me wakes me up every morning. 
That little calendar frame is standing there on top of the radio.”225 Here we see that the material 
artifacts exchanged between the sender and the recipient across national borders carried with 
them culturally specific information which only the recipient could decipher. “Aunt Aili sent me 
a Christmas card.”226 An English-language Christmas card could only resonate with a North 
American Finn in Karelia. This sort of interaction was transnationalism at a grassroots level, and 
might explain the perpetuation of a North American identity among some communities in the 
Soviet Union throughout the 20th century. Some letters written from Karelia to Canada and the 
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United States in the late 1980s227 demonstrate that some North American Finns still maintained 
their cultural distinctiveness and remembered American holidays and the English language 
despite the fact that their community was physically destroyed in the late 1930s and during the 
Second World War. Culturally specific festivities however would not be recognizable without 
particular rituals (dances), foods, and smells. In their letters many immigrants attest to having 
received packages with familiar foods, such as cookies and dried meats, as well as culturally 
familiar medicines, such as iodine (joti) and aspirins from North America.228  
More than that, Finns in North America and Soviet Karelia exchanged different working 
techniques they had mastered on opposing sides of the Atlantic.229 One correspondent mentioned 
receiving a book from Finland on telecommunication lines work: 
First they sent me a whole pile of books on telephone central work…But this 
book that is coming will be of good use to me also… I know myself how hard it is 
to get those books…But if you happen to run into a chance of getting the book, 
I’d want it mostly on telephone cable work, underground and in poles.230  
While men exchanged information on working methods, women often swapped cooking recipes 
and tried to stay up to date with the latest fashion trends: “please send me some dress patterns 
and some pictures from the catalogue” asked Terttu in a letter to her sister Toini in the United 
States.231  
 Writing to his family in Canada Antti Kangas addressed the recipients as “community 
friends.”232 Separated by an ocean, a continent, and thousands of kilometers from their families 
and friends in North America, many Finns in Karelia nonetheless maintained a high degree of 
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involvement in their former communities. In a series of letters, a father writing back to his 
daughter in the United States managed to instruct her on how to run the estate and capital he left 
behind in the United States. Moreover, he seemed to have been overly preoccupied with his 
daughter’s marriage, often asked for new pictures of his grandson, and stressed in his letters that 
he closely followed developments in the United States.233 Flowing through transnational circuits, 
communication between individuals, families, and communities across the Atlantic conditioned 
the migration flow and bridged human capital across time and space, in the process facilitating 
grass-root-level hybrid identities.  
Conclusion 
Although there was a certain element of spontaneity in the Karelian fever, for the most 
part it was a well organized and carried out recruiting scheme. As immigrant letters and 
interviews demonstrate, many immigrants required convincing and emigration, even in the 
context of the Great Depression, was not a foregone conclusion. The lure of Karelia was 
grounded as much in Finnish culture, as in socialist ideology. With the Karelian leaders 
sanctioning the scheme, recruiters in North America utilized the mediums of ethnicity and 
ideology to mobilize potential immigrants, while local ethnic organizations, such as the FOC 
endorsed the selling of Karelia to its members and even took it upon itself to be the vanguard of 
the movement. For the Karelian fever to become a reality, the public had to be convinced of the 
authenticity of the project, but also of its inevitable success. In order to retain their legitimacy 
and their jobs, the FOC and recruiters had to persuade the rank and file to migrate to Soviet 
Karelia, and were to a large extent successful. They convinced their audiences of the existence of 
an alternative community – an alternative Soviet type of Finland. Whereas only 7000 North 
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American Finns migrated to the Soviet Union, many more provided financial and moral support 
to Karelia, and even more were engaged with Soviet Karelia through the press, personal 
transatlantic links, by travel, remittances, and correspondence. 
The edifice of cultural production in the Finnish left-wing diaspora was the ethnic 
socialist press. It endorsed however a pattern that was already in motion in the 1920s. 
Transnational links between Finnish communities in Canada, Finland, the United States, and the 
Soviet Union existed from at least the early 20th century. Relations were established through 
official channels, such as the Comintern, but also through unofficial sources, such as personal 
and institutional links between Finnish leaders across the Atlantic. When the press, with the help 
of the recruiters and the FOC, endorsed Soviet Karelia as the symbolic home of Finnish workers 
in the early 1930s it popularized and advertised the Karelian recruitment scheme. By assuming 
control of the movement, the ethnic leadership appropriated this transnational phenomenon into 
its own diasporic discourse/narrative. It was no coincidence that recruitment coincided with the 
propagation of Karelia as an alternative Finland. It was only then, with the entry of the ethnic 
leadership into the process, that Soviet Karelia begun to take the form of an alternative – Finnish 
socialist community.  
In concert with the Finnish leadership of Karelia they shared a vision of the future of the 
left-wing Finnish Diaspora. Leaders of the Finnish diaspora in Canada in fact fused the past – 
Karelia’s folkloric role in the Finnish ethnic identity, present – poor conditions in North 
American and future – the inevitable success of the Soviet, but also Karelian, project – into one 
aspect – that is migration to Soviet Karelia. Displaced by the Finnish Civil War, the left-wing 
Finnish leadership in North American found a new home in Soviet Karelia, which promised soon 
to become what Finland should have been in 1918. The Karelian fever in this way sanctioned 
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and legitimized the views of the leader of the Finnish-left in North America. The mere existence 
of the Soviet Union legitimized the left movement in the United States, while the appearance of 
Karelia came to legitimize the power and influence of the left-wing Finnish leadership. In the 
process, the migrant’s identity/narrative became a terrain where leaders of diasporic and national 
imaginaries now conflicted over the right to appropriate his/her story in their own hegemonic 
narratives/discourses.  
 In many ways, the battle between left and right wing Finnish groups in the press was one 
over the definition of a national and ethnic identity. In the process of elaborating their diasporic 
folklores, both were competing for their members’ loyalty, and both embraced “return” 
migration to the symbolic home of the diaspora. Varpu Lindstrom noted that the FOC never 
recovered from the departure of the 2000 Canadian Finns to Karelia, most of whom were 
members of the FOC.234 However, in light of the fact that many came back by the mid-1930s, it 
was not the numerical exodus of its members that crippled the organization, but rather the failure 
of the republic as a Finnish-socialist entity and the general dismay with the communist system in 
the Soviet Union. 
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Chapter 3:  
 
The Artificial Republic 
 
…I propose adding the term “imagined 
futures” to the set of concepts that relate to nation-
building. An imagined future is a dynamic element 
in an imagined community. When a nation comes 
into existence, it will be composed of different 
interest groups that view the future of the collective 
body from different perspectives, and that propose 
actions or policies in accord with these diverse 
interests…The concept of an imagined future is 
particularly useful for understanding immigration 
policies…235  
 
 Under the Soviet nationality policy, which promoted indigenous culture, Karelia’s red 
Finnish elite was capable of endorsing the Finnish language and culture in a place where Finns 
constituted less than one percent of the population. The arrival of North American immigrants 
was central to Gylling’s project, as it allowed the Karelian leadership to entrench the 
demographic, political, and cultural position of the republic’s Finnish-speaking minority. 
Immigrants, it was calculated, would solve labor shortages in the republic and help local 
industries meet five-year plan quotas. More importantly, Gylling hoped that immigrants would  
offset the demographic imbalance in a republic dominated by Russian and Karelian populations. 
Gylling had a particular vision for Karelia. The future he imagined for it was clearly reflected in 
his immigration and public policies. He was obviously partial towards immigrants of Finnish 
origin. Moreover, the fact that North American Finns were assigned a privileged economic, 
social, and cultural status in the republic indicates whom the Karelian government considered 
ideal citizens. Finnish cultural and social norms were promoted through official channels and the 
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media, glorifying North American Finnish working methods and living standards as a model to 
be emulated by others. Finnish origin did not only signify a privileged socio-economic status, but 
also became synonymous with cultural, social, and political enlightenment. 
The following chapter unveils a process of “artificial” national community construction. 
A series of circumstantial developments made is possible for the red Finnish faction to wrest 
political power away from their Russian rivals. Specifically, it was the Soviet nationality policy, 
which was in force from the early 1920s to the mid-1930s that stimulated the necessary 
conditions for the rapid ethnicization (in this case Finnicization ) of the public discourse. I begin 
by exploring the mythological role of Karelia in the Finnish national identity, in particular its 
folkloric renaissance in the mid-to-late 19th century. Then the story turns to the early 1920s when 
in contrast to the Marxist orthodoxy, Soviet leaders sanctioned an affirmative-action-like 
nationality policy that aimed actively to promote the languages and cultures of formerly 
oppressed minorities at the expense of the Russian majority. It was in this context that Edward 
Gylling lobbied the Kremlin and secured political authority in Karelia. Throughout the 1920s, 
under the auspices of the Soviet nationality policy, Gylling would institutionalize Finnish 
cultural norms in the republic’s public arena and consolidate the red-Finnish grip on the Karelian 
economic and political infrastructure. In the early 1930s, taking advantage of relaxed Soviet 
immigration policies, Gylling lobbied the central government to allow skilled Finnish workers 
from Finland and North America to immigrate to Karelia. Backed by the local government and 
the Soviet nationality policy, many of these immigrants would participate enthusiastically in the 
promotion and entrenchment of Finnish and North American cultural norms. What follows then 
is an account of appropriation in the dominant discourse of migrants’ identities by the Karelian 
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cultural and political elite, where the merger became a foundation for the construction of a new, 
Finnish socialist Soviet Karelian identity. 
Karelia in the Finnish National Folklore 
Ethnicity and nationality are relatively modern social and “imagined” constructs.236 
Contrary to Karl Marx’s predictions that it would disappear with the decay of capitalism, 
nationalism re-emerged and redefined itself during the 1930s in North America, Europe, but also 
the Soviet Union. This made unsustainable the notion that nationalism, and nationalities were 
disappearing in the solvent of economic development and social mobility.237 In the 1980s and the 
1990s, Benedict Anderson, Eric Hobsbawm, and Grigor Suny238 demonstrated the way 
nationalism and the making of nations was conditioned by class and modernity. Making 
nationality, like making class, came to be seen as a “complex process of creating an ‘imagined 
community’ that finds its expression in symbols, rituals, flags, songs, collective actions, and the 
articulation and representation of its goals.”239 For an historian, uncovering the socio-economic 
and political developments underlining national formations became a framework for 
understanding social, economic, and political changes occurring in societies over time and space.  
The most important role in the development of national communities is played by so-called 
symbolic elites. This term refers to groups (such as state actors and journalists) who are 
implicated in the construction of dominant discourses through their privileged access to powerful 
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institutions and instruments (such as the mass media) in society.240 Although this definition may 
not be precise, symbolic elites can be broadly understood as “those who control the means of 
communication and who are engaged in the manufacturing of public opinion.”241 Historically, 
usually in the context of a political struggle, they “invented traditions” and defined and redefined 
the criteria of membership in a national community: “They revive, refine, and pass down 
rhetoric, symbols and rituals that soon appear to have a naturalness and authenticity that 
originates deep in history and possesses legitimacy for shaping the future.”242 For these reasons, 
the role played by political leaders and the educated strata in the formation of a Finnish-socialist 
national identity in Karelia in the 1920s and the 1930s should not be underestimated. They 
licensed a particular representation of society and history, and channeled their efforts at 
entrenching their beliefs through certain images, texts, and discourses. North American Finns for 
their part played a central role in cultivating national identity in Karelia in their own image. 
Key to nation-state building is a construction of a myth of a single people who share one 
territory, undivided loyalty to government, and a common cultural heritage.243 The place and role 
of Karelia in Finnish culture, folklore, and national identity cannot be overestimated. It was in 
Karelia that during the 1820s-1840s Elias Lonnrot discovered old runes which he used to create 
the Kalevala.244  A Finnish national epic poem, Kalelvala, was published in 1838 and became 
the point of reference in the Finnish language, culture, and ethnic identity.245 It was not without 
significance that Kalevala was used extensively by Jean Sibelius. A Finnish composer of the late 
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Romantic period, Sibelius played a key role in the formation of the Finnish national identity. As 
a result, since the middle of the 19th century Karelia became the foundation of an imagined 
Greater Finland, subsequently inspiring many Finnish writers, poets, artists, and composers to 
perpetuate the national myth, a movement which came to be known as Karelianism.246 As one 
Finn put it, Karelianism was “an escape to a past of Karelia and the entire Finnish tribe, which 
was the Finnish form of universal escapism and utopia.”247 
Soviet Nationality Policy, 1920s-1930s: Institutionalizing Ethnicity 
 
 In the midst of the Russian Civil War, Bolsheviks found themselves fighting on the 
domestic front, as well as fending off foreign interventions. Given Karelia’s geo-political 
importance to the survival of the Bolshevik regime, Lenin and the People’s Commissariat on 
Internal Affairs (NKVD) set up the Karelian Commune as a buffer against repeated Finnish 
attempts to annex the region.248 The creation of the commune had several other rationales behind 
it: first, to prevent Karelian nationalism, which was anti-Russian, anti-Soviet and thus presented 
danger to Soviet internal security; second, the commune would become a medium through which 
to spread the socialist revolution to Scandinavia.249 
Although these developments reflected military and strategic concerns of the state, there 
was also an underlining political and ideological rationale. Despite staunch opposition within the 
Communist Party, Lenin believed concessions to national minorities would demonstrate to 
workers abroad and within the territory of the former Russian Tsarist Empire, that socialism was 
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compatible with national cultures.250 Lenin strongly believed that the nationality question in the 
Soviet Union was an inevitable historic phase, a byproduct of capitalism, and once all of national 
culture was exhausted, conditions for the organization of an internationalist socialist culture 
would be ripe: “national identity is not an essential and permanent reality but rather an 
unavoidable by-product of the modern capitalist and early socialist world, which must be passed 
through before a mature internationalist socialist world can come into being.”251 Lenin argued 
that by insisting on the development of national minorities’ culture, he would speed up the 
historical process, which would culminate in a smooth transition to a universal Soviet culture and 
communism in general. This thinking formed the foundation for the Soviet nationality policy, 
which allowed regional minority leaders to gain and consolidate political power.252  
Dubbed Korenizatsiya, meaning “nativization” or “indigenization,” the Soviet nationality 
policy did not simply endorse, but actively promoted, and even trained national elites into 
leadership positions in local government, schools, industrial enterprises, management, 
bureaucracy, and nomenklatura.253 The Soviet state financed mass production of books, 
newspapers, journals, movie, and opera productions, museums, and other forms of non-Russian 
language cultural production.254 Local languages assumed official status and all who served in 
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local governments, regardless of national and ethnic background were encouraged, and in many 
cases required, to learn the local language and culture. For example, between 1928 and 1938, the 
number of non-Russian newspapers increased from 205 titles in 47 languages to 2188 titles in 66 
languages.255  
 Writing about the essence and consequences of Korenizatsia, Yuri Selezkine depicts the 
Soviet Union in the 1920s as a communal department with various nationalities inhabiting it.256 
Lenin’s theory of good (“oppressed nations”) nationalism, according to Selezkine formed the 
ethno-cultural infrastructure for the later development of the ethno-national identities in the 
Soviet republics.   
…uncompromisingly hostile to individual rights, they [Bolsheviks] eagerly, deliberately 
and quite consistently promoted group rights that did not always coincide with those of 
the proletariat. The world’s first state of workers and peasants was the world’s first state 
to institutionalize ethno-territorial federalism, classify all citizens according to their 
biological nationalities and formally prescribe preferential treatment of certain ethnically 
defined populations.257 
 
Another Soviet historian, Grigor Suny, goes as far as to argue that the majority of national 
republics were Soviet-era creations, when the central government gave carte blanche to certain 
ethnic groups, while denying others’ claims for self-determination. From the early 1920s up until 
the reversal of nativization, and the ensuing russification of the Soviet society in the mid-1930s, 
Soviet federalism guaranteed and actively endorsed cultural rights of an array of national 
minority groups. In fact, at one point Lenin advocated for the Soviet Union to have over 100 
official national languages.  
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 To help “backward”, or oppressed, nationalities to catch up with the Great Russians, the 
state was to assist local leaders financially and politically in introducing their own courts and 
agencies of government that would function in the native language and consist of people familiar 
with life and mentality of the local population.258 The party was to help local national leaders to 
develop their own press, local social clubs, and other cultural and educational institutions in 
native languages.259 For example, it was considered scandalous if North Caucasians or 
Ukrainians did not have their own theater, libraries, or literary organizations.260 In was in this 
way that a small red-Finnish educated elite in Karelia utilized Korenizatsia to promote and 
entrench the Finnish language and cultural forms in a territory where Finns were only one of 
many national/ethnic minorities, but who as a result of circumstances got a grip on political 
power in the republic. North American Finns arrived in Karelia in the context of this widespread 
indigenous, and in some respect artificial national construction – a historical period which one 
historian called a “feast of ethnic fertility, an exuberant national carnival sponsored by the 
party.”261  
Edward Gylling: Role of the Elites 
One of the minority leaders who emerged from such circumstances was Edward Gylling. 
A prominent Social Democrat and the Commissar of Finance for the revolutionary “red” Finnish 
government during the Finnish Civil War, Gylling found himself in the Soviet Union in 1920. 
When the Civil War was lost for reds in Finland, Gylling’s dream of a greater socialist Finland 
was also lost. Shortly after, however, he developed a new plan, in which socialist Karelia would 
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become sort of a bridgehead that would carry the revolution to Finland. Following negotiations 
with Georgy Chicherin – the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs, as well as Lenin and 
Stalin, Gylling became head of the Karelian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (KASSR), 
serving as chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars from 1920 until his dismissal in 
1935. 
Gylling personally negotiated political and economic terms for Karelia and was granted 
full authority in the republic’s administration. For Gylling the task in Karelia was “a bit like a 
contract for Finnish communists.”262 Although an internationalist and socialist throughout his 
life, nonetheless Gylling’s civilizing mission throughout his time at the helm in Karelia was 
heavily imbued with the Finnish nationalist discourse, which penetrated the Karelian government 
and society on all levels. During his rule Karelia became a national home for Finnish 
communists dispersed around the world. Gylling once even admitted he was a nationalist, 
although he claimed that nationalism was a necessary evil that had to accommodate communism 
at this stage.263  
The policy of Korenizatsia brought red Finns to power in Karelia. It was used by Gylling 
and his supporters as a guiding principle to subject the republic to Finnish cultural norms and 
political authority. To solidify his creation demographically Gylling set out to recruit skilled 
Finnish workers from Finland and North America. Alarmed by the influx of Russian workers and 
fearing demographic russification Gylling relentlessly lobbied the Kremlin to allow North 
Americans to come to Karelia. Despite opposition from the Ministries of Internal and External 
Affairs, the Kremlin leadership thought it would be beneficial to the Karelian and Soviet 
economies to approve the scheme. The request came at an opportune moment. Soon after the 
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revolutionary fervor subsided, Bolshevik leaders realized that there was an acute shortage of 
skilled and unskilled labor in the Soviet Union. To solve the problem, they encouraged limited 
immigration of specialists which resulted in tens of thousands of North Americans crossing the 
Atlantic to work in the first workers’ state.264  For example, at the Soviet embassy in Germany 
alone, more than 70 people were employed to manage the recruitment office.265  
 Without the administrative tools and without support from the central government, the 
Finnish Karelian community would have never blossomed the way it did from 1920 to 1935. The 
application of Korenizatsia was at times so intense and penetrated local discourses to such an 
extent that it made anyone who objected to the policy subject to public condemnation. 
Indigenous Karelians who spoke against finnicization were labeled ‘separatists’, and any 
Russians who did so was labeled a ‘great power chauvinist’. Markku Kangaspuro has suggested 
that “had the Orgburo of the Central Committee of the party, headed by Stalin, not made a 
decision supporting the views of the Finns on March 6, 1922 the game would have been over.”266 
In fact, if one were to juxtapose the process of national building in Soviet Karelia throughout the 
1920s and the first half of the 1930s, to the national construction process in the Finnish Grand 
Duchy under the Tsarist regime prior to 1918, one would find striking similarities: “the similar 
process of national construction produced similar results; a national consciousness and a national 
(autonomous) administrative machinery.” 267 
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In convincing Soviet authorities to allow immigration of skilled Finnish workers from 
North America, Gylling argued that the Soviet government would not need to invest any capital 
in the venture. Throughout the 1920s several North American groups expressed a desire to settle 
in Karelia. In asking for permission to immigrate they indicated a willingness to pay for their 
own transportation and import the necessary tools and equipment. In addition, another 
development in the early 1930s played into Gylling’s hands and facilitated the recruitment of 
North America workers. In light of an acute labor shortage, Soviet social scientists determined 
that training new cadres would be significantly more expensive than bringing skilled workers 
from abroad. 268 And in September of 1930 the Council of People’s Commissars (Sovnarkom) of 
the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) approved in principle immigration 
from North America.269 On March 5, 1931 SNK SSSR allowed the Karelian government to bring 
up to 2,000 lumbermen from Canada. In the next four months alone, 2,824 North American 
Finns arrived.270  
Gylling resisted russification even before he assumed power.271 An economist and a 
demographer by training, he often lamented the initial Finnish exodus to North America. Even 
before the revolution in Finland, he argued it was imperative for the Finnish state to ‘reclaim’ the 
lost North American tribe. During his tenure in Karelia he would struggle to rectify this 
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‘mistake’ by initiating an elaborate transatlantic recruiting scheme. It must be made clear that 
Gylling and his entourage instructed recruiters in Canada and the United States to enlist workers 
exclusively of Finnish descent. At the time of the Great Depression, labor migration to the Soviet 
Union was an attractive option, in particular for left-wing immigrant workers. There is enough 
evidence to suggest that throughout the first part of the 1930s North Americans of Finnish, 
Russian, Polish, German, Italian, Ukrainian, Hungarian origin were on the move to the Soviet 
Union.272 The CPC archives and a close reading of the Worker reveal that many workers of non-
Finnish origin contacted the CPC and the KTA offices to inquire about employment 
opportunities in the Soviet Union. However, the CPC, the FOC, and Karelian recruiters refused 
to provide information on how to get a transfer to the Soviet Union, let alone accept non-Finnish 
applicants for consideration.273 It was clear that Gylling wanted skilled workers specifically of 
Finnish origin; others, no matter how skilled, were of little interest to the Karelian patriarch.  
Gylling imagined a future where Soviet Karelia would be populated by the Finnish 
diaspora, where the lost North American tribe would live immersed in socialism, the Finnish 
language, and the Finnish culture. Gylling’s immigration policy was not an isolated thought, but 
an integral part of his broader vision for Karelia in the international system. ‘Ideal’ immigrants 
were gauged according to their ethnic suitability within the republic’s imagined future.274 After 
all, Gylling’s search for skilled workers to boost the republic’s economy and fulfill five year plan 
quotas dictated by the Kremlin all too conveniently coincided with his search for specifically 
Finnish specialists. As a result, in addition to skilled workers, Gylling also received a fair share 
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of ethnic community activists – the educated leaders and cultural producers, or as one 
commentator noted ‘ethnic entrepreneurs’.275 
Reproducing Culture 
 
As a result of its demographic insignificance the Finnish-speaking population of Karelia 
was for the most part invisible in the early 1920s. In 1921 there were only about 1,000 Finns in 
Karelia, with 550 residing in the capital – Petrozavodsk,276 while the majority of the republic’s 
population spoke Russian and various Karelian dialects. Yet, by the mid-1930s, the republic’s 
public and administrative life came to be dominated by the Finnish language and culture. 
Theatres, orchestras, choirs, art studios, as well as an array of newspapers and radio stations 
operated in the Finnish language.277 Whereas in the early 1920s red Finns faced resistance from 
the local “Karelian-Russian” opposition, the adoption of Korenizatsia gave the red Finnish 
faction an upper hand in the conflict, and allowed Gylling to appoint and control the political and 
cultural bureaucracy in the republic. Thanks in large part to immigration from Canada and the 
United States, the Finnish population in Karelia increased from 2,544 in 1926 to 12,088 in 
1933.278 All in all, North American Finns made a substantial contribution to the Karelian 
economy. However, they were also markedly active in the republic’s social, cultural, and 
political life, and were instrumental in creating a new Finnish Karelian identity. They played a 
central role in developing the local administration, educational system, and cultural institutions, 
all in a language not familiar to the vast majority of the population.  
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In the early 1930s, Finnish was becoming an increasingly influential language in the 
public sphere. Following the signing of the Treaty of Tartu in 1920 it was expected the language 
of administration, legislation, and public education in Karelia would be that of the ethnic 
majority, which in turn meant one of the Karelian dialects.279 However, under pressure from 
Gylling, that privileged role was assigned to the Finnish language.280 Its influence grew 
throughout the 1920s under the auspices of Korenizatsia, and in 1929 the Karelian Regional 
Committee (Obkom) of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (VKP b) established that 
there would be no choice in the language of instruction between Russian or Finnish, and that 
Finnish would become the mandatory language of literature, writing, and instruction in 
schools.281 The fact that the number of people who could read and write doubled from 1920 to 
1932282 also meant that the message conveyed by Karelia’s cultural producers was reaching even 
wider audiences. 
The rising influence of the Finnish language and culture in the public sphere in the first 
part of the 1930s coincided with an exponential rise in the number of Finnish-speaking cultural 
producers in Karelia. For example, unionized teachers of Finnish descent in Karelia constituted 
8.2 percent of the total in 1926, 11.1 percent in 1928, 15.5 percent in 1930, and 30.9 percent in 
1933.283 Notable is the steep increase in the number of Finnish-speaking teachers between 1930 
and 1933, a trend that coincided with the Karelian fever. A similar trend could be noticed in the 
publishing industry. Finns represented 3.4 percent of the republic’s printer’s union membership 
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in 1926, 14.3 percent in 1928, and 30.2 percent in 1933.284 By 1933, Finns also comprised more 
than a quarter of all the art workers in the republic.285 These numbers are significant because in 
1933 the Finnish population was only 12,088, nine times inferior to the number of Karels 
(109,046), and eighteen times less than that of the Russian majority (224,445).286  
Finnish intellectual workers in North America had at best limited employment 
opportunities; however in Karelia they were welcomed with open arms. By 1934 the Karelian 
branch of the Soviet Writers’ Union (SWU) had 12 members, 9 of whom were Finns.287 Mikko 
Ylikangas estimates that there were 32 Finnish writers in Karelia, along with 12 Russians and 5 
Karels. The majority of Finnish writers were North American immigrants who, among other 
things, also actively advocated further Finnish migration to Karelia.288 The growing number of 
Finns in administrative positions of Karelia’s cultural and political infrastructure was a direct 
result of the Korenizatsia policy. Whereas in the second part of the 1930s, the excessive number 
of Finns in positions of importance would be widely criticized, in the first part of the decade the 
exact opposite held true. The Finnish elite, as well as the rank and file, knew how to exploit the 
favorable situation in their own interests. For example, at regional workers’ union meetings, 
many complained that not enough Finns, in particular North American Finns, were employed or 
involved289 with the central office of the Insnab.290  
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The creation of nations as imagined communities, according to Ernest Gellner, is 
achieved through public education, public rituals, and mass mobilizing institutions such as the 
army or political parties.291 If that is the case, Karelia’s Finnish institutional completeness was 
virtually fulfilled. Finns for example, predominated in the command core of the republic’s 
military units. Whereas Karels and Russians virtually monopolized the rank and file positions 
(Karels 65% and Russians 34%), Finns were in the majority among the intermediate and senior 
commanders (60%).292 Finns also held major posts in the government and in the Communist 
Party. New publishing houses printed newspapers and books in Finnish, and imported literature 
from Finland. Between 1929 and 1933 almost all books published in Karelia were in the Finnish 
language.293 Furthermore, a drama theater was established, with membership composed entirely 
of North American Finns. By 1932, 99.6 percent of Karelian children in schools, and 70 percent 
of Karelian adults were being taught in Finnish.294  
The policy of Korenizatsia created a situation where ethnicity and privilege became 
inseparable. Ethnic interests were openly promoted by the political elite through administrative 
units, through the Communist Party, trade unions, and the media.295 For example, well defined 
salary categories clearly privileged Finnish workers. The highest paid category of workers was 
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dominated by North American specialists. They received higher salaries that any other group, 
and, what is more important, had access to special stores, such as Insnab, and thus foods and 
consumer goods that were often unavailable to the majority of the population. In addition, North 
American workers were provided by the authorities with significantly better living quarters than 
local workers. ‘National workers’ – all other Finns legally residing in the republic comprised the 
second category and earned the so-called language bonuses, which amounted to higher salaries 
than workers in the third category dominated by Karels and Russians.296 
The media obviously knew how to play the Korenizatsiya tune. For example, 
correspondents for Punainen-Karjala (Red Karelia) actively encouraged further Finnish 
immigration to the republic. One journalist accused the leadership of the Kondopoga lumber site 
of sabotaging the nationality policy and favoring Russian over Finnish workers.297 According to 
the article printed in the paper, the Russian management was reactionary, and promoted workers 
only from its own group. It is clear that the Korenizatsia policy generated the necessary 
conditions for institutionalized ethnic and social inequality, to the benefit of the Finnish 
population.298 
Karelia’s demographic realities did not reflect the republic’s political landscape. In the 
early 1930s, a total of approximately 65,000 immigrants came to Karelia. The majority of 
immigrants (81%) were either of Finnish descent, 7,700 (12%) or Russian, 44,000 (69%).299 
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Also, in 1933 more than a third of the population was born outside of Karelia.300 Thus, based on 
numbers alone, immigrants played at the very least an important demographic role in Karelia’s 
social, cultural, economic, and political life in the 1930s. Russian immigrants, who outnumbered 
Finnish ones 6 to 1, nonetheless found themselves in a position of a political, cultural, and 
economic inferiority. In unbalanced competition with other immigrants over jobs and scarce 
resources, protected by the state and the local administration, North American Finns played a 
pivotal role in the construction of a particular form of representation of the Karelian community.  
 
An Imagined Community: The Greatest Trick the Nation Ever Pulled was to Convince the 
World it Does Exist 
The ideological power of imagined communities lies in its ability to generate distorting 
perceptions of reality. Peoples’ everyday experiences, however, serve as an antidote in this 
equation, as they often find little consistency with the “realities” as interpreted and projected by 
ruling elites and cultural producers. For example, the majority of letters and memoirs penned by 
North American immigrants in Karelia in the early 1930s testify to the fact that life in Karelia 
was extremely difficult, and at times unbearable. The truth about life in Karelia, they wrote, did 
not reflect the far-fetched stories told by Karelian recruiters in Canada and the United States.  
For example, the three memoirs written by Finnish-Canadians Martti Heurlin (1975), 
writer Salli Lund (1983), and journalist Veikko Taipale (1986) all mention that most immigrants 
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could not stand the birthing pains of socialism and left quickly.301 In an interview, Eila Balandis, 
a Canadian Finn who survived the purges and the Second World War, mentions the difficult 
conditions in which North American Finns found themselves upon arrival in Karelia.302 She 
recounts how at one sitting she ate a lot of wheat porridge, which she then threw up. This 
incident caused her mother to lash out at her father for bringing his family to a place “where 
children had to eat chicken food.”303  Her father, like many other immigrants, believed that a 
better future was just around the corner, and that they should just wait. This sort of thinking was 
a reflection of typical Soviet propaganda, which endlessly promised a bountiful future amid 
permanent state of scarcity and chronic economic depression. The basic trope of socialist 
realism, argues Sheila Fitzpatrick is “the superimposition of a better ‘soon’ on a still imperfect 
‘now’.304 In the discourse of socialist realism, the Soviet society was represented in terms of not 
‘life as it is’ but ‘life as it becoming’.”305  
Although the Karelian government had sincere aspirations to supply North American 
specialists with the necessary lodging and food provisions, the incompetent Soviet bureaucratic 
apparatus stalled such initiatives. Two letters from the Head of the Customs Office, a certain 
Rutenberg, written 6 months apart, show that as late as December 1932 officials still did not have 
the slightest idea about the regulations on levying duties on foods and goods brought across the 
border by foreign workers.306 OGPU weekly reports reveal that many of the workers’ houses had 
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leaking roofs and no heating, and despite workers’ numerous appeals to Karelles (a trust which 
owned the houses) problems were addressed very slowly. When repairs were finally begun, they 
had to be halted once again because of a shortage of nails. In addition, OGPU records show that 
the expensive equipment brought from North America by immigrants was misused and rendered 
useless by incompetent administrators.307  
Most of all, foreign workers were frustrated by the lack of employment and adequate 
housing. For example, given the absence of work in Petrozavodsk, the Karelstroi (Karelia’s 
construction trust) had to send some of its employees to work on the outskirts of the city. Many 
were dispatched to Kondopoga, but soon returned arguing they did not want to live apart from 
their families, and that on top of everything there was a housing shortage in the town. Thirty 
fishermen who were sent to Kandalksha from Petrozavodsk also returned citing an absence of 
adequate housing in the area. Correspondence between government officials, dated July 1935 
reveals that although directives for the construction of houses for foreign workers were given out 
as early as 1931, most construction sites had not even begun their projects.308 When the 
ministries did finally allot the necessary funding in the summer of 1935 it turned out that there 
was now an acute scarcity of construction materials, and the project had to be postponed once 
again.  
The underlying promise of the entire recruiting scheme was guaranteed employment for 
all. However, North American Finns encountered a different reality. Although official settlement 
statistics indicate that all arriving workers were assigned work at various trusts throughout 
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Karelia, other sources, such as records of arrests, reveal that some were in fact unemployed.309 
Ivan Chukhin, for example has demonstrated that, although the official line claimed 
unemployment was non-existent in the Soviet Union, by the early 1930s there in fact were close 
to 500,000 people out of work in the Soviet Union.310 Chukhin also argues that mass arrests and 
imprisonment throughout the 1930s, in addition to solving the country’s socio-political problems 
and dissent, were meant to provide the much needed labor for Stalin’s failing industrialization 
initiatives.311 The OGPU set up several labor camps intended for large industrial projects 
throughout Karelia in the 1930s. In fact, forced labor could be found throughout the Soviet 
Union since the early 1920s. Thus, in some way, recruiters did not lie, as work was guaranteed 
for everyone, even if it meant employment in the Gulag. 
In addition to the bureaucratic ineptitude, North American Finns had to deal with the 
condescending attitudes of local Russian and Karelian workers, who often resented immigrants, 
calling North American Finns “nahlebniki” (parasites) and bourgeois. Not surprisingly, they 
accused foreign workers of stealing jobs from locals, and the OGPU reported cases of 
mistreatment and even abuse as early as 1931.312 Although the Karelian government, as well as 
the republic’s major industrial trusts wholeheartedly supported immigration from North 
America, common workers did not.  
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Many American and Canadian specialists believed they were coming to a place where 
everyone was equal, in particular when it concerned their Finnish compatriots.  However they 
found the realities to be much different from what they expected. For example, at one of the 
logging camps, ten border hopper Finns were excluded from Insnab dining rooms despite the 
collective demand by American workers to let them stay and eat from the food allotted to 
them.313 After the request was denied and the dining room was divided into two sections to 
differentiate between legal and “illegal” workers, immigrants began sarcastically referring to 
sections as the “Bosses” and “Proletarian” zones. Workers also often complained about the 
rampant corruption in the Insnab stores. For example, there were several complaints about the 
store in Uhta, where the same worker was responsible for the ordering of provisions, 
management of stockpiles, as well as the accounting.  
North American Finns also found the sales personnel at Insnab stores rude and conniving. 
Allegedly they put up poor quality products on the shelves, while quality foods and goods were 
being sold “under the counter” for higher prices. In 1933 Insnab privileges for foreign workers 
were canceled altogether, causing uproar among North American immigrants. The cost of living 
increased drastically as a result, and caused many to re-emigrate.314 In addition to shortages of 
consumer goods, inadequate food provisions, and long lines in the stores, there were also the 
frequent hold ups in the payment of salaries. And as a result of poor and unsanitary living and 
working condition, mass illness was also not uncommon.315 Living conditions were poor to the 
                                                
313 НАРК, ф. 690, оп. 1, д. 22/254 «Доклады и докладные записки ГПУ АКССР о положении финско-
американской колонии и...». Л. 54. [Report of the GPU AKSSR on the state of the Finnish-American colony in 
Karelia as of 1st October 1932] 
314 Alexey Golubev and Irina Takala, In Search of Socialist El Dorado, p. 104. 
315 КГАНИ, ф. 3 (Каробком ВКП(б)), оп. 2, д. 790 (Информации обкома и переписка... о партийно-массовой 
работе и культурно-бытовом обслуживании иностранных рабочих и промпереселенцов). февраль-декабрь 
1932. л. 23-26 Докладная записка о положении иностранных рабочих в Карелстройобьэдинение (март 1932 
г.) [Information of the regional committee and correspondence ... about the party mass work and cultural services of 
111	  
	  
extent that it made most immigrants admit they made a mistake in coming to Karelia, and some 
even claimed that conditions in depression-stricken United States were by far superior to what 
they had to endure in the Soviet Union.316  
A letter written by one of the immigrants in March of 1932 reflects the disparity between 
the recruitment message advertised in the Finnish communities across Canada and the United 
States on one hand and Soviet reality on the other. Edvard Mason’s comments illuminate the 
deceptive nature of the constructed and idealized image of the Soviet Union as a workers’ state, 
and highlight some of the reasons for the failure of Soviet immigration policy. Mason writes:  
I am back from Petroskoi and on the way to USA. When I arrived there with Lehtimaki’s 
group, I found things much different there as was described in New York. We was 
promised work in the aeroplane shop, but there was nothing of this kind, and nothing 
under construction, or in the sight, that such workshop would be constructed in the 
nearest future. We was promised 3 room apartment, but there was no house of that kind 
built in all town and we had to put in poorest living quarters one could ever think of. 
Sufficient food was promised, but it was poorest I ever eat in all my life. And wages, 
which was going to be 300 rubles per month, was little over 200 rubles per month for the 
time I worked there on the building. And when they wanted me to go to lumber camp, I 
refused, demanding the work for which I was assigned, then they told me I could quit, 
which I did. I demanded the money back what I paid to you and Lehtimaki, they refused, 
offering me the rubles, which I couldn’t use…317 
 
Immigrant letters expose that many immigrants felt deceived upon arrival in Karelia. For 
example, one of the first groups to arrive in Karelia noted that “in Canada we are used to 
thinking that Petrozavodsk is a Finnish speaking city. This is not the case.”318  
 Open letters warning about substandard quality of life in Karelia appeared as early as 
August 1931 in the North American Finnish press. For example, Lauri Nordling wrote that 
people should not go to Karelia unless they were wholeheartedly dedicated to the socialist cause. 
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Otherwise, he insisted, they would be disappointed: “In many cases people leave and go back to 
the capitalist world, sometimes ashamed, having lost everything, and sometimes they become 
real enemies of socialism – better be clear in your mind before you come.”319 Nordling also 
encouraged men to go to Karelia first, settle in, and only when conditions improved to call for 
their families to join them. Such a recommendation stood in contrast to the message spread by 
recruiters, who encouraged men not to leave their families behind.320 Recruiters were concerned 
that men would leave Karelia without fulfilling their contracts, something that eventually did 
happen.   
Nordling also observed that in Karelia, contrary to what people were made to believe in 
Canada, illiteracy was widespread, as was the belief in superstitions and religions.321 Soviet 
Karelia was highly nationalistic he wrote, illiterate, with a poor infrastructure and chronic food 
supply shortages. Karelia as advertised by recruiters it seems was a mirage. It is worth quoting in 
full, one historian’s observation on the disparities between the constructed realities, as opposed 
to everyday experiences, in Karelia:  
In the immigrants’ dreams—and probably in the stories of American and Canadian 
recruiters—Petrozavodsk was a large beautiful city with straight and broad streets, multi-
story buildings, and many parks and gardens. In reality, in the early 1930s, the capital of 
Karelia was a small and dirty town with less than a third of its streets paved, cows and 
goats grazing at the crossroads, and few streetlights. Horses were the major means of 
transportation. The electric power supply was often cut, and almost a quarter of the 
population lived without it at all. There was no sewage system or centralized water 
supply…Many families could not even dream of an apartment of their own and had to 
rent a room or even just part of a room. Extreme overcrowding with poor sanitary 
conditions led to a high incidence of disease as well as a high mortality rate.322  
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Several articles in the Canadian mainstream media – The Star and The Globe – 
throughout the late 1920s and the early 1930s reported on the brutal Soviet prison camps and, as 
evidence, presented testimonies of North American immigrants who managed to escape the 
Gulag.323 These claims however were dismissed by the CPC and the FOC as bourgeois 
propaganda aimed at tarnishing the Soviet image. Within the Finnish communities, many of the 
returnees tried to tell the horrid truth about Soviet Karelia. However, most of their pleas fell on 
deaf ears. To make matters worse, the socialist press in Canada was quick to denote such rhetoric 
as signs of betrayal and bourgeois propaganda.  
The left-wing press in North America contributed exponentially to the construction of the 
Soviet and the Soviet Karelian image as a constantly progressing society, whose imperfections 
would be settled in the near future. For North American Finns, who were far removed from the 
Soviet actualities, it was difficult to develop a balanced judgment. Moreover, returnee witness 
accounts and contradictory stories in the media further divided the Finnish community, even 
within the left. For example, a group of Finns seen sent off “by hundreds of comrades” to the 
Soviet Union in August of 1931, wrote to the Vapaus that on their way a crowd of “strangers 
came by and tried to talk us out from leaving,” citing poor conditions in Karelia.324 The use of 
language here is very telling. While it was “comrades” who came to see them off to Soviet 
Karelia at the port in Halifax, it was “strangers” (or the ‘others’) who were trying to talk them 
out of going.325  
Furthermore, sources indicate that the OGPU and the Ministry of Internal Affairs (NKID) 
knew all too well, and warned both the Soviet government as well as the Karelian leadership, 
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that North American immigrants would be disappointed with the social conditions in Karelia and 
would most likely return to North America. The OGPU and the NKID had their own reasons for 
concern. They feared, and rightfully so, that foreign workers would transfer currencies abroad 
and expose the harsh realities of Soviet life in their correspondence with friends and relatives 
abroad. At a meeting of the Orgburo TSKa dated September 22, 1932, a certain Postishev wrote 
to Karelia asking Gylling to stop the immigration of Canadian fishermen until proper dwellings 
and other buildings had been constructed. NKID representative, a certain Rotshtein wrote to 
SNK RSFSR in 1930 and stated that bringing Finnish workers to Karelia would be 
counterproductive.326 First, he argued, the emigration of left-wing elements from Finland would 
weaken the class struggle in Finland. Second, there was a good chance that living and working 
conditions in the Soviet Union would turn out to be much worse than in Finland, which would 
inevitably result in return migration and tarnish the Soviet image in the eyes of the international 
proletariat. OGPU opposition to immigration from abroad dated to at least 1928. In fact, Gylling, 
while lobbying the government to allow immigration from North America, had to work hard to 
convince authorities in the Kremlin to bypass the opposition of the OGPU.  
Attempts by the OGPU and the NKID, two of the most powerful ministries in the Soviet 
Union, to forestall immigration from Europe and North America can be explained by the very 
nature of their existence – the protection of the Soviet imagined community from internal and 
external threats. They and, as we will see, also the Canadian government and the RCMP, with 
vast resources at their disposal, were well informed about the inconsistencies between Soviet 
propaganda and lived realities, and were convinced that immigrants would find social conditions 
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in Karelia unappealing, even unbearable. The “Potemkinites”327 at the OGPU and the NKID 
were trying to protect the Soviet façade. It is not surprising then that these same agencies would 
participate in one way or another in the purges that would destroy the North American 
communities.  
Representations of imagined communities always appear more colorful and attractive at a 
distance. For example, Mennonites who traveled to Canada following the Second World War 
were “dismayed to encounter large unpopulated areas of trees and prairie, and a country that was 
“less civilized” than the richness they had been expecting.”328 Marlene Epp argues that our 
traditional and popular understanding of Canada and the North American continent is challenged 
by such a narrative. In a similar fashion, Finns who arrived in Canada in the 1920s and in Soviet 
Karelia in the 1930s were dismayed (although to different degrees) to find that the images of 
Canada as a land of opportunity and of Soviet Karelia as a workers’ paradise were misleading, 
constructed representations of social, cultural, and economic realities. 
Re-Emigration 
Evidence of the fact that the Karelian imaginary was chimerical is the quick paced re-
emigration from Karelia. Having realized they had been deluded by recruiters, people began to 
leave the region as soon as they arrived. The Peoples Commissariat of AKSSR mentions re-
emigration of North American Finns as early as March of 1931.329 There were reports of 
immigrants who did not even unpack their suitcases, but turned around and went back to North 
America, or continued their voyage to Finland. However, the majority did not leave right away. 
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Only 63 Canadian and American Finns left Karelia in 1931.330 On average, migrants returned 
after spending about a year there. Departure en-masse began in late 1932, as North American 
specialists departed even before their employment contracts expired, many without getting 
paid.331 As mentioned, some of the reasons that prompted migrants to move on were poor living 
conditions, insufficient food supplies, inadequate and late supply of materials to work sites, and 
hold ups in salaries.332 According to the Karelian Resettlement Committee and Canadian 
Passengers lists, by December 1933, 322 Canadian Finns and 560 American ones had left 
Karelia.333 Although there are no official records for 1934 and 1935, it is likely that the outflow 
of North American Finns from Karelia continued apace. Even though it became more difficult to 
leave the Soviet Union in the mid-1930s, nonetheless there were those like Matti and Katri 
Kujala of Dorchester, Mass, who received their passports at the U.S. consulate in Moscow as late 
as the spring of 1936.334  
As OGPU records show women were the ones who encouraged emigration from 
Karelia.335 While the ratio of women to men was virtually identical in the re-emigration stream, 
there were twice as many men as women who initially made their way to Karelia. Women were 
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thus more likely to re-emigrate. Moreover, nearly 20 percent of the returnees were children.336 
Analysis of transatlantic passengers’ lists reveals contrasting patterns of migration from North 
America to Soviet Karelia, as opposed to return migration from Soviet Karelia to North America 
and Finland. On their way to the Soviet Union, it was common for men to arrive in advance of 
their families, who joined them once they established themselves financially in the Soviet Union. 
On the other hand, return migration was markedly different and reveals a reverse trend: women 
and children left first, and were followed by their husbands, on average about a month later.337 It 
seems as if women and children were leaving Karelia in a hurry. One can conclude that promises 
in regards to free education, healthcare, and social security, offers which attracted many couples 
with children to Karelia in the first place, were at best misleading. Although free, the level of 
education, healthcare, and the overall standards of living were appalling to many women who 
decided to leave. They played a major role in persuading their husbands to do the same. 
In order to dispel one of the myths about return migrations, it should be noted that 
returning Canadian and American Finns did not all go back to North America. In fact, close to 
fifty percent of the returnees did not end up in Canada or the United States, but went to Finland, 
Sweden, Germany, or moved on to other regions in the Soviet Union. It suggests that although 
immigrants were desperate to go back, return specifically to North America was never a 
foregone conclusion. The fact that women and children were leaving before men also suggests 
that North American Finns feared for the well being of their families in Karelia, and were trying 
to escape it as quickly as they could. Passenger lists’ analysis reveal that several North American 
Finns arrived at the ports of Halifax and New York working as ship crew members. This 
demonstrates that some spent all their money to get to Karelia and were looking for any way 
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possible to return home, wherever they considered it to be. Edward Waldman for example, 
arrived in the port of New York on April 1933 on board the President Harding hailing from 
Bremen, working as a crew member.338  
In addition there were instances, although rare, that immigrants left for other regions in 
the Soviet Union. Sources show that in attempts to find suitable employment and better living 
conditions North American Finns moved actively within Karelia and the Soviet Union.339 For 
example, a group of 16 auto-workers left Karelavto and relocated to an automobile factory in 
Nizhniy Novgorod. In the second half of 1934 alone, 143 requests were submitted to the 
Resettlement Agency asking for a transfer. Workers cited low wages, a chance to receive a better 
salary elsewhere, and remoteness of current work locations from major towns and food supplies 
as the main motives for relocation. For example, Vaine Kuffal asked to be transferred to the 
Matrossi lumber camp location, as he and his family lived far away from their nearest neighbors, 
there was an absence of any cultural centers or activities, and nearest food provision posts were 
nearly 50 kilometers away.  
Abolition of Insnab provisions for North American Finns proved to be the last straw. In 
1931 and 1932, although appalled by the living conditions, Canadian and American Finns were 
nonetheless one of the most privileged groups in the Soviet Union. Insnab provisions allowed 
foreign workers to receive 7 times more bread than Russian workers, 3 times as much sugar, 1.5 
more fish, and they also could receive 1.5 kg of butter a month, something that Russian workers 
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could only dream about. Reversal of the migration trend was so drastic following the cancelation 
of Insnab benefits that by mid-1933 there were as many North American Finns returning as 
arriving in Karelia. Mass exodus of North American Finns from Karelia began in the early 
months of 1933. They left the republic consistently throughout 1932, at a rate of about 20 
migrants per month. However, from January 1933, the number of returnees more than doubled. 
Between January and September an average of 50 immigrants departed Karelia every month, 
with the largest exodus recorded in March, when 83 Finns left.340  
The Dominant Discourses and the Power of Imagined Communities 
 The belief in the infallibility of the Soviet Karelian imagined community was strong. In 
some cases people continued to consider their arrests during Stalin’s purges a mistake, a result of 
a misunderstanding and confusion, blaming saboteurs and other real and imagined enemies of the 
Soviet regime for their misfortune. Many of the survivors maintained the ideological allegiance 
to the Soviet state even following Khrushchev’s de-Stalinization speech, and some remained 
convinced of Stalin’s altruism even after the collapse of the Soviet Union. In light of absence of 
significant resistance or alternative agendas within the Soviet public discourse, it seems that 
North American Finns embodied the hegemonic Soviet representations of the society. 
Immigrants however were not simply passive recipients, but also propagated and zealously 
defended the virtue of Soviet Karelia’s integrity. Judith Hokkanen, for example following 10 
years spent in a Soviet prison, still believed her arrest was illegal and was the work of internal 
class enemies who infiltrated the Soviet society.341  
                                                
340 Evgeny Efremkin, Переселение североамериканских финнов в Советскую Карелию.[Resettlement of Soviet 
Finns to Soviet Karelia] 
341 Mayme Sevander, Red Exodus: Finnish-American Emigration to Russia, (Tyomies Society, 1996), p, 6. 
120	  
	  
Yet another North American Finn mentioned the horrors of the terror, the arrests at night, 
of the deportations, and the miserable living conditions.342 However, he also was convinced in 
the good nature of the Soviet regime, holding spies and saboteurs accountable. It was because of 
them, he thought, that people were being wrongfully accused and arrested. Such thinking was 
shared by many others, who were certain that those arrested were most likely American agents 
that were somehow involved in “white Russian” sabotage. Sources indicate that even those who 
returned to North America believed most of the arrests were reasonable. A questionnaire sent to 
the returnees revealed a widespread belief in the existence of internal enemies in the Soviet state 
at the time. The general consensus was that if people were arrested there was in most likelihood a 
good reason for it.343 These beliefs were a reflection of typical Soviet interwar propaganda sifted 
from top to bottom through official channels and the media. This again, was a result of the 
embodiment of the dominant Soviet discourse rather than projections of daily-lived realities in 
Soviet Karelia. There is very little, if any evidence to suggest North American Finns sabotaged 
Soviet industries, or belonged to any type of international spy rings. Soviet propaganda was 
permeated with messages about lurking external and internal enemies, of perpetual danger to the 
Soviet regime. Due in large part to monopoly on lines of communication by the time mass 
purges set on the Soviet society, the state managed to convince the majority of the population of 
the absolute necessity of the project. 
Unsympathetic reviews about Soviet Karelia surfaced in the ethnic and mainstream press 
in the United States and Canada as early as the mid-1920s. For example, American Finns who 
returned from the Sower commune cursed it and the entire Soviet system for cheating honest 
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people.344 In the 1930s, Karelian fever returnees complained that they were misinformed by the 
recruiters and the socialist press. Nonetheless, most returnees refrained from open criticism, as 
disapproval directed at the Soviet Union was often met with resentment and hostility in the North 
American Finnish left-wing communities. Disillusioned migrants who were swept by the 
Karelian fever, but somehow managed to make it back to North America in most cases chose to 
remain silent about their experiences in the Soviet Union.345 Many moved to a different locale 
and became apolitical, while some were shunned even by friends and family.346  
In September 1931, a certain Kemppainen upon returning from Karelia wrote an 
extensive critical commentary about it, which was published in the Sault St. Marie News and the 
Upper Michigan Farm Journal, and then reprinted in Canadan Uutiset (published in Thunder 
Bay).347 The response was swift. In the next several weeks letters came in from within Canada 
and Karelia to criticize and denounce Kemppainen. He was accused of being a drunk and a lazy 
socialist. In fact, from the early 1930s, party members were being expelled from the CPUSA for 
criticizing the Soviet Union following their return from Karelia.348 The ideological protection of 
the Karelian regime was powerful and extended beyond its geographical borders. The Soviet 
Karelian cause was propagated but also cultivated and protected by North American Finnish 
community leaders and their followers. Those who decided to return to North America were seen 
as traitors and deserters in Canada and the United States, and were also criticized by those who 
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remained in Soviet Karelia. Immigrants’ letters reveal that many held a grudge against those who 
returned: “Selma Maki, she didn’t have a strong enough desire to a build a socialist society. 
What does she give as her reason for returning?”349  
In response to the growing criticism of Soviet Karelia and the Soviet Union by returning 
Canadian Finns, Gus Sundquist, head of the FOC, asked Gylling for permission to send over a 
Canadian delegation to inquire into living and working conditions of Canadian Finns in Karelia, 
to which Gylling enthusiastically agreed. For Gylling the arrival of the delegation meant an 
opportunity to promote Karelia in North America once again, as the immigration flow virtually 
stopped by 1934.350 As for Sundquist, following his return from the Soviet Union he immediately 
set off on a lecture tour throughout Finnish communities across Canada, which was subsequently 
published in the Vapaus. What was striking in Sundquist’s reports was the way in which he 
criticized, and in the process ostracized, returning Canadian Finns. In a letter to Eklund, dated 
April 1935 Sundquist wrote that the delegation met with many workers in Karelia and have not 
heard a single worker expressing a wish to return to Canada and that “the fact is that the kind of 
person who wants to move back from here to a capitalist country must have something wrong 
with his head or then he is here for some specific purpose.”351  
The rhetoric in these few lines requires further attention. According to Sundquist anyone 
who left Soviet Karelia was deviant. He hinted that returning Canadian Finns might in fact be 
infiltrators, saboteurs, and Finnish spies. Sundquist’s remarks were in line with the Soviet 
dominant discourse of the day, which in light of the Third Period policy and the economic 
depression engulfing the country saw departure from the Soviet Union as an act of treason. To 
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substantiate his argument Sundquist brought with him a manuscript of the “Statement of 1483 
workers who moved to Soviet Karelia about what is taking place in Soviet Karelia” which was 
published by Vapaus as a book in October 1935.352 The document was full of accusations against 
those who spoke out against the Soviet regime, and underscored that North American 
communities in Karelia had been compromised and infiltrated by saboteurs. It condemned 
criticism spread by the returning migrants, branding them as “bourgeoisie agents masquerading 
as workers.”353  
Contrary to attempts by FOC leaders to save face, one returnee and a former member of 
the FOC, Suomela, decided to go public and authored a short monograph “Six Months in 
Karelia: What an Immigrant saw and experienced in Soviet Karelia.” He was also quickly 
denounced by the left-wing press and accused of being an agent of white Finland. One of the 
letters condemning Suomela interpreted the return of Canadian Finns as a call for war against the 
Soviet Union. The letter blamed them for engaging in “whisper campaigns” against the Soviet 
regime and glorifying the capitalist system in North America. In his turn, Sundquist was only too 
happy to grant support to such claims: “This stage preceding the military attack was without 
weapons but it was nevertheless war.”354  
Return from Karelia fostered further discord within the Finnish North American left. The 
ideological struggle was most visible in the press, with the Vapaus and Vapa Sana, taking 
opposing stances on the issue. Vapaus, which supported the Karelian venture, published the 
“Statement of 1483 Workers” that celebrated North American Finnish achievements in Karelia, 
and refuted stories of the returnees. Vapa Sana, on the other hand, published Suomela’s critical 
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account on conditions in the Soviet Union. There was even a division among the returnees 
themselves. Suomela, for example, mentions heated debates on returning ships between those 
who wanted to stay quiet, and even lie, so as not to discredit the first workers’ state, and those, 
like Suomela, who argued that truth about the terrible living and working conditions in the Soviet 
Union had to be told. 
 Nonetheless, while some could not cope with Soviet realities and left, others were still 
convinced that the place of Finnish workers was nowhere but in Soviet Karelia. One of the letters 
written from Karelia to Canada exclaimed: “I can already say that our place is here at least as 
long as imperialists govern outside of the Soviet Union. And if Karelia needs us we can stay here 
forever, but after Finland has its revolution we may be needed there.”355 This respondent’s 
enthusiasm reflects the embodiment of official Soviet propaganda, but also reveals the influence 
of the dominant discourses in Karelia, where a promise of a socialist utopia blended with 
guarantees of a Finnish-speaking homeland.  
 The fact that many migrants stayed devoted to the Soviet cause, most probably depended 
on their individual experiences, but also reflected the persuasive ideological and imagological 
power imagined national communities have over individual, subjective reasoning. Some of the 
North American Finns who went to visit relatives in the Soviet Union in the 1970s were 
surprised to find that many were more than content with their lives in the Soviet Union and had 
no regrets leaving depression-riddled capitalist North America.356 In addition, there were those 
who survived the purges, famines, and deportations, and upon return to North America still 
retained their socialist and communist allegiances. Finally there were those who never stopped 
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supporting Soviet Karelia and the Soviet Union. For many years they would continue to believe 
in the infallibility of the Soviet regime, despite the mounting evidence to the contrary. Lauri 
Hokkanen’s own mother, for example, refused to believe in the wicked nature of the purges357 
even after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the opening of previously restricted archives that 
revealed Stalin’s atrocities. 
 On the other hand, many ardent supporters of the CPC and the FOC were disillusioned by 
the failure of the Karelian venture. Many came knocking on CPC doors asking for information 
about their relatives in Karelia.  The CPC however could not do much. It placed several requests 
with Soviet authorities, but no explanations were ever sent back. Some of the returnees even 
wanted to sue the CPC and demanded back the money they had invested in the Machine Fund.358 
This produced a crisis in the relationship between the CPC and the Finnish communities in 
Canada. There is enough evidence to suggest that the FOC’s all-in investment mentality in the 
failed Karelian venture brought on the decline of socialist and communist popularity in the 
Finnish communities across Canada. The symbolic elite struggled to sustain the ideological grip 
over their constituencies: “Quite frankly [our position] is critical…if we cannot fulfill our 
obligations and explain the situation we’re sunk. There has emerged a threat to the very 
existence…of communist organizations among the Finns.”359 The contrast between reality and 
the perceived image of Soviet Karelia was so stark that it made the staunchest communists turn 
white for a brief period of time.360  
                                                
357 Ibid., p. 138. 
358Karelia accepted only relatively wealthy immigrants, who were in the position to contribute to the so-called 
Machine Fund, which would pool money for the purchase of tools and equipment for Soviet Karelia 
359 Quoted in Michael Gelb, “Karelian Fever, The Finnish Immigrant Community during Stalin’s Purges,” p. 101. 
360 Ibid. 
126	  
	  
The FOC did all in its power to plug the leak in their ship caused by returning 
immigrants. It did so by ostracizing its own former members who spoke out against the Soviet 
regime. For example, one member of both the FOC and the CPC, who was in charge of the local 
Vapaus library in Montreal, upon his return from Karelia, was questioned by the CPC as to the 
reasons he did not remain in the Soviet Union.361 He answered frankly that his family did not like 
the living and working condition there and preferred to live in Canada. Finding it difficult to 
explain why a well known Communist Party member, who had been praising and defending the 
Soviet Union for the past decade, refused to remain in Soviet Karelia and instead preferred 
“capitalist” Canada, and to avoid further negative publicity, the Finnish Bureau of the 
Communist Party expelled the member on the grounds that, having been a disciplined member of 
the Party, he should have remained in the Soviet Union regardless of the conditions there.  
Conclusion 
Returning migrants did not fit into the contours of the imagined community constructed 
by the North American Finnish left, and as a result found themselves on its margins. While some 
were expelled from political and ethnic organizations to forestall ideological “contamination” of 
the community, others removed themselves from the left-ethnic organizations voluntarily. The 
daily lived experiences in Soviet Karelia were in bold contrast to the messages and images 
spread by the Finnish and non-Finnish left in Canada and the United States. In case of the 
Karelian fever, most migrants who had gone to and returned from Karelia denounced the Soviet 
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Union. While some chose to remain quiet, others spoke out. In either case, the returnees found 
themselves ostracized from the imagined collective.  
By 1934 the Great Depression subsided, and with it the Karelian fever. The KTA closed 
is doors in the United States, while in Toronto John Latva’s funds for recruitment were also 
running out. Nonetheless, records reveal that even by 1935 there were as many as 3,000 North 
American Finns ready to depart for Soviet Karelia. However, the migrant contingent had 
changed, as those willing to depart were of the poorest element and did not have the means to 
sponsor their own voyage. In the first half of 1934 for example, 940 contracts were signed with 
North American Finns, however only 57 would depart to Karelia.362 While workers lacked funds 
to emigrate, Soviet authorities refused to sponsor their voyage. It seems that there were more 
than enough factors to halt the exodus from North America to Soviet Karelia, including failure of 
the Soviet immigration policy, returnees’ revealing stories, letters written from Soviet Karelia 
dissuading from immigrating, improving economic conditions in Canada and the United States, 
and the closure of KTA offices to coordinate and facilitate emigration. Despite all of that, there is 
plenty of evidence to suggest that even after 1934 (when migration to Karelia virtually halted) 
North American Finns continued to cultivate and defend the social Finnish Soviet Karelian 
identity, and many would refuse to believe in the ill nature of the Stalinist regime even several 
decades later.  
 Mass migration of North American Finns to Soviet Karelia in the early 1930s 
strengthened Gylling’s Finnish socialist vision of Karelia. By granting North American Finns a 
privileged economic, social, and cultural status in the republic, the Karelian government made it 
clear who it considered the “ideal” member of society. Gylling’s vision of Karelia was reflected 
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in the future he imagined for Karelia, where Finns, and more specifically skilled male Finnish 
workers, were valued most and were clearly privileged. North American Finnish social and 
cultural norms were actively promoted by the Karelian government through official channels and 
the media. Up until the mid-1930s they glorified North American Finnish working methods, 
setting their experiences as an example for Karelian workers, but also for the rest of the Soviet 
population to emulate. In the process, the Karelian elite had appropriated the identity of North 
American Finnish migrants in its own hegemonic discourse. Immigrants’ achievements, both real 
and constructed, became the cornerstone for the construction of a Finnish socialist Soviet 
Karelian identity. Through the appropriation of North American Finnish migrants’ social and 
cultural identities, Karelia’s leaders strengthened the demographic, political, and cultural status 
of the republic’s Finnish public character. 
 Many migrants participated enthusiastically in the construction of the Karelian Finnish 
community. Cultural producers as well as the rank and file exploited their privileged positions in 
the society. With the Finnish language and culture supported by the state, North American 
Finnish writers and teachers actively promoted finnicization of the republic, and encouraged 
further immigration of Finns from Finland and North America. For their part, skilled workers 
often took their privileges for granted and protested, often by leaving, when those privileges 
were threatened. Although as the next chapters will show it yielded many positive changes in the 
Karelian economic development, for most actors involved in this story the migration scheme 
failed miserably. One of the consequences was to be a rapid deconstruction of an imagined 
socialist-Finnish community, first, physically, in the Soviet Union with the advent of the purges, 
and then psychologically in North America with a total disillusionment with the Karelian fever. 
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Chapter 4:  
 
Canada’s Invisible Nationality Policy 
Creating Ethnicity, Managing Populations, Imagining a Nation 
 
 
“No ID, no person.”363  
 
In the 1920s and the 1930s, the political borders of the Canadian state, with the exception 
of Newfoundland and Labrador, were similar to what they are today; surrounded by the Pacific, 
Arctic, and Atlantic Oceans, bordered by the United States to the south. The same however 
cannot be said about Canada’s cultural frontiers. In the past two centuries large transatlantic 
waves of human migration routinely altered the demographic composition of Canada’s 
populations. This necessity to study Canadian history in transition makes national borders an 
ideal place for examining the process of Canadian national identity364 formation. The following 
chapter adopts critical discourse analysis in examining the ways in which Canadian border 
officials documented incoming immigrants, returning residents, and visitors to Canada. The 
strategy reveals an idiosyncratic process of reproduction of social and political domination in 
text and talk.  
Since entering Canada was always a privilege and not a right, Canadian border officials 
and security agencies, such as the Royal Canadian Mountain Police (RCMP), were assigned the 
roles of profiling, classifying, and monitoring individuals and groups crossing national borders. 
                                                
363	  Mikhail Bulgakov, Master and Margarita. Vintage, 1996.	  
364 I treat national identity as a sense of belonging to one nation, regardless of one’s citizenship status. Officially, 
prior to the adoption of the Canadian Citizenship Act 1947 which conferred Canadian citizenship as a status separate 
from British nationality, Canadian nationality denoted British subjects who were born, naturalized or domiciled in 
Canada, as per Immigration Act 1910 and Canadian Nationals Act 1921. What made Canada’s nationality laws more 
confusing was that the status of ‘British subject’, regulated by the British Nationality and Status Act 1914 and 
adopted in Canada by the Naturalization Act 1914, was still considered the main form of identification, at least as far 
as public officials were concerned.   
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This chapter examines the way Canadian public officials, border agents, the RCMP, and the 
mainstream media socially constructed the Canadian population. Embodying dominant 
discourses based on accepted popular and scientific wisdom about race, gender, and ethnicity, 
these powerful agencies with significant financial and political resources created labels for 
different segments of the population, in the process delineating the social, political, and cultural 
contours of the Canadian national identity. Representations imbedded in these discourses helped 
the symbolic elites to imagine a Canadian national community through an elaborate and complex 
system of population classification and management. By defining an exclusive place for certain 
segments of the population in the national social formation, they also defined what being 
Canadian meant. 
In the first half of the 1930s, hundreds of North American Finns who ventured to the 
Soviet Union were on their way back to Canada and the United States. For fear of being 
detained, migrants would rarely disclose they were returning from the USSR. In addition, the 
fact that ships on which they came arrived from Finland, Great Britain, or Germany made it 
difficult to detect who was actually coming back from Soviet Karelia, and who was returning 
from a short visit to Finland. The more passenger manifests I encountered, the more I began to 
notice specific trends in the way border officials were documenting and classifying returning 
Canadian Finns, but also other passengers into prescribed categories. The categorization and 
treatment of incoming immigrants, returning residents, and visitors to Canada depended on 
several factors, such as class, ethnicity, gender, family status, nationality, and place of birth. 
Based on the examination of aforementioned transatlantic ship manifests (Canadian 
passenger lists), Canadian mainstream newspapers, and RCMP files, I look at the way the 
Canadian imagined community was constructed in the official and public discourses. The way 
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that immigrants were depicted by border officials upon arrival in Canada, documented by 
Canadian security agencies, and represented by the mainstream media was central to the process 
of subject formation in Canada. I argue that in the early 20th century, Canadian bureaucracies, 
reinforced by the media and bourgeois culture, began to enforce strict categorization of its 
population according to racial, ethnic, and national criteria. In the process, they fostered specific 
representations of Canadian national identity, and also contributed to the construction of 
diasporic identities in Canada. Although the chapter still retains its focus on the Karelian fever, it 
also broadens the investigation to the Canadian population in general. This effort is made to 
demonstrate the larger pattern by which state officials and cultural producers appropriated or 
rejected ethnic and cultural particularities of particular groups in the Canadian society in efforts 
to define the cultural and social contours of the Canadian national identity. 
The present chapter draws on the works of Michel Foucault and Antonio Gramsci. I use 
the Foucauldian concept of governmentality and its emphasis on the population as an object of 
governance to explain processes of national identity formation in Canada. The bureaucratization 
of this fast modernizing society allowed the state to observe, evaluate, document, and classify its 
populations. The production of knowledge, argued Foucault, and its association with power, 
formed subjects who embodied dominant discourses through organized practices, such as 
mentalities, rationalities, and techniques.365 The dominant discourses, in turn, facilitate the 
diffusion of ideologies shared by the ruling elite. Gramsci’s prevailing worldview is particularly 
handy here, as it depicts a dominant ideology that perpetuates the social, cultural, and political 
status quo. His theory of cultural hegemony explains that cultural norms in a society are dictated 
                                                
365 See Michel Foucault Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977. Translated by 
Gordon L. Marshall, J. Mepham and K. Sober (New York, Pantheon Books, 1980).  
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by symbolic elites, and must not be considered natural or inevitable, but as artificial social 
constructs, whose main aim is to manufacture consent and legitimacy of state power.366 
Immigrant experiences continue to be defined in terms of assimilation and acculturation. 
From the historical perspective this is problematic, because such rendering of immigrant stories 
further contributes to constructing monolithic national and diasporic identities. Instead, one 
needs to look at how national and ethnic identities were created, negotiated, and renegotiated 
across social contexts and levels of scale. The present work looks not at the way immigrants 
were incorporated in Canada, but rather how the Canadian “incorporation regime” was itself 
culturally produced.367 Through representation of certain non-charter groups as foreigners and 
“outsiders,” public officials and the economic and political elite constructed a version of an 
“insider” whom they envisioned as the ideal member of the national community.  
Dominant Discourse on Race and Ethnicity in Early 20th Century Canada 
One of the main tangibles in Canadian historiography is the emphasis on founding 
nations, and the ensuing ethnic and political conflict between them, as the centerpiece of 
Canadian history.368 However, the English and French myth of bifurcated identity that dates back 
to the Plains of Abraham is an outdated rhetoric of conquest and assimilation.369 Gramsci wrote 
that myths were social constructs propagated by the hegemonic forces to be accepted from below 
as normal reality. They simply go unquestioned as common sense. In this way, the myth of 
bifurcated identity in the Canadian national discourse predominates in the public realm and 
                                                
366 See Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci, (New York: International 
Publishers, 1971).  
367 Yasemin Soysal, Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Postnational membership in Europe, (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1994). 
368 Dirk Hoerder, Donna Gabaccia, James Oliver Horton, People on the Move: Migration, Acculturation and Ethnic 
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academia to this day. Although since the 1970s the focus has shifted to the study of other ethnic 
communities, it seems merely to reinforce yet another national paradigm, now dressed up in the 
rhetoric of multiculturalism.370 Dirk Hoerder infuses a more refreshing account of Canadian 
history by taking national and provincial narratives apart, arguing that immigrant groups’ social 
spaces extended beyond provincial and national borders. Canadian societies were built by men, 
women, and children argues Hoerder, and it was only later that smaller regions coalesced into 
larger spaces, such as provinces and nations.  
The second wave of the industrial revolution began in Canada in the early 20th century 
and witnessed the expansion of manufacturing, resource extraction, as well as concentration of 
the ownership of the means of production.371 Centralization of state power, in turn, was 
paralleled and reinforced by the economic and cultural modernization of the society, where the 
growing influence of capital and the state led to new forms of social relations.372 For example, in 
the intellectual realm, the response to the publication of Darwin’s Origin of the Species resulted 
in the emergence of British idealism as the dominant philosophical outlook of leading 
philosophers and university teachers in Canada.373 The theory of evolution was thought to 
explain the ultimate understanding of the universe. All forms of knowledge, be it poetry, history, 
philosophy, or natural science could converge to provide a universal form of explanation. 
Darwin’s evolutionary theory found a comfortable place in the idealists’ social explanation, 
where social Darwinism came to explain not only the natural, but also the social world in the 
minds of the academics, the elite, and soon in the Canadian public mind. It was only in the 
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1930s, with the incursion of the Chicago school of social research in Canadian universities that 
social scientists began to emphasize the influence of the environment in shaping social structure, 
values, mores, and institutions, thus rejecting the idea that genetic predispositions explained the 
character of nations and ethnic groups.374 However while this was a breakthrough in the direction 
social sciences were taken, it would take another generation for such views to penetrate into the 
public mind and discourses.  
 The premise of social Darwinism consequently was grounded in Clifford Sifton’s 
recruitment of non-British immigrants to settle the prairies. He assumed that the so-called 
immigrants in “sheep skin coats” from central and Eastern Europe were ‘racially’ suited for labor 
in the harsh northern Canadian climate. In this context, people of particular origins were 
racialized. Finnish men, for example, given the absence of good land and work in the cities, 
clustered in the resource extraction industries of Northern Ontario, in the process becoming 
primarily concentrated in the lumber industry. Finns were included in the Canadian nation in so 
far as they served national economic building needs. However they were placed in unequal 
relation to settlers who more closely approximated the model of an ideal citizen.375 
 A useful expansion of Benedict Anderson’s notion of an imagined community376 is Alan 
Simmons’ idea of imagined futures.377 The social construction of the Canadian nation, according 
to Simmons, encompasses an ever-present dominant visualization of the nation’s future, and it is 
this imagined future around which nation-building efforts are concentrated. Immigrant 
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populations and their identities are always in flux not only as a result of economic fluctuations on 
global and domestic markets, but also as a result of the changes in the national perceptions of 
“ideal” community members. As Andrea Flynn suggests, “at any point in time, immigration 
policies will continue to make sense only insofar as they enable the nation’s goals [as defined by 
political leaders] to be realized.”378 
The increasing arrival of non-British and non-French migrant workers to Canada since 
the late 19th century began to challenge the largely “white” order in Canada. By the early 1920s, 
non-British immigrants constituted almost a quarter of all immigrants entering the dominion.379 
Sifton’s immigration policies in the 1890s, as well as his replacement’s in 1905, Franck Oliver, 
reflected the intersection of economic and demographic interests, but also showed concern over 
national cultural identity.380 Both Sifton and Oliver believed that the country was supposed to be 
filled with desirable, more “ideal” immigrants, rather than with people who would only 
contribute to the deterioration of Canadian racial and national character.381 As a result, they 
looked to refrain from recruiting non-British immigrants as much as possible. 
Mariana Valverde argues that between 1880 and the First World War major changes took 
place in Canada that generated the social and cultural consolidation of a nation. At the forefront 
was the social reform movement, headed by the bourgeoisie and the affluent sections of the 
emerging middle classes, shaping the working classes, and protecting the interests of bourgeois 
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culture.382 The reform movement was based on social purity within a clear racial and ethnic 
context, where racial and national purity became almost synonymous. Social and moral 
reformers, constituted for the most part of white Canadians of British descent aimed to “correct” 
society’s ills, which in their minds were directly connected to the forces of industrialization, 
secularization, and modernism.383 Immigration and immigrants in their minds were one of the 
problems created by the changing nature of the capitalist society. In the 1920s there appeared 
clearly entrenched notions of ‘legitimate and ‘illegitimate’ occupants, and ‘desirable’ and 
‘undesirable’ immigrants.384 The centralization of the Canadian economy and politics was also 
followed by cultural modernization. To sustain this large, and often disconnected economic and 
political entity, a national identity was needed, a common culture. In the process, a dominion 
which was home to racially and ethnically diverse populations was being transformed into a 
single nation.  
The national identity fostered by the growing middle classes and the Canadian state had 
clear ethnic overtones. It was dominated by white settlers of British origin in an uneasy but 
necessary union with French Canada. There was no one unified entity or party that drove 
national identity construction, but nonetheless, the foucauldian symbolic elites involved in the 
construction of the imagined community had a common socio-cultural denominator, which was 
conditioned by contemporary discourses on race, ethnicity, class, and gender, and grounded in 
imperial, transcontinental, and international contexts. For example, national identity was in part 
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shaped by the so-called imperialists. Although few in number, imperialists’ ideas, imbued with 
the colonial language and symbols reflecting notions of Anglo-Saxon superiority permeated the 
public discourse.385 A radically different conception of Canadian identity as an alternative vision 
of a nation of two races came from Quebec. As H.V. Nelles suggests, French-Canadian public 
memory had evolved opportunistically into a larger celebration of Canadian nationality, where 
two races were to be united within the empire.386 As for the representation of the non-British and 
non-French nationalities and ethnicities in the public and official discourse, they were depicted at 
best as foreign, and at worst as racially and socially unfit for the Canadian society, landscape, 
and climate. After all, Canadian immigration policy, at least until 1967 was plainly racially 
exclusionary, and always suspicious of the ‘subversivness’ of foreign elements.387 
White supremacy was also ingrained in the Canadian legal structure. The system, argues 
Constance Backhouse, instituted perverse racial discrimination, perpetuated through 
institutionalized and systemic practices. In the early 20th century, race and ethnicity were being 
designated, or rather imposed, on the population by officials, novelists, historians, and the media. 
The proliferation of social sciences in turn professionalized, institutionalized, and rationalized 
racism, creating in the process an elaborate system of ethnic and national codification.388 By 
conferring outsider status on European and Asian immigrants, the Anglo-Saxon and the 
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Francophone elites in Canada were affirming their own identity and privilege.389 Thus 
racialization and categorization of races and ethnicities reveals more about insiders, the 
“friends,” than about outsiders, the foreigners, potentially “enemies”, as over time the “cultural 
and physical characteristics of a group become inseparable from its work role and its subservient 
position.”390  
Creating Ethnic Populations 
Ethnicity is a matter of contrast, and thus inherently relational. To assume an ethnic 
identity (or to assign one to someone else) is to distinguish ‘us’ from ‘them’ on the basis that 
‘we’ share something that ‘they’ do not. Knowledge and reality, in the view of social 
construction theorists, are produced in order to provide a framework of understanding. With this 
in mind, I suggest that the Canadian state manufactured ethnic identities at the nation’s entry 
points. By ‘hailing’ passengers in social interactions, that is through the classification of 
incoming passengers’ into prescribed national, ethnic, and racial categories, the state and border 
officials outlined the parameters of “foreign” as opposed to Canadian identities. This cultivation 
of ethnic and racial categories denote a process of subject formation – the articulated categories 
were not ‘natural’, but rather imaginary and symbolic, constructed to reflect the dominant 
ideologies shared by the Canadian political, economic and cultural elite. Classification of the 
population into ‘knowable’ groups served a specific purpose, making the population, visible, 
accessible, familiar, and, thus, manageable. In addition, it allowed the Canadian bureaucracy to 
draw cultural contours around the concept of Canadian national identity, an essential component 
of any modern nation-state.   
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The ‘discovery of population’ marks the origins of modern governments. As Bruce Curtis 
demonstrates, in the process of state formation, the state centralizes authority over knowledge 
production, and, through capturing “matter of national interest” numerically codifies social 
relations.391 Writing about census makers, Curtis argues they configure social relations in 
keeping with particular political and cultural objectives and interests in order that such relations 
may be known and governed.392 In other words, the census seeks to tie people as state subjects 
and citizens to official identities within a determined territory in order to rule them.  
As Foucault has shown it is through visibility that modern nations exercise controlling 
systems of power and knowledge, or what he called power knowledge.393 Increased visibility 
means the state can more easily track or manage its population through their lives. In turn, 
subjectivities are conditioned by structural forces which “act upon” individuals,394 in the process 
classifying them into particular social, political, economic, and cultural categories. Concepts 
such as majority, minority, immigrant, and native are then socially constructed. Associated with 
distinctive minority statuses classified into categories such as ethnicity, race, and gender, 
immigrants’ identities and subjectivities are “made” in the process of cultural production in the 
public sphere. 
 The analysis of Canadian passenger manifests395 reveals a similar process of governing 
predetermined identities, where definitions of the ‘knowable community’ fit right into the 
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cultural equations of dominant groups in society. These lists, used by Canada’s border officials 
to screen people entering the country, consisted of several rubrics: name of passenger, age, 
gender, marital status, previous presence in Canada before; if so, when, where, and how long, 
whether intending to permanently reside in Canada, whether able to read and write, birth 
country, race, nationality, destination, occupation, date of arrival, port of arrival, port of 
embarkation, ship name, and shipping line. While all these categories can be subjected to 
analysis, the present work centers on passenger entries in sections of ‘country of birth’, 
‘nationality’, and ‘race’. These forms were filled out on the ships by British pursers and upon 
docking in Canadian harbors were handed over to Canadian immigration officials.  
The sample used for this chapter includes over 5000 passenger entries recorded at the 
port of Quebec between 1931 and 1937. Detailed assessment of these manifests reveals 
inconsistencies between passengers’ own sense of ethnic and national identity on the one hand, 
and the state’s depiction and representation of its population in the public discourse on the other. 
Whereas the state mandated categories such as race and nationality for classification purposes, it 
was left to border officials to fill in the gaps, to make sure that individuals entered “appropriate” 
terms in the rubrics. The “corrections” that immigration officials applied to passenger entries in 
the race and nationality sections reveal the nature of the national discourse, and the contours of 
the dominant ideologies.  
One of the main revelations is that non-British and non-French Canadian residents, 
regardless of whether they were born in Canada or not, were depicted as foreigners, and deemed 
by border officials to be on the periphery of Canadian national identity. While border agents did 
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not seem to share a consensus on whether concepts such as Canadian nationality or race existed, 
they, for the most part, agreed about what being non-Canadian meant. In the vast majority of 
cases, when Canadian residents of European descent, whether born in Canada or abroad, entered 
‘Canadian’ under the nationality and race rubrics, border officials crossed out the entry and 
instead wrote in the person’s presupposed race, ethnicity and nationality, be it Ukrainian, Italian, 
Finnish, or Polish.396 Even if the person in question was born and raised in Canada, spoke fluent 
English, and might have never visited Europe before, he/she was still considered a member of 
that nationality and race to which his/her ancestors allegedly belonged. More importantly, it 
meant that he/she was a foreigner – not Canadian.  
For instance, a Romanian national of Jewish heritage had to enter “Hebrew” in the race 
section of the manifest, although initially he described himself as a Romanian.397 In a similar 
case, Dagobert Lisser, born in Germany, identified himself as German by race. However, after a 
conversation with the immigration official, it turned out that Dagobert’s race was Hebrew. 
Another passenger, born in Canada to Finnish parents, was prevented from self-identifying as 
Canadian either by nationality or race, despite the fact that, technically, the Immigration Act 
1910 and the Canadian Nationals Act 1921 allowed him to do so.398 Another Finn, William 
Koskilainen, was born in Canada and entered ‘Canadian’ under the nationality rubric. It was 
however changed by the officials to ‘British’ to denote his status as a British subject.399 Thomas 
Fuelson, born in Norway, entered ‘Scandinavian’ in the nationality section; however the border 
agent changed the entry to Norway. The imposing classification system was applied even to 
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French Canadians. Joseph Renaud, born in St. Remi Quebec, entered Canadian in his nationality 
and race rubrics, but state officials thought it was more appropriate to label Joseph British by 
nationality and French by race.400  
One could be Canadian by race and nationality only if one was of British heritage.401 
More than that, a British descendant had the choice to be British or Canadian; such a privilege 
did not extend to any other ethnicity or race in the first half of the 1930s. Even then there were 
some ambiguities as to what constituted a Canadian nationality and if there was such a concept 
as a Canadian race. Arriving in the port of Quebec in 1933, aboard the Duchess of Richmond, 
Doris Johnston indicated she was born in Toronto, that her race was British, and nationality – 
Canadian. Traveling on the same ship, Sarah Stevenson, and Walter O’Neal, although born in 
England, similarly entered ‘Canadian’ in the nationality rubric. Another passenger, Dugald 
Henderson, born in Scotland, considered himself Canadian both by nationality and race. 
However, the examining immigration officials were of a different opinion and corrected all the 
‘Canadian’ entries to ‘British’. On the other hand, Freda Knox, born in England, traveling with 
her Canadian born children Valerie and Angus, identified herself and her children as Canadian 
by both nationality and race, and while the race rubric remained untouched by border agents, the 
nationality rubric for all three was changed to British. 402  
Out of the 1062 passengers arriving on the Duchess of Richmond, on 122 occasions 
people entered Canadian in either the race or nationality rubric. Five of every six ‘Canadian’ 
entries were corrected by immigration officials to what they considered to be the correct national 
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and racial identity of these people. As mentioned, there were exceptions, and some border 
officials did not seem at all concerned with the way some passengers self-identified.403 For 
example, Jean Roy, born in Quebec, was allowed to leave Canadian under the nationality 
heading. When George Saloum and Chammas Kevorkian, born in Syria and Turkey respectively, 
entered ‘Canadian’ in the nationality sections and ‘Syrian’ in the race columns, they were not 
told to change the entries. The fact that not everyone subscribed to the practice suggests that it 
was a result of personal preferences, not a mandatory exercise. The reality that many border 
agents chose to change passenger entries indicates the prevalence and nature of the ethno-racial 
public discourses of the early 1930s.  
In some cases, border officials seemed increasingly preoccupied with people’s race rather 
than their nationality.404 Arriving on the Empress of Britain at the port of Quebec in 1933, 
American born Morris Epstein, his wife Anne, and their children Herbert and Norma entered 
U.S. in the nationality section and English in the race column.405 However, based on their 
perceived appearance, accent, or family names, immigration officials changed their entries in the 
race section to ‘Hebrew’. Similarly, a large group of Canadian born passengers of British descent 
arriving in the port of Quebec on the Laurentic in 1931406 entered ‘Canadian’ in the race section. 
Without exception, however all ‘Canadian’ entries were changed to ‘British’, ‘Hebrew’, 
‘French’, and ‘Finnish’, to reflect border officials’ apparent knowledge of anthropologic 
typologies and world geography.   
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 Passengers of English and Scottish descent demonstrated the ambiguous tendency to 
identify both with Canada and Great Britain. Some, who were born in Canada, still considered 
their race and nationality to be British, while for others ‘Canadian’ was becoming the dominant 
national and racial identity. In the first part of the 1930s the majority still identified with Great 
Britain and the British race. Things however began to change in the second part of the 1930s. It 
seems that with the passing of the Statute of Westminster in 1931, and with the coming of age of 
a generation which was in its youth during, and after, the First World War the construction of 
Canadian national identity began to gather steam. 
In 1936 and 1937 increasing numbers of immigration officials were getting used to the 
idea of Canadian nationality and Canadian race. Moreover, there was also a tendency on the part 
of the passengers to identify as Canadian both by race and nationality. Britishness, as a form of 
self-identification, it seems was becoming less paramount by the late 1930s. The trend was 
changing to such a degree that some border officials began to change passenger entries from 
‘British’ to ‘Canadian’, although Canadian citizenship as a status separate from British 
nationality would not become legal and official until the passing of the Canadian Citizenship Act  
in 1947. For example, in 1937, Canadian born Charles Frederick Pinder arrived in the port of 
Quebec with his wife Hilda Mary and daughter Joan. He entered ‘British’ in the nationality 
rubric, however it was changed to ‘Canadian’ by the border official.407 By 1937 immigration 
officials were also far less inclined to assign ‘foreign nationalities’ to Canadian residents of 
European descent, although ideas about presupposed races still remained intact.408    
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 Up until the late 19th century, all passengers who were not of “British birth” were simply 
designated as “foreign” by immigration officials.409 By the 1930s however, the state seems to 
have refined its methods of population classification. While non-British residents were still 
assigned a “foreigner” status, there developed an entire system of ethnic and national 
categorization. For their part, immigration officials played a constitutive role in subjectifying 
passengers to ethnic, racial, and national identities, and assigning them specific – visible – roles 
in the Canadian social formation. Although Canada did not have a clear-cut nationality policy at 
the time, the ideological interpellation process outlined above facilitated the assignment and 
redistribution of specific social identities, which reformulated subjects’ identities along the lines 
of political, social, and cultural values of the dominant groups in Canadian society.  
Classification strategies employed by immigration officials at Canada’s entry points also 
reveal a great deal about the intersection of ethnicity, class, and gender. One should not neglect 
the class divisions prevalent between the ‘charter’ groups (aka, British and French) and the 
diasporic groups in the Canadian society.410 For example, the vast majority of cabin and first 
class passengers returning to Canada were of Scottish or English origin, while Canadians of 
eastern and southern European origin, as well as Canadians hailing from the Scandinavian 
countries, traveled predominately in third class.411 Passengers of British descent, traveling in the 
first class, were usually members of the bourgeoisie and the financial elite, and were less likely 
to be detained than passengers of European descent traveling in the third class, in occupations 
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considered of lower class status.412 Gender and family status also played a role. Single 
passengers were more likely to be detained than married men and women with children. The 
interaction between the individual and the state at national entry points speaks volumes about the 
nature of the dominant public discourses of a particular national entity at a given point in time. 
Managing Populations 
Classification of the population into visible, knowable, and recognizable categories 
facilitated the process of governing. If before the First World War, the state was preoccupied 
with the type of people who entered the Dominion, in the interwar period it was faced with 
another task – how to govern the diverse populations of the country. According to Althuser, there 
is a blurry line between the functions of ideological state apparatuses (i.e. family, church, 
schools) and repressive state apparatuses (i.e. police, military, criminal justice system). In 
modern societies the educational system is a central agency which cultivates and reinforces 
national imaginaries. Ideological control of its curriculum is crucial for the maintenance of 
particular representation of the social formation, which also has to constantly re-impose and re-
invent itself. In other words, ideological control of the educational curriculum is imperative to 
social order and stability. For example, social and moral reformers of the early 20th century 
aimed to promote progress, righteousness, morality, patriotism, unity, security, and the 
prosperity of Canadian society through the public education system.413 In this equation, children 
were subjected to education edicts that stressed virtues of ideological uniformity and cultural 
accommodation.414 The most extreme example of cultural assimilation could be found in the  
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industrial schools, which isolated aboriginal children from their parents, demeaned aboriginal 
customs, and enforced Christian values.415 
 However, whereas the public education system was controlled and administered by the 
state, various language schools found in the ethnic communities across Canada were not. 
Reflecting the interests and ideologies of alternative social formations – i.e. diasporic 
communities – they posed a potential threat to the uniformity of the dominant national ideology. 
In the 1930s, the state reached to observe and document potential ‘deviant’ activities in the 
ethnic language schools with the help of the RCMP. Concerned with growth of communism as 
an alternate force to the religious foundation of Canada, as well as a threat to its social and 
economic security, the state needed to cultivate knowledge about any ideological delinquents. 
The following section reviews surveillance reports of Finnish and Ukrainian language schools, 
compiled by the RCMP Intelligence section on the activities of those who were considered 
threats to Canada’s national security.416 These reports were circulated within the Cabinet, among 
senior civil servants, and within the RCMP itself.  
 Testimonies of RCMP officers reveal that the bureau had an in-depth knowledge of the 
language schools’ mandates, operations, and curriculum. For example, they knew that the largest 
Finnish schools were located in Port Arthur, Fort William, Nipigon, and Intolla with student 
populations of over 200. RCMP could identify by name all the schools’ teachers, and singled out 
in its reports those who were particularly intelligent and outspoken.417 Intelligence also detailed 
the “nature of teaching”, outlining the schools’ curriculum, such as the subjects taught, 
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methodologies used, as well as the content of administered examinations. “Did God Create 
Mankind, or Mankind Create God”, an essay by a 13 year-old boy attracted the attention of one 
of the reporting officers. Prompted to conduct further investigation, the officer added that the boy 
was a leader amongst the Pioneers, and his brother, also a graduate of the Workmen’s Circle 
School, was a leader in the Young Communist League.418 Other students’ essays mentioned in 
the report were “Coal: How this dangerous work is very poorly paid”, “the Labor Problem”, and 
“Can there be peace between the workman and the Boss.” 
 The RCMP also singled out particular language school teachers, whom it considered 
most dangerous. One of them was Ivan Symbay from a Ukrainian community in Edmonton. One 
report stressed that Symbay “is unusually well educated…a fluent speaker…is imbued with 
revolutionary ideas…exceedingly well thought of by the Ukrainians generally, and must be 
regarded as a dangerous man.419 The report underlined that he refrained from teaching English in 
his classrooms, spoke poorly of religion and royalty, and propagated socialist values. The RCMP 
also made note of guest lecturers frequenting language schools. For example, it documented a 
lecture delivered by Gus Sundquist, the Secretary of the FOC, to the students of the “Executive 
Courses” in Sudbury:  
He lectured about the building and tasks of revolutionary organizations, and 
particularly reminded them of the fights which the Finnish Organization has 
conducted against the menace from the right. These fights must be continued, he 
said, if the Finnish Organization shall remain a revolutionary organization. Finally 
Sundqvist said that the Finnish Organization is an educational and cultural 
organization in the class fight. 420 
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 Finnish and Ukrainian educational and cultural organizations represented, or dictated, the 
interests of the marginalized social groups in the Canadian society – ethnic minorities and 
workers. The alternative ideologies of these diasporic social formations, expressed in 
unconventional language, symbols and meanings, posed a challenge to the established social 
order according to the RCMP. The bureau was concerned with the influence of ethnic socialist 
organizations on foreign farming communities. For example, it noted that a children’s orchestra, 
composed of 26 students, associated with the Ukrainian Labor Farmer Temple Association 
(ULFTA) of Edmonton, accompanied its organizers into neighboring farmer settlements, 
performing revolutionary songs and marches.421 In their reports, RCMP agents made it clear that 
Ukrainian communists relied on music as an avenue of propaganda. They even followed a 
mandolin orchestra on a tour of the Prairies. Trained by the Winnipeg section of the ULFTA, the 
music troupe which consisted of 20 young girls was considered dangerous by the RCMP.422 
Officers also mentioned the prevalence of socialist symbols in the Finnish and Ukrainian 
language schools, such as photographs of Lenin and other Bolshevik leaders hung on the 
schools’ walls.423 
RCMP officers in the field made it clear that immigrants’ ideals and loyalties as well as 
the symbols and the language they were using were not Canadian, or western (imperial at that 
time). As far as the RCMP was concerned, immigration and radicalism were visibly intertwined. 
Communism, they held, was a European disease transferred by European immigrants: “The more 
immigrants that we put into Canada, the better it will be for the Communist movement and the 
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end of the capitalist class will be nearer and it will help the Communist party to organize farmers 
against the capitalist class. There will be more soup houses than ever in Canada this year.”424 
Immigrants, by virtue of their ethnicity were represented as a foreign and potentially menacing 
force that could disrupt Canada’s social and economic system, and even threaten the domestic 
agricultural industry. These sentiments came to the fore during the Winnipeg General Strike of 
1919, when authorities and the press made the public believe the majority of strike leaders and 
participants to be revolutionaries and ethnic immigrants. Strikers were depicted as “aliens” and 
“anarchists”, and the New York Times proclaimed that Bolshevism invaded Canada, despite the 
reality that the majority of strikers were Canadians or immigrants of British descent, and their 
ideas and demands were reformist rather than revolutionary in nature.  
The RCMP closely monitored the ULFTA and noted in its reports the strategies and the 
methodologies the radical organization applied in recruiting new members and expanding their 
organization. In particular the RCMP was concerned with the type of education the organization 
promoted, but also with its views on religion, as well as the type of entertainment, leisure 
activities, and literature it promoted.425 The Mounties paid close attention to the ULFTA. For 
example, officers made note of the way the organization was preoccupied with the number of 
students that attended language schools, the number of picnics and shows organized by the 
sections, the status of propaganda activities, the number of lectures delivered, the quantity of 
literature sold, the number of new members recruited into the organizations’ branches, the 
dropout rate, and if youth was being actively recruited.  
                                                
424 RCMP Headquarters. Ottawa, 19th August, 1926. Secret. No. 332. Weekly Summary.  Quoted in R.C.M.P. 
Bulletins: The Early Years, 1919-1929.  
425 RCMP Headquarters Ottawa, 17th July, 1926. Secret No. 327 Weekly Summary Notes Regarding Revolutionary 
Organizations and Agitators in Canada Report. Quoted in R.C.M.P. Bulletins: The Early Years, 1919-1929. 
151	  
	  
 RCMP officers were also perturbed by the un-Christian funeral processions held in the 
Finnish and Ukrainian communities. In one of the communiqués, the officer called the funeral 
processor a Communist ‘priest’, stating: 
Bolsheviks and Communists are trying to separate their members from the Church 
and religion forever. The members of the Ukrainian Labor Farmer Temple 
Association are particularly prohibited to attend any Church service. Many of 
them live together only on a marriage license, and none of them baptize their 
children. Now they start a new form of funeral, exactly the same as the 
Communists in Russia.426 
 
The report mentioned the three main ideological state apparatuses (school, family and the 
church), which according to Althuser are required to channel the dominant ideologies and form 
compliant subjects. The fact that diasporic organizations were involved in the consolidation of 
communities with alternative ideological institutions alarmed public officials. Un-Christian 
funeral processions were seen as foreign, and un-Canadian. The following report is worth 
quoting in its entirety: 
Three young Pioneers boys and girls dressed in white blouses and red scarves 
with two red banners bearing the hammer and sickle and numerous wreaths of 
roses formed the most conspicuous part of the funeral. The ceremonial program 
consisted of funeral marches played by the Ukrainian Labour Farmer Temple 
Association band, reading of telegrams and letters expressing deep condolences 
and regrets from distant organizations, and addresses delivered by delegates 
representing local organizations. The addresses were of propaganda text 
expressing deep sorrow, and urging the workers to join and fill in a thousand fold 
the vacancy left by the comrade whom cruel fate had torn out of the ranks of the 
revolutionary movement.427 
 
Also closely monitored were Finnish socialist halls and the Finnish socialist press. The 
RCMP kept close watch over Gus Sundquist and other notable Finnish socialists. The bureau it 
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seems had agents within the Finnish communities who helped officers in the field to interpret 
lectures delivered by radical socialists in the Finnish labor temples. A. T. Hill, for example, was 
reported addressing a mass meeting of Finnish workers in the hall of the Finnish Organization of 
Montreal, where he spoke of his experiences in the Kingston Penitentiary, and rallied workers to 
unite in the defense of the Soviet Union, in the struggle against Fascism and the establishment of 
a Soviet Canada.428 The agency highlighted that the majority of attendees at socialist and 
communist mass meetings were of “foreign extraction,” and that some of them had to be turned 
away because halls which held the meetings were filled to capacity.429 The left-wing Finnish 
press was also closely monitored, in particular the Vapaus.430 The newspaper, for example, often 
publicized the names of prominent socialist leaders in the Finnish communities, which made the 
RCMP surveillance job much easier.  
Ethnicity, race, and ideology were closely linked in the public discourse, and European 
immigrants were conventionally seen as bearers of foreign ideologies. Throughout the 1920s and 
the 1930s, notions such as ethnicity and race provided state officials with the analytical tools to 
monitor and manage Canada’s populations. Ideological “loyalty” was a pre-requisite for full 
participation in the Canadian society. However, ideological uniformity was difficult to achieve as 
a result of the disparity in the economic and political power positions of different groups in the 
Canadian imagined community.431 Division of the population to prescribed ethnic and racial 
groups outlined in the previous section of this paper, further reinforced the economic and 
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political imbalance in the national community and urged some to question the existing social 
order.432 The state, to preserve the social formation intact, had to ensure that alternative 
ideological formations would not challenge the dominant cultural, social, and political 
framework of the Canadian society. One’s ethnicity or race either facilitated or erected barriers 
for full social, economic, and cultural membership in this social formation, and the perpetuation 
of such hierarchies was fundamental to the stability and survival of the social order.  
Ethnic Management and National Security 
One of the practical ways in which the Canadian state utilized ethnic population 
management was in matters of national security. With the adoption of the 1907 Immigration Act 
by Frank Oliver, whose purpose was “to enable the Department of Immigration to deal with 
undesirable immigrants,”433 the Canadian state was endowed with the means to control Canada’s 
immigrant populations. The category of “prohibited” immigrants was expanded and the 
government was given authority to deport immigrants within two, later three, and five years of 
landing. During the First World War, the state closely monitored and then interned Germans and 
nationalities from the Austro-Hungarian Empire, such as Ukrainians.434 Furthermore, following 
the Bolshevik revolution national security services began to pay close attention to Russian 
ethnics and nationals. In 1918 orders-in-council declared illegal labor and anarchist groups, such 
as the Industrial Workers of the World, and banned publications in languages of potential fifth 
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columns within the dominion, such as Finnish, Russian, Hungarian, and German. During the first 
red scare in 1918 and 1919, the RCMP arrested scores of individuals for attending meetings 
where the Russian language was used, and for having in their possession papers in the Russian 
language.435  
Amendments to the 1919 Immigration Act prohibited immigration of explicit ethnicities 
and races because of their “peculiar habits, modes of life and methods of holding property.”436 
An amendment to the Naturalization Act stated that citizenship could be taken away if a person 
was found “disloyal.”437 Furthermore, during the Second World War it was the turn of Italians, 
Germans, and Japanese to play the fifth column role.438 To diffuse political and social tensions in 
the society, the state interned or persecuted groups of people based at times only on their 
perceived or real ethnicity, race, and nationality. Throughout the cold war the fifth column was 
thought to be composed mainly of Eastern European nationals and Canadians of Eastern 
European ancestry. Changes in international developments coupled with the evolving pseudo-
scientific understandings of concepts such as ethnicity, race, and nationality, not only prescribed 
various populations into social and cultural roles, but at the same time generated perceived 
internal and external threats to Canada’s national identity. Canadianess it seems was always 
under siege, and the notion of Canadian identity is more easily explained by what it does not 
represent, than for what it actually stands for.  
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 Historians such as Jack Granastein trumpet the First World War as a defining moment for 
Canada and for Canadian identity. In some respects they are correct, because the state was 
learning how to manage its population and suppress internal unrest. The treatment of ethnic and 
political minorities during the Great War and following it (Easter Riots in 1918, The Winnipeg 
General Strike in 1919) demonstrates that Canada was indeed on the verge of independence and 
political maturity as a nation state. However, the greatness of the Canadian state was not made 
on the battlefields of Europe, but in public offices across the nation, where the bureaucracy 
matured in its internal management of the state. From Red River rebellion to Easter Riots to 
Winnipeg General Strike to internments in both world wars, to cold war persecution of 
communists and eastern Europeans to the FLQ crisis, the Canadian state demonstrated a 
consistently successful method by which unrest could be handled through ethnic population 
management. 
In July of 1931, Liberal Senator Pierre Casgrain introduced a bill in the Senate entitled 
“An act to Provide for Alien Identification Cards.”439 It required that “every alien of more than 
sixteen years of age, upon entering Canada by vessel with the intention of residing in Canada, 
shall before leaving such vessel complete on oath before and obtain from a peace officer a card 
of identification.”440 Any alien, “a person who is not a British subject,” convicted of an offence 
against this act, would be convicted of a criminal offence within the meaning of the Immigration 
Act, with a penalty of imprisonment of up to seven years. The identification card would indicate 
in addition to an address and a photograph, the place and date of birth, as well as nationality of 
the subject. In Casgrain’s words, the bill would have provided “a check on the communist 
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agitators acting under the direct instructions from Moscow who are taking advantage of the 
depression in an attempt to undermine the present social order in Canada.”441 The proposed bill 
was a natural outgrowth of the tendency by the state to categorize and classify the population of 
a modernizing society. In practice, it would have allowed Canada’s “peace officers,”442 to detect 
and deport foreign born workers engaged in any strike or other activity considered revolutionary.  
The bill was popular in influential circles across Canada. Mayors and police chiefs 
seemed to have embraced alien registration cards. The Mayor of Winnipeg, for example, stated 
that “95 percent of the Canadian people support the proposed legislation to register all aliens. All 
hope there will be no delay.”443 A similar opinion was expressed by the Montreal Police 
Department Director who telegraphed the Senate that he is “strongly in favor of identification 
cards, especially in Montreal, in order to control the foreign element.”444 Thus, ideas about 
population control along lines of ethnicity, race, and nationality, especially in areas with large 
concentration of “aliens” were not simply expressed on a theoretical level, but pursued in 
practice by powerful political actors on municipal, provincial, and federal levels. 
There was also a significant opposition to the legislation both on a grassroots level and 
within various levels of government. The Jewish community in Winnipeg, for example, 
laboriously lobbied against the bill arguing it would diminish immigrants’ achievements and 
belittle their efforts to become model citizens in Canada. It is worth noting that while immigrant 
communities were understandably resistant to the bill, others opposed as well. Many rejected 
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alien registration cards because they feared it would set a dangerous precedent, which would be 
unpredictable in the way it could in the future be applied to the rest of the population.445 After a 
prolonged debate, the bill was defeated 20 to 12. Causes for rejection included interference with 
civil rights of the people, and the high costs associated with such an undertaking.        
The planned bill was in tandem with the tendency of the state to equate certain ethnicities 
and races with various sources of local, regional, or national danger. For example, an analysis of 
Canadian passenger lists reveals that residents or visitors of British descent were almost never 
detained at the border. Similarly, immigrants entering Canada for the first time, who had 
undergone rigorous inspection prior to receiving entry documents, were also seldom detained. 
However, returning Canadian residents of non-British ethnic background, as well as non-British 
visitors were much more likely to be apprehended at the border. The rate of detentions clearly 
depended on one’s ethnicity and/or nationality. For example, residents, visitors, or merchants of 
Russian descent were detained at a higher rate than ‘foreigners’ from other countries.446 
Moreover, the fact that prior to 1947 Canada issued two types of passports, a blue colored 
document to British subjects by birth, and a red colored passport to the naturalized British 
subjects made border officials’ profiling tasks much easier.  
The demographic concentration of ethnic groups in certain geographic areas fostered 
increased suspicion towards foreign born individuals. For example, in September 1931, 
following a demonstration broken up by police in Kirkland Lake the courts sentenced six Finns 
to prison terms, while one Ukrainian and one Englishman were released with a warning.447 The 
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author of the report which covered the incident and the trial was extremely satisfied with the 
“reds” taking a hit in Kirkland Lake, where according to him they seemed to have been very 
active. The growing Finnish population of Kirkland Lake, according to the author was one of the 
reasons for the growing red menace in the city. 
Ethnic management allowed the state to maintain the ideological status quo, fostered a 
unified vision of a Canada, but also contributed to the process of diasporic identity construction. 
Marginalization of left-wing Finns, a result of repressive state policies and unfavorable socio-
economic conditions, was in turn a nationalizing, and at times a radicalizing experience for the 
Finnish population of Canada. In the early 1930s the national unemployment level reached 
600,000 or 32 percent of the population.448 Finnish immigrants who arrived on the eve of the 
Great Depression were often the first to get laid off and the last to get rehired. For example, 
among the 2000 Canadian Finns who left for Soviet Karelia in search of work between 1931 and 
1933, more than 30 percent were unemployed.449 In the context of xenophobia, socio-economic 
prejudice, and political exclusion – an inevitable response to an economic crisis – many Finns 
were subjected to increased state persecution. In 1931, when the CPC was banned and its leaders 
were arrested, the RCMP intensified the surveillance of Finns who represented large percentages 
of the party’s membership. Singled out for surveillance, many Finnish workers were blacklisted, 
and eventually deported.450  
Young men without work and relief during the depression became potential dangers to 
social stability, and deportation came to play a role in managing the ethnic/undesirable 
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population. During the 1920s and the 1930s, deportation of undesirables was a way to manage 
labor supply and maintain social order, as deportations helped to alleviate employers, 
municipalities and the state of the problems of unemployment and political unrest.451 Deportation 
in the immigration policy was as necessary as sewage in the urban setting.452 In turn, public 
opinion for the most part approved of the policy of ridding the country of the poor, unemployed, 
and the politically undesirable.  
The economic depression and the hostile attitudes towards immigrants put a dent in the 
demographic structures of the ‘Finnish’ population in Canada. Its male population for example 
declined from 25,257 in 1931 to 22,752 in 1941.453 Causes of the decline can be explained by 
several factors. First, immigration of Finns to Canada decreased dramatically in the 1930s, as 
only 758 Finns were allowed in between 1931 and 1941. In addition to natural deaths that took 
place in this period, males were more likely to return to Finland,454 or to travel to Soviet Karelia. 
Furthermore, 173 males, 29 females and 19 children were deported.455 The Canadian government 
deported mainly men (86%) as opposed to women (14%). Fearing public unrest emanating from 
unemployed on the move across the country in search of work, the government aimed to rid the 
state of ‘dangerous foreign’ men. Canadian society at the time was dominated by patriarchal 
discourses, which saw the non-British immigrant male as a potential menace to internal security 
of the state. Although not a rule, but in most cases women were targeted when thought to be 
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accomplices. Only when women entered “male” spheres, such as places of work and public 
protest, were they targeted by the state. 
Between 1930 and 1934, 16,765 immigrants were deported, 6 times the number of 
deportees in the previous five years.456 Some Canadian regional leaders, such as the mayor of 
Winnipeg, the same Ralph Webb who supported alien registration cards, campaigned to deport 
all ‘undesirables’. Similarly, the Mayor of Sudbury, a city with a large concentration of Finns, 
went as far as to demand the Dominion government ‘deport all undesirables and Communists’.457 
In 1934, 94 percent of applications for naturalization were refused, many on the grounds of 
political, or labor radicalism, as well as general ‘bad character’.458 Between 1931 and 1933, 2.3 
percent of the entire Finnish population of Canada was deported. Most of the Finnish deportees 
were suspected of ‘dangerous radicalism’, but officially were charged with vagrancy, mental 
illness, or being ‘an expense to the government’.459 For instance, in 1932, Arvi Tielinen, Thomas 
Pollari, Viljo Piispa, and Jaako Makynen were convicted on ‘public charge grounds’ for taking 
part in an unlawful assembly after they had marched in a parade in Timmins, Ontario. In less 
than a year they were deported. Prominent individuals in Finnish Canadian communities, such as 
Martin Parker (Pohjansalo), an associate editor of the Vapaus, were often rounded up and 
deported.460 In another case, in 1931 Vapaus’ editor Arvo Vaara was arrested for participating in 
a May Day demonstration, labeled ‘particularly clever individual…and particularly dangerous’, 
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and deported.461 “He is a menace to the existing economic and governmental structure of this 
country” read the charge.462  
During the Great Depression the Bennett government’s rhetoric and actions were 
permeated with explicit references to ethnicity and ideology as markers of foreignness, 
difference, and danger. Fear of the fifth column seemed to be a matter of daily life and political 
decision-making throughout the 1930s. Angelo Principe, writing about Italian internment in 
Canada during the Second World War, argues that by the late 1930s the fifth column hysteria 
engulfed Canada from coast to coast.463 The RCMP actively recruited Italian-Canadian 
informants, and Canadians in general voluntarily provided the RCMP with documents about 
alleged spies, saboteurs, and enemy agents. As with Finnish and Ukrainian schools in the early 
1930s, the RCMP now paid close attention to the content of the curriculum taught in Italian 
language schools.464 Despite the growing hatred of right-wing ethnic organizations with the 
advent of the Second World War, left-wing ethnic organizations were not spared the scrutiny. In 
fact, in the late 1930s, charges against communists in Canada were as ridiculous and, often as 
fictitious, as ever. RCMP methods used to fabricate charges against the communists were 
strikingly similar to the way local NKVD authorities in Karelia conducted its arrests in 1937 and 
1938. Given that actual hard evidence was difficult to come by, charges of conspiracy were 
based on reports that X knew Z who knew Y. Norman Robertson, a senior official in the 
department of External Affairs, even described himself humorously as a one man Cheka or 
Gestapo.  
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Shaping Diasporic Identities  
Throughout the 1930s ethnicity and ideology reinforced each other, in the process 
mapping out borders of imagined national, but also diasporic communities. The fact that the state 
persecuted left-wing Finns played an important role in reinforcing the ‘Great Divide” within the 
Finnish communities.465 Authorities and cultural producers tended to alienate pro-communist 
organizations, and befriend, or act indifferently towards the anti-communist associations. The 
split in the Finnish-Canadian community then had as much to do with official government 
repression of communists, it did with disputes within the community. It seems that Canadian 
government’s mapping and categorization of ethnicities had a significant effect on the formation 
and reformulation of ethnic identities in these communities.  
Although the division along political and ideological lines between Finnish right-wing 
and left-wing groups dated to the Finnish Civil War, and was sustained and reinforced through 
transnational links with Finland and Soviet Karelia throughout the 1930s, it was also augmented 
by the Canadian state. Public policies aimed at the marginalization of socialist immigrant 
communities often bypassed conservative, loyalist Finnish groups. Unlike the FOC, right-wing 
Finnish organizations promoted loyalty to the crown and preached the Protestant religion, 
something that was sure to generate sympathy with the Canadian public. The Canadian state and 
right-wing immigrant groups had something in common – conservatism, religiousness, and a 
hatred of socialists and communists. Finns who belonged to right-wing organizations and 
attended churches had a better chance to be accepted in the Canadian society than their socialist 
compatriots. Lauri Salmio, a chairman of one of the right-wing organizations boasted at one of 
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the meetings: “Our National Finnish Society’s membership card in this country is becoming like 
a passport, even if for another purpose. It will become such ‘sesame’; it will open many doors for 
Finns.”466 On several occasions the Toronto Star chronicled the dissatisfaction of conservative 
Finnish organizations with the departure of socialist Finns for Soviet Karelia. For example, the 
Organization of Loyalist Finns in Timmins condemned their socialist countrymen and was 
“ready to join hands with Canadians to rid the community of the communist menace, the well-
paid Russian agitators.”467  
Socialist Finns departing to the Soviet Union in the first part of the 1930s became the 
subject of criticism and scorn by right-wing Finnish organizations, but also by the RCMP. In its 
reports about the exodus the agency remarked: “The departure of these men from Canada will 
leave nothing to be regretted as they are all avowed communists. It is quite possible that many of 
them will want to return to Canada.”468 The fact that there was nothing ‘regrettable’ about their 
departure shows that socialist Finns did not fit into the contours of the Canadian national 
discourse. The RCMP imagined a future with no place for Finnish communists in the Canadian 
national imaginary. Given that Vapaus published scores of names of people who have gone to 
Karelia, returned from Karelia, or was associated in one way or another with Karelia and the 
Soviet Union, the RCMP was well aware of the exodus. Moreover, it seemed to be informed of 
the harsh living conditions in the Soviet Union as well, as it suggested that many of the Finns 
would return to Canada. Nonetheless, the RCMP and the Canadian government remained idle 
about the situation at best. Given that the Karelian fever occurred in the midst of an economic 
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depression and mass deportations, departure of these ‘foreigners’ to Karelia was most likely 
welcomed; at the very least, it was not discouraged. 
 Canada’s official stance towards its ethnic populations shifted in accordance with 
international developments, and the changing perceived or real threats to what the elite 
considered to be its vital domestic and foreign interests. For example, Canadian public attitudes 
towards Finns changed drastically from 1939 to 1941.469 In November 1939, a mere three 
months following the signing of the non-aggression pact between Nazi Germany and the Soviet 
Union, the latter invaded Finland. The Winter War lasted for several months, ending in a virtual 
stalemate by March 1940. A review of the Globe and the Toronto Star in those years reveals a 
sympathetic account of the Finnish struggle against the Soviet Union, often described in David 
vs. Goliath terms.470 This led to a changing public attitude towards Finnish nationals as well as 
naturalized subjects of Finnish descent in the Dominion. The leftist groups were marginalized 
even further and some were even interned given their sympathy and links with the Soviet Union, 
while loyalist Finns received support and sympathy of the public. For example their speeches 
and gatherings that criticized their socialist compatriots were often mentioned in the The Globe 
and the Toronto Star.  
Public perceptions of Finns however were reversed when the Soviet Union entered the 
war on the side of the allies against Germany and Finland. Influenced by the official propaganda 
both in the United States and in Canada, the Soviet Union and socialists by association were now 
portrayed in a sympathetic light by the North American media. Stalin in fact was named man of 
the year in 1943 by Time magazine. Hollywood released films that portrayed the Soviet 
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leadership and its people in a positive light. Public attitudes towards Finland and by association 
Finns in Canada swung to the other extreme. Right-wing Finns were now considered dangerous 
fascists, whereas left-wing communities’ marginalization subsided somewhat. In fact, several 
editorials appeared in the Toronto Star with the FOC appealing to the Finnish population (both in 
Canada and Finland) to depose the fascist Finnish government.471 For example, The Star 
published “Expel Nazis’ is Plea of Canadian Finns.”472 The transition in public perceptions was 
truly remarkable. The FOC, a radical left-wing organization, was given the national podium to be 
heard. More than that, they were not called foreigners, immigrants, or even Finns. Whereas 
previously Canadian mainstream newspapers never depicted Finns as Canadian citizens or even 
as British subjects473, the tone now changed, and Finns, and socialists at that, were declared to be 
Canadian.  
Karelian Fever Returnees 
Population movements across state boundaries are an inherently political matter – they 
threaten to sever the alignment of territory, political institutions, and society that states try to 
create and in which nationals so fervently believe.474 This explains why Finns returning from 
Soviet Karelia in the mid 1930s did not indicate on their declaration forms (although specifically 
asked to do so) that they had spent a prolonged amount of time in the Soviet Union. Loyalty to 
more than one state, let alone one like the Soviet Union, was bound to generate negative reaction 
from Canadian authorities, as transnational actions in general usually generate perceptions of 
disloyalty. The imagined national community constantly redefines but also protects itself. The 
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modern state needs to manage its population at both internal and external levels in order to 
monitor and “protect” the membership of the national collectivity.475 
It is obvious that most returning Finns were hesitant to disclose they spent a considerable 
amount of time in the Soviet Union. Very few mentioned they had lived or worked in the Soviet 
Union, despite a mandatory section in the passenger manifest to disclose the last place of 
residence. There was a good reason why the returnees did not the reveal truth about their 
escapades, because when they did, they were often detained, denied entry, and deported.476  Out 
of 296 returning Canadian Finns, 15 were detained, of whom 5 were deported. Only 7 or a mere 
3 percent of the returnees specified they were coming back from the Soviet Union. Five of the 
seven were detained, held for questioning, or deported.477 Some of the returnees seem to have 
changed their names when crossing North American borders once again. For example, Oscar 
Heino returning to Sault-Saint-Marie in August of 1933 with his wife Aimo and children Veikko 
and Syvia changed his last name to Heine and first name to Paavo.478 
 Hannes Maki, his wife Ida and their 7-year-old Canadian-born daughter Taimi were 
detained for a week when they arrived at the port of Quebec in April of 1933.479 Hannes and his 
family came back a mere four months following their departure from Canada, and were on their 
way to Nanaimo, BC. A 32-year old lumberjack, Charles Palo and his wife Anna, were on their 
way back to Tionaga, Ontario when they were detained, although released the same day, at the 
port of Quebec in October of 1933.480 Palos were among the few who indicated in the passenger 
manifests their Soviet residence. Ale Simonson, a 32-year old farmer, his wife Hilja and a 2-year 
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old daughter Evelyn from Densmore, Saskatchewan were arrested and held in detention for 18 
days before being released in March 1933 at the port of Halifax. What is also striking about this 
family is that all three members held different citizenships. Ale was American, Hilja Finnish, and 
Evelyn Canadian. In a similar fashion, the Ylikarhula family of 3, including a 9 year-old 
American citizen Toivo, were detained, but then also deported. They left for Karelia in August 
1932 and upon their return a year later were denied entry to Canada. The head of the family 
indicated he was coming back from the Soviet Union.481  
Conclusion 
 Ethnic identities are generated not only at grass root levels and by diasporic leaders, but 
also in a dialectical relationship with national bureaucracies. The search for an ever elusive 
Canadian national identity should begin in the first part of the 20th century. The Canadian 
bureaucracy, informed by social Darwinist views on race and ethnicity, coupled with the 
Anglophone bourgeois concern over modernization brought on by the forces of industrialization 
and urbanization, both consciously and subconsciously developed an elaborate system of 
categorization of Canada’s population according to prescribed criteria of ethnicity, nationality, 
and race. In other words, a rigid, albeit invisible nationality policy was developed. The way 
immigrants were represented and treated in the public discourse speaks volumes about nature 
and the process of construction and renegotiation of the Canadian national identity. Border 
officials, in many ways similar to Canadian census makers, imagined Canada’s ever changing 
population. Officials at Canadian borders and in public offices created Canada’s ethnic 
populations, by making them recognizable in the dominant discourses. In addition to classifying 
Canada’s population according to gender, region, and class, they delineated strict categories of 
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ethnicity and race, making the Canadian community ‘knowable’ for the government and the 
public. And once the community became recognizable; it was easy for officials to monitor and 
handle its populations.  
 Whereas in the 19th century, the Canadian state and public were concerned with the type 
of people that were entering the country, by the 20th century the concern shifted to managing and 
controlling the existing populations. RCMP records reveal that the Canadian state was concerned 
not merely with ‘foreigners’ but with different categories of “foreigners”. Immigrants and 
foreigners were not all the same.  In light of their ethnicity, race, and nationality coupled with 
one’s class and ideological affiliations, all immigrants carried differing, albeit potential social, 
economic, political dangers to the existing social formation. Rigid classification of Canada’s 
“ethnic” populations also contributed to the construction of diasporic identities in Canada. I have 
demonstrated that in relation to the Finnish Diaspora, the “Great Divide” in the community was 
conditioned by the different degrees of marginalization of Finnish socialist and conservative 
groups by the Canadian government.  
 The reproduction of ethnic, national, and racial identities in the public discourse served a 
practical purpose for the state. For example, the categorization process made it possible for 
authorities to detect, monitor, and, then, “handle” radical socialists throughout the country. 
Terms radical and immigrant were closely intertwined in the public discourse of the interwar 
period. Although officially, the cold war would not commence until after the end of the Second 
World War, the interwar period in Canada was already ideologically charged, as evidenced by 
the red scare that accompanied the Bolshevik Revolution and the massive crackdowns on 
socialists and communists with the advent of an economic depression in the early 1930s.  
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 Left-wing immigrant communities presented authorities with one of the greatest dangers 
to the established order, because they represented the only viable, complex, and sophisticated 
alternative to the existing dominant ideology in Canada. What perturbed authorities was not their 
ability to gather mass support through propaganda, although it was also a matter of concern. 
Rather, it was the immigrant communities’ ability to create and sustain institutions (language 
schools, labor temples, unlicensed marriages) dissimilar and independent/detached from 
mainstream ideological state apparatuses. Even though Canada had no official “nationality 
policy”, it nonetheless legislated and operated with an acute awareness of ethnic and racial 
distinctions in the society. By reproducing perceived ethnic and national identities in the national 
censuses and at Canadian borders, the state made the population visible. This in turn, allowed the 
state to track individuals, to survey, to supervise, and to apply/enforce acceptable social and 
political conduct through ideological state apparatuses.  
 One of the repercussions of the process outlined above is that immigrants’ stories 
throughout the first part of the 20th century remained in contemporary discourses just what they 
were back then – immigrants’ stories. They were not incorporated into the national discourse and 
historical narratives, but were left on the periphery of the national conversation, marked as parts 
of “foreign”, “immigrant”, “new Canadian”, or, as it called today, “multicultural” history. This 
very fact indicates that they are also on the margins of what we consider today the dominant 
national identity in Canada. The reality that in our day a fairly educated undergraduate student 
thinks of Canada in the 19th and early 20th centuries in multicultural terms, attests to the power of 
current dominant discourse on multiculturalism, stemming from Trudeau’s attempts in the early 
1970s to consolidate the nation, which at that point required more than a national vision 
dominated by British cultural texts and symbols.  
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 The process of ethnic identity construction and population management outlined above 
was only the beginning, or rather a part, albeit an important one, in the construction of a 
Canadian imagined community in the 20th century. Official multiculturalism in Canada is a 
sociological reality, or an ideal that involves an elaborate process of classification of the 
Canadian population into different ethnic categories. This policy had its origins in the 
classification of non-British immigrants and residents during the interwar years. It was a logical 
outgrowth of the process of ethnic imagination and control of Canada’s diverse populations. This 
is not to argue that grass-root level identity construction did not exist in 20th century Canada, but 
to suggest that ethnic categorization in census and border registries (two of the main agencies 
distributing ethnic, national, and racial identities in the first part of the 20th centuries), were 
bound to produce a population, who eventually would have to be managed officially, now 
through the policy of multiculturalism. Canada’s invisible nationality policy was the precursor of 
official multiculturalism in Canada.    
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Chapter 5:  
 
At the Intersection of Modernities: 
Migrants as Agents of Economic and Cultural Modernity 
 
 
North American Finns’ presence in Soviet Karelia left a visible imprint on its economy 
and society. Prior to their arrival to the Soviet Union, most of these migrants were exposed to 
industrialization and urbanization, and the accompanying economic and cultural modernization 
that generated new forms of labor and social relations. When they re-emigrated to Finland, or 
chose to relocate to Soviet Karelia, migrants also brought along North American “cultural 
baggage” – ideas, experience, technology, innovative thinking, and mentalities. Having 
embodied North American representations of modernity, in Soviet Karelia they became defacto 
agents of social and cultural change. With the help of imported machinery, tools, and equipment, 
as well as with the infusion of new working methods, values, routines, and ethics, they 
drastically increased production rates at the republic’s trusts and factories. Glorified and 
publicized by the Karelian government and the media, immigrants’ labor shops and farm 
communes became models to be emulated by others in Karelia and throughout the Soviet Union. 
Having come into contact with the local population and the Soviet bureaucracy, North American 
Finns inculcated elements of western modernity into everyday life patterns of the local 
population as well as into the Soviet society and economy at large. 
 In this chapter, I look at the intersections of the local and the global; I examine the 
dialectical process of cultural diffusion and appropriation. North American Finns found 
themselves at the crossroads of modernities, in-between capitalist western modernity and 
socialist Soviet modernity. While they were agents of change in their own right, their social 
identities were subsumed and appropriated by the Soviet state and Karelia’s cultural producers in 
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order to promote a Soviet version (an alternative form) of economic and cultural modernity. 
Migrants’ physical and intellectual movement across national borders shaped and reconstituted 
the Soviet path to modernization, even if for a short period of time. In the process, concepts of 
the local, the national, and the modern (i.e. the global), became increasingly entangled. The 
deciphering of this relationship in turn reveals the dialectical undercurrents of diasporic and 
national identity formation. One of the main findings of this paper is that culture and ethnic traits 
had little to do with migrants’ superior working techniques and hard-working mentalities. Rather 
it was the embodiment of a particular form of modernity – in this case social, cultural, and 
economic values of an industrial capitalist North American society – that set them apart from the 
rest of the population in Soviet Karelia despite the shared linguistic and ethnic commonalities.  
Alternative Modernities 
 Modernity spans the entire symbolic/political/economic universe and is about the 
relationship between power, society, and the subject. The advent of industrial, agricultural, and 
political revolutions in Europe in the 17th and 18th centuries ushered in the beginnings of the 
modern state. These major economic and political tremors fundamentally altered the relationship 
between the state and the subject.482 Newly erected modern institutions of power (schools, 
prisons, bureaucracies, etc), among other things aimed to discipline the population in attempts to 
cultivate a productive labor force. Through education and cultural enlightenment the modern 
state now strove to generate a subject who recognized, but above all appropriated and 
internalized, the values, norms, and perspectives of power.    
 In the present work, alternative modernities allude to the differing conceptions of 
ideologies and frameworks of thinking related to the question of how the modern state and the 
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modern subject should look like. Without a doubt, all political modernities, namely the rule by 
modern institutions of the state, bureaucracies, and capitalist enterprise, have their roots in the 
intellectual and theological traditions of Europe.483 In fact, many notable writers and scholars 
predicted that capitalist modernity would sooner or later engulf the rest of the world.484 Recently, 
with the collapse of the Soviet Union, Francis Fukuyama in his highly controversial “The End of 
History” argued that the western form of liberal political rule has triumphed and that capitalist 
modernity was an inescapable conceptional option available to humanity.485 Nonetheless, despite 
globalization and the advance of capitalism, recent developments in international relations 
suggest that a global triumph of western form of modernity is anything but a foregone 
conclusion.  
 These developments led many to argue that an application of cultural analysis to the 
study of modernity reveals an existence of an array of alternative modernities, predicated on 
specific local contexts, which were formed as a reaction to experiences and practices diffused 
from the west – usually by ways of colonization and imperialism. Some began to assert that even 
western modernity itself was not monolithic, and that one could detect multiple/alternative 
modernities within the dominant western European and North American ideological paradigm. 
This overt emphasis on cultural determinism and the subsequent mushrooming of alternative 
modernities, in my opinion, contributes to the reproduction and re-entrenchment of national 
centered historiographies (national historiographies in disguise if you will). The proliferation of 
the term and its explicit accent on the “special path” – culturally specific approach to deal with 
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the contradictions of industrialization and urbanization – each nation embarks on the way to its 
modernity – renders the term superfluous, as the original meaning of the notion is lost. I rather 
utilize the term alternative modernity to refer to the fundamental variations between social 
relations generated by western capitalism and soviet socialism. The way the state and the 
populace responded to the advent of modernity differed markedly in these two societies. The 
cultural approach to modernity however has its benefits. For example, it offers a particularly 
helpful framework to examine the role of local agency, and the way it appropriates, adapts, and 
transforms differing forms of political and socio-economic modernity.486 
Migration and Modernity 
 Migration, globalization, and modernity are closely interconnected. Migration is a 
fundamental process that shapes human communities, social structures, and polities. It diffuses 
material, spiritual, political, and social culture wherever, whenever, and whoever it comes in 
contact with.487 It can be argued that migration and globalization facilitate the diffusion of 
western modernity, as well as its encounter and dialogue with its alternative forms.488 In other 
words, modernity is spread through migration of human capital, ideas, and experience, which in 
turn are adapted and recreated in local contexts. The impact migration has on the formation of 
modernities brings to the fore the issue of local vs. global, of the fluid interaction between the 
two; of the process of localization and hybridization that produce new forms of social relations. 
The Soviet experiment is a distinct moment in the history of modernity, and is perhaps its most 
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potent alternative form. The case study of North American Finns in the Soviet Union in the early 
1930s offers an opportunity to examine the converging points of alternative modernities. The fact 
that migrants, as agents of a particular modernity, could so profoundly impact the Soviet Union’s 
socio-economic and political universe in many ways empowers the individual migrant as an 
agent in history. 
 Historiographies using exclusively national frameworks of analysis are incapable by their 
very nature of explaining the interrelation between local and global trends. National 
exceptionalism and the belief in special historical paths cannot constructively elucidate how 
alternative ways of thinking shape and reshape different visions of global societies. For example, 
in the North American public and academic discourses, Soviet history is considered an anomaly 
in the western development, on par with Hitler’s Germany. In reality, however, there are more 
similarities in the evolution of the western capitalist and the socialist form of modernities than 
one might suspect.489 The framework of alternative modernities and the role migration plays in it 
allows us to explain forms of social and cultural organization whose ambition is to transcend the 
boundaries of the nation-state.490 Ronald Robertson suggested that it makes no sense to define 
the global as if it excludes the local, and proposed the term “glocalization” to denote the 
impossibility of separation between the two conceptual frameworks of thinking.491 The 
interpolation, which in this case is exemplified through, and by the process of, migration, is so 
diverse and intense that it becomes difficult to pinpoint agency to individual actors, who become 
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both subjects and objects of multiple modernities.492 In course of migration, actors find 
themselves in between states and modernitites, or “in between the positives by which subjectivity 
is normally constituted.”493 It is at this juncture that individual, diasporic, and national identities 
are reformulated and re-constituted. The movement of human capital and experience conditions 
the formation of Diasporas, nation-states, and modernities.  
Agents of Modernity 
In wake of the Bolshevik Revolution, a bloody civil war, and the advent of 
collectivization by the late 1920s, the Soviet state managed to liquidate virtually the entire 
capitalist business class as well as the “bourgeois intelligentsia,” while the professional elite, 
who survived the Bolshevik onslaught, fled abroad. With the launch of the first Five-Year Plan, 
Soviet leaders soon realized there was an acute shortage of specialists to facilitate 
industrialization and modernization of the Soviet society.494 It was in this context that the 
communist leadership approved limited immigration from the west. In summer of 1930 the XVI 
Congress of the VKP (b) agreed to the policy of inviting foreign engineers, experts, and trained 
workers to the U.S.S.R.495 The scheme made sense economically. In search of solutions for an 
acute labor shortage, Soviet social scientists determined that training new cadres would be 
significantly more expensive than bringing skilled workers from abroad.496 
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The Soviet government planned to use North American specialists as instructors and 
mentors, and their habitat as model communes to teach the indigenous population new working 
techniques.497 In early 1931 Edvard Gylling498 received directives from Moscow to use foreign 
labor to introduce American technology and working methods into the following sectors of the 
economy: construction, road maintenance, forestry, and state farms.499 Gylling, however, 
generated these ideas already in 1929, if not earlier. Citing contemporary scholarship, he argued 
that North American workers’ productivity was more than double than that of the local 
population.500 Writing to Moscow in December of 1929, Gylling envisaged “involving a small 
group of Finnish-Canadian lumberjacks who, coming with their own working tools, could bring 
with them and instill American methods of logging.”501 Even then, the idea of North American 
labor migration to the Soviet Union belonged neither to Soviet nor to Karelian leaders. Groups of 
North American Finns wrote to the Soviet and Karelian governments as early as 1927 requesting 
permission to immigrate and to set up agricultural and worker communes. North American 
Finnish migration thus was in many ways a grassroots phenomenon that was eventually utilized 
by the central and regional governments to assist and promote their own particular hegemonic 
national visions. 
 Once the immigration of foreign labor to Soviet Karelia was approved in principle, 
various Karelian labor trusts and organizations, ranging from industrial and agricultural, to 
educational and cultural, expressed an acute interest in receiving a fair share of North American 
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specialists at their factories, communes, and ministries. For example, in early 1931, the Karelian 
State Mining and Industrial Trust asked for 200 qualified North American workers for its mining 
operations.502 Several weeks later the Karelian Auto Trust put in a request for 417 specialized 
North American workers, including 300 drivers.503 Even the Karelian People’s Commissariat on 
Cultural Enlightenment asked for some North Americans to come and work for the organization, 
specifically requesting the services of a conductor, Valdemar Heklund, and an artist, singer and 
music teacher, Ioan Ahti.504  
The experience, skills, and technology immigrants imported into Karelia brought about 
revolutionary changes in several of the republic’s economic sectors. For example, previous to the 
arrival of Canadian lumberjacks, production in Karelia’s forest industry was seriously hampered 
by primitive tools and working methods. However, following the implementation of North 
American inspired methods of labor organization, work techniques, and hardworking attitude 
Karelia’s forest industry was completely reformed.505 Mechanization of forest harvesting in 
Karelia began only with the arrival of North American immigrants.506 Prior to that, Karelia, the 
leading region in the industry, had neither the required machinery nor the specialists who could 
operate these machines. Several reports point to the fact that the expensive machinery brought 
over by North American Finns and delegated to certain agricultural and workers’ communes, 
was misused, abused, or altogether abandoned – mostly due to the lack of knowledge in 
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exploitation.507 In the United States, in the early 1920s, 50 percent of all logs were transported 
from the logging sites by trucks or tractors. By contrast, in Karelia in 1932 only 2 percent of 
harvested timber was hauled from the logging sites by truck or tractor.508 North American 
mechanics and drivers arrived in large numbers in Karelia,509 and they also brought the much 
valued North American machines, tools, and technology. The first trucks used for tree hauling in 
Karelia were 23 American Model AA Fords brought by immigrants themselves, or purchased 
through their financial contributions to the Machine Fund.510  
Analyzing North Americans’ Success 
Throughout the first part of the 1930s, Soviet journalists and social scientists actively 
explored the causes behind North American workers’ high performance rates. They soon 
established that one of the main factors contributing to their success was the tools and 
technologies they imported from Canada and the United States.511 Specifically, Karelian 
journalists pointed to the superiority of the Canadian axe and the hacksaw, which wore down less 
frequently than their Soviet counterparts, and, more than that, led to increased production. 
Canadian tools in fact were imitated by Soviet Karelian manufacturers. The Onega factory for 
example manufactured an axe called “Canadian.” Later, with the reversal of the nationality 
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policy and the fall of Finns from grace, it was renamed ‘Onega’.512 Also noted was the attentive 
and “modern” care migrants allotted to the upkeep of their tools and equipment.513  
 Canadian and American Finns brought with them scores of mechanized tools, cars, 
tractors, and even plane parts in attempts to establish an aviation shop. At the very least, 56 
automobiles were brought over from North America in the early 1930s. These were mainly Fords 
and Chevrolets, as well as several Buicks, Studebakers, Hudsons, Nash Sedans, Graham Pages, 
Chryslers, and Durants.514 All in all, North American Finns brought over approximately 500,000 
dollars worth of equipment to Soviet Karelia.515 There was even a group of pilots-mechanics 
who organized the purchase of aviation equipment from a bankrupt North American company to 
be transferred to Soviet Karelia, where an aviation repair shop and base for the construction of 
new gliders was supposed to be established.516   
Despite the significant role the mechanization of labor played in North Americans’ 
success, Karelia’s cultural producers quickly realized that new forms of labor organization and 
work ethic brought over from across the Atlantic were equally important. It was not enough, they 
argued, to simply introduce new technology into the worksite and train the workforce to use it. 
To achieve high levels of productivity, workers had to be taught new forms of labor organization 
and adapt to novel forms of industrial discipline. 
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First and foremost, Soviet workers had to learn ways to efficiently utilize time at work.517 
Labor had to be rationalized, and time had to be reasonably allocated for individual operations of 
work if high production rates similar to those of North American employees were to be 
achieved.518 One journalist who observed North American Finns noted that Canadian 
lumberjacks did not waste time the way local workers did. They do not “beat around the bush,” 
have set time for breaks, and they work in a set rhythm. The author placed particular emphasis 
on the fact that Canadian workers had a certain rhythm to their labor, and did not make any 
unnecessary movements. Karelian scientists reported that while a Canadian worker spent on 
average 87.93 percent of his time at work performing useful tasks, among local workers the rate 
was only at 42.94 percent, with the remainder of the time spent slacking off (21 percent) or 
performing unnecessary tasks/work (30 percent).519 Furthermore, a foreign worker could harvest 
1 cubic meter of wood in only 47 minutes, while a local worker did the same job in only 87.5 
minutes.520 In terms of daily production, in 1931, the average productivity of labor among local 
lumberjacks was 4.3 cubic meters (152 cubic feet) of wood per person per day, while the 
productivity of labor of North American lumberjacks reached 8.5 cubic meters (300 cubic feet) 
per person per day. Some reports boasted of Canadian lumberjack teams in Matrossy who 
managed to achieve an (unchallenged rate in the U.S.S.R) average of 12 cubic meters (424 cubic 
feet) of harvested wood per person per day.521  
 Karelia’s industry specialists and cultural producers were amazed at the way North 
American Finns exercised self-regulatory individual and communal control. North Americans 
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managed their work and leisure time through mediums such as clocks, calendars, and community 
newspapers. These time-regulatory items were particularly noticeable to Karelian journalists 
because they were virtually absent among Soviet workers. The latter allegedly had an awkward 
timetable, a “poor” work ethic, and hardly any watches, clocks, or calendars to organize their 
labor around. The only time-indicator for Soviet workers, as one journalist explained was the 
sun. Soviet cultural producers identified a direct correlation between new forms of labor 
organization and industrial discipline on the one hand and high productivity on the other, and 
were convinced that adoption of new technologies and working techniques to local conditions 
would inevitably augment production rates among local workers.522 
Those who observed and studied North American Finns at work concluded that improved 
technology, novel forms of labor organization, and rigid industrial discipline were the pre-
requisite for increased productivity. The first Five-Year Plan demanded speedy economic 
modernization. Rationalization of labor became the slogan of the day, as the soviet political, 
economic, and cultural elite realized that rapid (or shock) industrialization was not possible 
without fundamental changes in the population’s attitudes towards work. In other words, 
rationalization of work demanded cultural modernization – a reconsideration of many aspects of 
the individual’s social and cultural life.523524 Whereas in the early 1920s hardly anyone bothered 
with questions concerning rationalization of labor, labor’s productivity, and industrial discipline, 
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by the late 1920s both state officials and cultural producers called for an increased tempo in the 
development of byt525 and culture.  
In this context, North American immigrants became the epitome of cultural and 
economic modernization in Karelia. Their unrelenting work ethic and their disciplined, self-
regulatory behavior was credited with their high performance rates, and, as a result, came to 
serve as a model to be emulated to produce experienced, disciplined, and efficient soviet labor.526 
As one journalist put it, “the experience of Canadian lumberjacks in Karelia, which had given 
magnificent results among the Karelian lumberjacks who utilized it, demonstrates to us the 
concrete ways to rationalize the lumber production industry and increase in its production quotas, 
deserves its due attention and its infusion into the wider practice of Karelia’s lumber 
industry.”527 
 Iosif Tonkel, one of the most prolific commentators on North American Finns, published 
several books and articles on the subject in both the Russian and the Finnish languages.528 He 
recommended copying North American working methods and applying them to local conditions 
almost in their entirety.529 For Tonkel, Canadian and American methods of labor organization 
and work routines were by far superior to soviet ones. Canadian and American workers were 
punctual and absenteeism was not a widespread problem, something that could not be said about 
the local workforce. North Americans were also markedly active socially and culturally. The 
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majority of workers were members of the communist party and belonged to some form of 
cultural or social organization.530 Tonkel was impressed with the way immigrants constructed 
and maintained their houses. He also noted the indispensable value of their specialized work 
wardrobe.531 Tonkel argued that if Canadian-type working tools, clothing, and shoes were made 
available to local lumberjacks, it would save resources and increase productivity.532 
An efficient workforce, it was believed, had to manage itself also outside work. Soviet 
cultural producers paid close attention to the way North American Finns organized their leisure 
time, and were convinced that it also led to increased productivity during working hours. One 
observer of the foreign communities noted that “rationally organized leisure contributes to the 
increased interest of the worker in the tasks he performs, as well as to the elevation of his 
cultural and political level, while at the same time allowing him healthy recreational time.”533 
In the context of the state inspired cultural modernization of Soviet society, well 
organized leisure, hygiene, physical exercise, and above all sobriety, it was argued, helped 
produce a more effective and productive labor force. As Sheila Fitzpatrick demonstrated, during 
the cultural revolution of the 1930s, the Soviet elite aimed to civilize the masses in order to 
mobilize and cultivate a disciplined and productive labor force.534 Adopting Frederick Taylor’s 
ideas of scientific management, Alexei Gatsev developed a “science of work” in the Soviet 
Union. In the context of rapid industrialization, culturing unskilled peasants and workers with 
industrial discipline became an urgent task. While in the west, industrialization was for the most 
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part a gradual process, and industrial discipline was being infused in the workforce at a moderate 
pace through education, laws, and regulations, in the Soviet Union, given the circumstances, a 
more intense approach had to be adopted. 
North American immigrants were commended for particular attention they allotted to 
daily hygiene. Dirty homes were evidence of unculturedness.535 To instill values of hygiene, the 
state created competitions for the cleanest homes, and North American Finns were usually 
among winners of those contests. Similarly, punctuality and sobriety were to make workers more 
reliant and efficient.536 Canadian Finns, for example, made sure to punish their compatriots and 
colleagues who indulged in heavy drinking by publicly shaming them in the local newspapers. 
The FOC for example made sure to screen out those who drank and denied them the opportunity 
to travel to Karelia. By and large, although not without exceptions, Canadian Finns were a good 
example of a sober and responsible workforce.   
 Physical competition was likewise applauded, again for the reasons that it fostered a 
healthy, sober, and orderly leisure time, and contributed to better performances during working 
hours. North American Finns excelled in sports as well, in particular in the skiing competitions. 
They won regional and national championships, something that was zealously advertised both by 
the Karelian and the Soviet mainstream press. North Americans also imported the game of 
baseball to Karelia.537 One of the North American Finns wrote a letter to the Sports Committee 
of the USSR in Moscow, outlining the rules of the game of baseball, which then would spread 
across the entire country.538 As Golubev and Takala write, Soviet authorities readily admitted 
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that in terms of fitness North American Finns were much closer to ideals of physical 
development than the Soviet population: 
…which was just learning ways to embody – literally, through sports – the socialist 
image of modern men and women. Finnish Americans and Canadians fit the Bolshevik 
visions of how the modern body should look, because their experience of sports and 
recreational activities was a product of the Western modernity, which during the 1920s 
and the first half of the 1930s remained a point of reference for Soviet authorities and 
rank-and-file builders of socialism alike.539  
 
Listening to, or playing, music, attending theatre and political schools were other ways 
for model socialist workers to occupy themselves in their free time. Again, North American 
specialists were at the forefront of these “high” culture and political activities. Immigrants, for 
example, constituted a majority in the Symphonic Orchestra, while the national theatre in 
Petrozavodsk was staffed almost entirely with North American Finns. The regionally famous 
musical ensemble “Kantele” was also put together by an American Finn, Karl Rautio. Having 
received his music education at the University of California, Karl arrived in Karelia in 1922 and 
soon began working as a music teacher at a teachers’ college in Petrozavodsk.540 North 
American Finns became the vanguard of western modernity in the Soviet Union. They seemed to 
have embodied most of the virtues of the ideal soviet worker – technologically advanced, well 
organized and disciplined, sober, accountable, and healthy. Depicted as agents of cultural 
enlightenment by the Soviet media, North Americans’ experiences and identities were 
appropriated by Soviet cultural producers in order to promote a Soviet version of modernity in 
attempts to fundamentally alter local workers’ values, attitudes, and approach to work. 
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Applying North American Work Experience, Technology, and Labor Organization  
 To facilitate the accommodation of North American expertise, work ethics, and methods 
of labor organization to local settings, the Karelian government set up professional schools and 
model working communes employing North American workers as instructors. From the early 
1930s, Matrossi, along with other timber industry settlements with large North American 
immigrant populations, such as Vilga, Interposiolok, and Lososinskiy logging camp, became 
centers where the latest techniques for forest harvesting and transportation were taught to local 
workers.541 A special school, for example, was established in Matrossi to educate local workers 
in North American methods.542 There alone Canadian Finns organized courses which trained at 
least 293 instructors, who were then dispatched, upon successful completion, to different parts of 
the Soviet Union to train others in North American lumber cutting and processing methods.543 
Reino Kero notes that in the early 1930s to get familiar with the infamous North 
American forest harvesting techniques scores of Soviet workers’ groups were organized and 
dispatched to Karelia.544 To visit Canadian lumber sites and attend special courses delivered by 
Canadian and American instructors, forest workers came from as far as the Urals, Siberia, 
Caucasus, republics of Komi and Chuvashiia.545 North American specialists likewise travelled 
across the Soviet Union to share their experience. In fact, they were so successful that North 
American working techniques were being made scientific. For example, the Karelian Research 
Institute launched an extensive project to study North American immigrants and their labor 
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organization methods in order to create a scientific model of effective timber harvesting in 
attempts to universalize the practice across the country.546  
Despite their low numbers, North American immigrants had a disproportionate impact on 
Karelia’s economy. They were without doubt the most qualified and the most in demand group 
of Karelia’s workforce.547 Although their influence was felt mainly in the forest industry, other 
economic sectors were affected as well. In fact, Karelia’s main construction trust 
(Stroyobyedeneniye) received more tools ($40000 worth of tools and machinery) than the lumber 
sector did ($20000).548 Immigrants brought with them everything ranging from nails to 
equipment for entire factories. They played a pivotal role in the construction of large industrial 
projects such as the pulp and paper factory in Kondopoga and the ski factory in Petrozavodsk.549 
The Kondopoga paper factory was particularly successful. It employed North American Finnish 
miners, carpenters, and mechanics who had enhanced its operations and drastically increased its 
production quotas. The factory also served as a school, enlightening local workers on new vital 
technical skills and new forms and methods of labor. In the same way, production at the 
Petrozavodsk ski factory skyrocketed with the infusion of North American labor into its 
operations.550 Between 1932 and 1934, following the introduction of American and Canadian 
expertise, the number of workers in one of the factory’s sections was reduced from 92 to only 4, 
while production actually increased.  
The dissemination of North American ideas and experience in the Soviet Union was in 
many respects also a grassroots, transnational process. Innovative ideas found their way into the 
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Karelian society with the arrival of immigrants, but also by way of correspondence between 
immigrants and their friends and relatives in the United States and Canada. In their letters, 
migrants often asked for various technical literature in various trades. One respondent asked his 
relatives in Canada for new books on telecommunications: “…this book that is coming will be of 
good use to me…I know myself how hard it is to get those books…but if you happen to run into 
chance of getting the book, I’d want it mostly on telephone cable work, underground and in 
poles.”551 Ideas flowed in both directions across the Atlantic. One respondent shared with his 
friends in North America new working techniques he witnessed at a Karelian factory.552 Women, 
shared cooking recipes and latest trends in fashion.  
The establishment of North American Finnish farming communes throughout the 1920s 
and the early 1930s made a significant contribution to Karelia and the Soviet Union’s 
agricultural economy. One of the earliest, and also one of the most successful, was Sade (Ray), 
established in the Olonets region in 1922. In a short period of time, it became a model 
cooperative, and farmers and social scientists from all across the Soviet Union came to observe 
its operations. For example, in 1931, 92 tour groups came to the commune from the Leningrad 
region alone.553 Many adopted Sade’s model, its technologies, and established similar communes 
elsewhere in the Soviet Union. Some of Säde’s plots served as basis for student training at the 
Leningrad Agricultural Academy and other young specialists from different Karelian 
kolkhozes.554 In 1934, Sade was nominated to the All-Union Agricultural Exhibition, where it 
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earned a medal, 10000 rubles, and a car as prize.555 The Soviet press highlighted immigrants’ 
tools, machinery, and most importantly their competitive, hard-working, dedicated mentalities as 
keys to the commune’s success. The cooperative settlement also attracted famous Karelian 
writers Emil Parras and Lauri Luoto, foreign writer Martin Andersen Nexo, and a German 
socialist painter Heinrich Vogeler.556 
North American Finns were indispensible to many Karelian industrial sectors. In the 
context of the Soviet food rationing system of the early 1930s, foreign workers were one of the 
most privileged groups in the country. However, in 1933 and 1934, many lost access to Insnab  
provisions. This caused a backlash in the North American Finnish communities, and prompted 
many of Karelia’s working organizations and trusts to lobby the government to maintain foreign 
workers’ privileged positions to prevent them from leaving Karelia and the Soviet Union in 
general. In January 1933, Karelgranit officials wrote to the Karelian government asking it not to 
deprive the 15 North American Finnish stonemasons employed at the Trust of their Insnab 
provisions.557 Citing their foreign expertise crucial to the development of stonemasonry in the 
republic, Karelgranit representatives were convinced that denial of Insnab provisions to foreign 
workers would result in the decrease of their production and also might lead to their complete 
withdrawal from work.558 In a similar manner, Karelavto officials asked for all its North 
American Finnish workers to be left on Insnab supply, simply for the fact that without their 
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input, the organization might go bankrupt. Aside the North American drivers and mechanics, 
there were hardly any qualified personnel in the republic to sustain the trust’s operations.559 
Lobbying the government for similar reasons, representatives of Karelia’s main construction 
trust, Karelstroi, also pointed out that foreign carpenters and masons were the most qualified 
workers in the entire republic. North American specialists introduced new tools, technical 
knowledge, new methods of work, and overall augmented the trust’s production. For example, 
the American system of plastering, both speeded up production and cut its costs, and at the same 
time saved considerable amount of materials and labor time. On top of all, its quality was 
significantly better than the local system of plastering.560  
“Ax and Saw Heroes”: Appropriating Foreign Identities into National Discourses 
 While Karelia’s cultural producers were busy documenting and advocating the adoption 
of foreign tools, technology, methods of work, and forms of labor organization, they were 
simultaneously involved in cultural appropriation and diffusion. The following analysis of Soviet 
Karelian press reveals the ways by which soviet cultural producers supported and reinforced 
national and ideological discourses through the appropriation of North American Finnish social, 
ethnic, and economic culture into the dominant discourse. Consistent with the Marxist ideology, 
they preached the homeland to be not so much a geographical as much as a class concept.561 It 
appeared only rational to them that the motherland of North American Finns was neither Finland, 
nor Canada or the United States, even if their passports stated otherwise. Instead, in line with the 
Soviet ideological dogma, Soviet journalists considered North American Finns as an integral part 
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of the Soviet workforce and society, who had finally found their proletarian homeland. Wilhlem 
Heikkonen, one of the North American instructors at the Vilga lumber camp, in response to a 
journalist’s statement that his students were surpassing him in trade skills, replied: “…this is 
good. It means I have done my job right, it means I justified the confidence of the state, of our 
country, where millions of people like me finally found a real home.”562 The journalist concluded 
his article with a statement that “virtually every foreign worker in Vilga or Matrossy can 
subscribe to what had been said by comrade Heikkonen.”563 
 In the Soviet media, Canadian and American Finns were portrayed as victims of 
bourgeois exploitation in North America, which they allegedly escaped by finding refuge in 
Soviet Karelia. Here, claimed one journalist “they found their real motherland, to which they 
give all their efforts, their knowledge, their skills.”564 By contrast, in North America, they were 
faced with poor working conditions, long working hours, employment insecurity, economic 
depression, and even starvation.565 In the Soviet Union, they no longer worked for the bosses, but 
for themselves and for their motherland. Immigrants’ high production rates were then attributed 
to the motivating ideological and national spirit of the Soviet society. “They have brought with 
them experience, technology and refined working methods” boasted one article, “…and the 
fusion of their experiences with the enthusiasm of patriots of the Soviet motherland, resulted in 
unprecedented results” (implying high production rates).566 The author continued to argue that 
North Americans’ production rates were higher in the Soviet Union than in North America 
simply because all immigrants shared a patriotic zeal towards the Soviet Union and shared an 
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unrelenting commitment to its ideological cause. A monograph entitled Ax and Saw Heroes 
published in 1933 by Johansson O. Kustaa, in both Russian and Finnish, described North 
American Finnish contribution to the Karelian and Soviet economy in heroic terms, assigning 
immigrants’ success to patriotic dedication and socialist idealism.567 In the press, North 
American immigrants came to personify labor enthusiasm and solidarity of the international 
proletariat. An excerpt from an interview conducted with a North American Finnish lumberjack 
by a Karelian journalist in 1935 is worth quoting at length: 
Forty-odd years I have lived in Finland, America and Canada. For thirty years I bent my 
back for the capitalists and for thirty years I have not seen a happy day. I was a logger, 
driver, miner, worked for merchants and farmers. On several occasions I have 
experienced the charms of unemployment. I have traveled across half of the world in 
search of a happy life and I could never find it. I worked, hating my job, as I worked only 
to avoid starvation. I never had an opportunity to input my own ideas into a venture, 
invent something, or rationalize labor. I knew that any sort of rationalization of labor 
would have the hardest impact on the worker himself, and would only add more 
unemployed to our ranks. I am in the Soviet Union for the fourth year now. I am a 
leading lumberjack at the Vilga mechanized lumber site. I am proud that I am a 
lumberjack, and I am proud that I am entrusted with training young Karelian lumberjacks 
with Canadian lumber production methods.568  
 
By appropriating North American success, Soviet elites and cultural producers also 
appropriated migrants’ socio-cultural identities into the Soviet dominant discourses. While North 
Americans’ daily lived experiences were markedly different from what Soviet cultural producers 
imagined them to be, migrants’ transnational movement and socio-cultural identities were 
subsumed to substantiate the process of cultural, economic, and political imagination of the 
Karelian republic and the Soviet state. Karelia’s cultural producers and state officials 
appropriated western forms of industrial discipline and applied them to local conditions in order 
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to legitimize the Soviet regime and ideology. For example, the media tried to convince the public 
that North American Finns’ unparalleled achievements in various regional and national 
economic sectors was natural because in the Soviet Union they had finally found a place where 
their labor was no longer alienated. Apparently it had nothing to do with their experiences and 
training they received in North America.  
The process of appropriation and adaptation of western forms of industrial discipline to 
local conditions however was not linear, and had undergone significant modifications. North 
American Finns for example found it difficult, and sometimes virtually impossible, to work in 
the so-called “leap economy” of the Five-Year plan era. While they were used to specific, and at 
times monotonous, work rhythms reflective of Fordian principles, in the Soviet Union 
Udarnichestvo (“shock work”)569 and socialist competition dictated the industrial ethic and 
discipline. As David Hoffman convincingly demonstrated, although Soviet cultural producers 
and the state adopted western techniques, nonetheless they implemented a markedly different 
industrial order to accommodate specific local conditions, which in the context of the backward 
economy was the rational thing to do. However, as Hoffman argues, it backfired in the sense that 
the society, tired after constant leaps, could not and would not embody shock industrial 
therapy.570 More than that Soviet authorities confused the population with the introduction of 
shock work, failed to discipline their labor force, and the western industrial discipline did not 
take root. 
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The appropriation of certain elements of western modernity and the rejection of its other 
rudiments was particularly noticeable in the cultural sphere. For example, one journalist while 
praising the organized nature of North American leisure time, rich in cultural activities, 
nonetheless believed that Soviet realities required a different cultural behavior. Songs that Finns 
brought from Finland and North America the author dismissed as “old and boring”, and instead 
called for new, energetic songs, which would reflect the spirit of Udarnichestvo – up-tempo 
work. The author urged the news songs to exemplify the new spirit of labor in the Soviet Union. 
North American Finns were applauded because they fully adhered to the main tenets of socialist 
modernity. They represented a clean, hardworking, cultured, disciplined, and well performing 
labor force – a fundamental requirement for economic modernization. 
“Hardworking” North American Finns in Finland and Soviet Karelia in the early 1930s 
In the course of this research, what made me think about the intersections of identity and 
modernity in the first place was a comparative analysis of documents written by local officials 
and journalists about North American Finns both in Karelia and in Finland. As mentioned 
previously, migration to Karelia throughout the 1920s, and especially in the early 1930s, 
resembled, in both scope and nature, return migration of North American Finns to Finland. 
Sources reveal that in Finland, not only Karelia, North American Finns were noted by local 
officials and cultural producers to have particularly hard working attitudes, innovative working 
techniques, and novel forms of labor organization – something that set them apart from the rest 
of the population and caught the attention of authorities. For me, it was a surprising discovery, 
not the least for the fact that most literature on the Karelian fever typically uses cultural relativist 
arguments to demonstrate North American socialist Finns as hard working immigrants, often 
also exclusive to other ethnic groups in Canada and the United States. Many argue that ethnicity 
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and the nature of the Finnish culture explained Finns’ inherent predisposition to hard and 
productive work. Likewise, left historians characteristically note North American Finnish 
socialist character to be the underlining reason for their dedication to hard work and a better 
future. 
A closer look at the reaction of local officials and cultural producers to North Americans’ 
daily living and working activities in Finland and Karelia demonstrates that ethnicity and 
political orientation had very little to do with the hard-working nature of these migrants. Rather it 
was their encounters with western modernity, and the subsequent embodiment of new social, 
economic, and cultural values, which led North American Finns to stand out from the rest of the 
population in both Finland and Soviet Karelia, even amid similar national, ethnic and linguistic 
traits. 
 In a detailed analysis of return migration to Finland in the first part of the 20th century, 
Keijo Virtanen observed that returning migrants made significant contributions to the Finnish 
economy. He credits this phenomenon to what he calls “mental capital” – or the experience 
North Americans brought to Finland. For example, in one of the Finnish counties, local 
magistrates put a report together in which they talked exclusively about the input of North 
American returnees into the local industry and culture. Fifty out of fifty eight officials spoke 
positively of the returnees, and almost all the bureaucrats made note of the industriousness and 
hard working ethic of North American Finns, which, according to them, differed substantially 
from the more relaxed and unorganized work ethic of the native population.571 North American 
Finns were noted to import new ideas, capital, tools, machinery, working techniques, and 
attitudes to Finland. Veikko Anttila, for example, recollected that having become familiar with 
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new working methods and machinery in America, returning migrants played an important role in 
the mechanization of agriculture in southern and central Ostrobothnia.572 Virtnanen writes that 
working hard “got into the blood” of many migrants from North America.  
 Virtanen also observed that wherever in Finland they were found in large concentration, 
North American returnees were represented disproportionately in local and regional cultural and 
political organizations. These findings echo similar trends in Soviet Karelia, where both the state 
and cultural producers hailed North American Finns as bearers of modernity, both cultural and 
economic. Just as Karelia’s cultural producers, Virtanen noticed that discipline and routinization 
of work and leisure time contributed to North Americans’ high levels of economic and cultural 
production. The virtually identical reviews of North American Finnish contributions in Finland 
and Soviet Karelia might as well void arguments made by ethnic and national historians, who 
more often than not propagate the exceptionality of their subjects of study. What made North 
American Finns stand out to both Soviet and Finnish officials were not as much ethnic or 
politically specific traits but rather the embodiment of North American conceptions of 
modernity.  
 Impressed by good living conditions they were exposed to in the United States and 
Canada, the returnees were encouraged to improve their lot in Finland as well, and, as a result, 
emulated experiences they have acquired abroad. It is interesting that the supposedly right-wing 
returnees were noted by local Finnish officials to have radical attitudes and ideas, which they 
spread in the Finnish countryside. In light of these revelations, it is more than misleading to 
attribute hard-working traits exclusively to socialists, or to specific ethnic groups, and, as is the 
case with the Karelian fever historiography, romanticize their national and/or diasporic building 
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efforts in Soviet Karelia. Socialist migrants to Karelia and white/conservative returnees to 
Finland both brought with them skills and experience acquired abroad, and applied them to new 
social, political, and cultural settings. It then seems that the ideological argument behind a 
particular socio-cultural identity of the migrant (be it right or left wing) is overplayed by 
historians whose subjectivities are influenced by specific political, ideological, or national 
discourses.  
It is not surprising then that many North American researchers praise various ethnic 
groups, such as Finns, Italians, etc. as exceptionally hard working. Hard working attitudes are a 
trait of North American modernity, which commands a particular work ethic and industrial 
discipline. This reality also explains the fact that many North American Finns, when writing 
about the Soviet society, often portrayed Soviet workers as lazy and backward. North American 
Finnish hard working attitudes should be explained by, and contextualized in, the fierce 
competition which they faced in labor markets in North America, and the scientific management 
to which many were exposed and subjected to in its industrial centers. 
 
Foreign Modern 
Whereas the Soviet economic and cultural elite welcomed North American Finns and 
skills and methods of work they brought to Karelia, local workers and the low-level management 
were not as enthusiastic about the intrusion of foreign workers with their unorthodox working 
routines. On the surface, the impending conflict between North American Finnish specialists on 
the one hand and local Russian workers and management on the other hand seem to have had 
ethnic and national roots. A close reading of the archives however reveals that these quarrels had 
much more complex causes than simple ethnic differences. Documents show that most of the 
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heated disputes between Finns and Russians occurred at the workplace. Outside work, relations 
between the two groups were, if not harmonious, definitely not hostile. In most cases, the 
Russian management and local workers refused to adapt Canadian methods of work, or put into 
use North American tools and machinery, citing preference for traditional tools and methods of 
work. On the other hand, North American Finns often complained that Russian workers were too 
lazy and slacked off at job sites.573  
“I have my own opinion, my own head, and my own ideas. I am an educated man and I 
do not wish to consent to the suggestion of others, even though they are made by people who 
have many years of technical experience abroad.”574 Kirpetskiy, an engineer at the Lossosinsky 
lumber yard, and the author of these words, did not hide his dislike of foreign workers. He 
thought them to lack discipline and respect for authority. “We have built the White Sea- Baltic 
Canal without the help of foreign workers”, he continued, “and it is a magnificent canal.”575 
Putting together monthly reports, local authorities at lumber cites with significant concentration 
of North American specialists, noticed the propensity of immigrants to get along with local 
Russian workers, and, in fact, command their respect for the new ways of work they introduced, 
which subsequently led to drastic increases in production.  At the same time however, 
immigrants continuously conflicted with management who bluntly refused to tolerate innovation 
in labor organization.576  
 Russian managers often complained that North American workers, in the absence of 
American technologies and tools, were basically useless. Their production rates dropped 
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considerably even in comparison to local workers when they had to work in “traditional” 
working setting with “conventional” tools.577 North American Finns were used to a highly 
technical manufacturing environment in North America, where they got used to working as part 
of a conveyer. As a result, they were not as efficient in tasks which in Canada and the United 
States were long ago mechanized and routinized, and performed by machines or other workers.  
 Another obvious reason for the discord between North American and Russian workers 
was the fact that the former had a privileged status, higher food rations per day, and access to the 
coveted Insnab stores, inaccessible to local populations; all within the context of chronic national 
food and commodities shortages. North American Finns became an easy object of envy and 
jealousy. Often labeled bourgeois and freeloaders, immigrants were criticized for their 
“excessive” style of living. For example, when North Americans introduced new facilities into 
the construction of living barracks for the workers, which were commonly used in North 
America, such as private bathrooms and toilets local workers saw these designs as ‘excessive’, 
and bourgeois.578 
Ethnic tensions were in many ways facilitated by the state. In the early 1930s, in 
accordance with the Korenizatsiya policy North Americans enjoyed all the benefits of the Soviet 
affirmative action policy at the expense of the Russian majority, and were, at the same time, 
portrayed in the public discourse as role models to be emulated by others. With the changing of 
the nationality policy in the mid 1930s, the situation was reversed, and verbal attacks on 
immigrants became much more systematic, mostly because Finns fell out of favor with the 
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central authorities and had nowhere to look for protection. Moreover, immigrants carried a 
double burden of being “twice” foreign. In 1934, when Stalin declared national bourgeois 
tendencies to be among the main dangers to the Soviet regime, immigrants immediately became 
an easy target. Cultivated fears of foreign invasion made North American Finns a potential fifth 
column. Although the United States, Canada, and Great Britain were not on Stalin’s enemies list, 
there was the implication that migrants arrived from bourgeois states. At the same time, 
increasing tensions with Finland in the second half of the 1930s contributed to a change in the 
public perception of Finns in the Soviet Union. Previously represented in the press as 
hardworking and diligent citizens, Finns were now being vilified and depicted as bourgeois and 
potential international spies.  
 While this discussion is covered in detail in the next chapter, here its suffices to note that 
amid the reversal in the nationality policy and the removal of Gylling from power many saw an 
opportunity to replace North American Finns from positions of privilege and power in Karelia. A 
physical education teacher was targeted at a party meeting in the Lossosinky settlement, and later 
fired, because it was argued that he, a nationalist bourgeois, had educated the youth using 
bourgeois nationalist methods of gymnastics rather than Soviet methods of physical training.579  
The reduction of production rates in various economic sector of the republic were similarly 
blamed on bourgeois nationalists.580 The fact that most of the art classes in the region were run in 
the Finnish language was enough for conspiratorial allegations of bourgeois nationalists’ 
tendencies. By the virtue of their ethnicity and even foreignness alone Finns were being 
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systematically blamed for all the problems in the republic. Ethnicity became a marker of 
foreignness and vice versa.  
Conclusion 
Most western scholars tend to ignore the positive aspects of North Americans Finnish 
migration to the Soviet Union. Mostly due to lack of resources they often choose to concentrate 
on the purges and, in this case, the tragic fate of North American Finnish immigrants. A 
transnational approach to the story reveals that North American Finns not only contributed to the 
Soviet economy and culture, but in many ways profoundly altered local ways of working, 
enjoying leisure and even thinking. The lens of migration and transnationalism allows us to see 
North American Finns as carriers of western modernity to the Soviet Union, which was in turn 
extrapolated and appropriated on local, regional, and national levels. These migrants found 
themselves at the intersection of alternative modernities. As I have tried to demonstrate, the 
widespread change North Americans inflicted on the Soviet society was conditioned much less 
by their ethnic identity and ideological orientation than by the “industrial cultural” baggage they 
imported from the United States and Canada. This should prompt other historians to probe the 
conventional culturally deterministic explanations of immigrant experiences in the 20th century. 
In fact if one were to look for one trait that was shared universally by virtually all North 
American Finns, it was their embodiment of western modernity in the United States and Canada. 
There were no other constants. Not all immigrants spoke the Finnish language. They differed on 
politics, had diverse ideological orientation, and had different conception of the Finnish ethnicity 
and identity.  
In this case, North American Finns became agents of modernization, whose technological 
knowledge and culture became instruments in the hands of the Soviet elite to endorse their own 
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version of the modern state and a modern population. Although they were agents of change in 
their own right, nonetheless, North American Finns became tools in the hands of the political 
elite and cultural producers in attempts to promote and create an ideal, modern soviet labor force. 
Soviet journalists and scientists were quick to study Canadian and American Finns at work. They 
documented their method of work and labor organization, in the process generating scientific 
literature in the forms of academic articles, newspaper articles, books, and pamphlets. They 
promptly established that American technologies were useless without the application of 
specialists’ working methods, tools, and above all disciplined mentalities. At the same time 
however, cultural producers attributed North Americans success to their patriotic zeal towards 
the Soviet Union and a desire to build socialism. North American Finnish success stories became 
success stories of the soviet worker – at least they were publicized to appear in this light.  
The bolshevist path to modernization however was opportunistic. Whereas in the first 
part of the 1930s, American and Canadian immigrants were emulated as role models of 
economic and cultural modernization, in the second half of the 1930s, with political shift in the 
domestic and international arenas, immigrants became foreign, an immediate threat to the 
national, cultural and economic foundation of  the Soviet state. By the late 1930s, North 
American cultural patterns had become increasingly criticized as “petty bourgeois” and 
“harmful”. Once the tide was reversed, and North American specialists fell out of favor with the 
central government, the same traits which made them stand out as exemplary workers and 
citizens, now made them subject to persecution, arrests, and murder.  
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Chapter 6:  
The State and the Stranger: The Great Terror and the Deconstruction of an Imagined 
Community 
 
When the subject of eternity disappears, with it disappear all its objects – and the only subject of eternity 
remains the one who at least occasionally recalls it.581 
 
I spent 10 days not sleeping at continually ongoing interrogations. I have received minor injuries. But 
others, when they got out of there, were hardly recognizable. Then I spent 10 months in prison. The 
Russian prison was a terrible anguish. Due to poor air and food people were getting sick. A significant 
part of the prisoners were women. Last winter, new interviews were also conducted in Petrozavodsk. 
There was no physical torture, but very few were released. And why is that? Because the government has 
issued a resolution that 95% of foreigners are criminals. The crimes were planned. It is also easy to see 
that this brutal figure was followed by local authorities and, even then, not always legally. 
(Matka Venajan) 582 
Introduction 
In late July 1937, Nikolai Ezhov, the people’s commissar of internal affairs of the USSR 
signed Operative Order 00447 – “the operation for repression of former Kulaks, criminals and 
anti-Soviet elements.”583 This order, based on an earlier resolution adopted by the Politburo of 
the Central Committee of the VKP (b) inaugurated a period of total terror. The operation was to 
start in August and last four months. The quota established for Karelia was at 1,000, with 300 
subject to “first category” punishment – the death sentence. In August, Ezhov signed order No. 
00486 “The Operation for the repression of wives of traitors of Motherland” – which became the 
basis for repression of relatives of “enemies of the people” – including “socially dangerous 
children of convicts.”584 The so-called “national orders” of the NKVD were launched by order 
00439 – “The Operation for repression of German citizens suspected of espionage against the 
USSR.” In August and September, further resolutions were adopted to extend repressions against 
                                                
581 Victor Pelevin, Generation P, Vagrius, 2004. 
582 “Matka Venajan Karjalasta Canadaan,” [A journey from Soviet Karelia back to Canada] Tyomies 27.4.1940. The 
author, who returned from Karelia to Canada, is writing about his experiences to Jaakko Saavinen in Brooklyn, NY.   
583 Irina Takala, “The Great Purge,” Kangaspuro, Markku and Samira Saramo (eds.), Victims and Survivors of 
Karelia, a special double issue of Journal of Finnish Studies, vol. 15, No. 1&2 November, 2011, p. 157 
584 Ibid. 
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Polish political immigrants and Harbinites585 workers and re-emigrants, and became the basis for 
mass repression of ethnic minorities in the Soviet Union, including Finns.  
These orders set in motion the deadliest period of political purges586 in the Soviet Union. 
Repressions587 however began as early as 1934, and some historians588 have traced it to the early 
1930s. To consolidate his power in the party, and the country in general, Stalin orchestrated a 
campaign that involved a purge of the Communist Party, Red Army leadership, wealthy peasants 
(kulaks), intelligentsia, national minorities, and the general populace suspected of wrecking and 
sabotage. Whereas before 1937 the term purge was used to denote the removal from positions of 
power and influence, with the advent of the Great Terror in 1937 and 1938 it came to indicate 
almost certain arrest, imprisonment, and in many cases execution. 
The historiography of the Great Purge is divided into two main streams. Intentionalists, 
led by the likes of Robert Conquest, attribute the purge to Stalin’s totalitarian system that 
maintained its citizens in a state of fear, and was a product of his ambitions, paranoia, and quest 
for unrestricted power.589 On the other hand, structuralists, among whom J. Arch Getty590 is the 
most notable historian, reject the totalitarian interpretation of the Great Terror, providing a multi-
causal interpretation that depicts Stalin shifting support between various regional factions, 
playing one group against another, in a political game that got out of hand and developed into a 
“flight into chaos”. People were selected at random, denounced or implicated by colleagues and 
                                                
585 The term refers to several generations of Russian immigrants who lived in Harbin, Manchuria. Many re-
emigrated to the Soviet Union in search of employment in the 1920s and the 1930s.  
586 The term "purge" in Soviet political slang was an abbreviation of the expression purge of the Party ranks 
587 The term "repression" was used to describe the prosecution of people considered counter 
revolutionaries and enemies of the people by the leadership of the Soviet Union. 
588 See Irina Takala, “The Great Purge,” Kangaspuro, Markku and Samira Saramo (eds.), Victims and Survivors of 
Karelia, a special double issue of Journal of Finnish Studies, vol. 15, No. 1&2 November, 2011. 
589 See Robert Conquest, The Great Terror: A Reassessment. Oxford University Press, 2008; Zhores A. Medvedev 
and Roy A. Medvedev. The Unknown Stalin. I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd, 2003. 
590 See J. Arche Getty and Oleg V. Naumov, The Road to Terror: Stalin and the Self-Destruction of the Bolsheviks: 
1932-1939. Yale University Press, 2002. 
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acquaintances; NKVD officials often acted on their own initiative, and in the context of a highly 
unstable society of the 1930s, the planned, but limited purges spiraled out of control.   
There is no single or simple explanation for as complex an event as the Great Purge. In 
many ways the purge was aimed at the potential “fifth column” in the Soviet society. North 
American Finns as a result carried a double burden: of being American, and also belonging, at 
least discursively, to the nation bordering Karelia – Finland. There was never an explicit order 
that called for the arrest and execution of either American or Finnish nationals in the Soviet 
Union. This makes the study of the purges in Karelia, and ‘from below’, even more necessary. 
Although local authorities and the population embodied certain representations of power, 
operated within specific discourses, responded to commands, their reaction to orders from above 
was anything but determined, was permeated with local socio-economic motives, reflected local 
and personal interests, and was largely opportunistic. 
The North American Finnish experiment in Karelia took a drastic turn by 1935. With 
changes in the nationality policy and the reversal of Korenizatsia, Finns found themselves in a 
precarious position. Virtually overnight, the representations of Finns in the public discourses 
changed and became permeated with notions of foreignness and otherness. North American 
Finns and their cultural forms, once heralded as epitomes of modernity, now became 
increasingly criticized as “petty bourgeois” and “harmful.” Between 1935 and 1938 the Finnish 
elite were methodically displaced, the Finnish language banned, and Finnish cultural and social 
norms tabooed. By the time Stalin’s Great Purges were over, Finnish was no longer the official 
language, the Karelian government and the Karelian communist party were no longer dominated 
by Finns, Finnish publications ceased to exist as their editors and journalists were arrested and 
imprisoned, Finnish managers of large Soviet Karelian trusts were removed from positions of 
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power, Finnish teachers were fired and arrested, Finnish-language schools were closed, and 
North American Finnish specialists were methodically rounded-up and imprisoned. The 
imagined socialist-Finnish transnational community, actively constructed from early 1920s to 
mid-1930s was “discontinued” by 1938. 
 By the mid-1930s, North American Finns were no longer portrayed by the media and the 
government as exemplary and leading members of the international proletariat, but rather as 
dangerous foreigners. The visibility of their social and cultural norms made them particularly 
vulnerable to the looming purges. The common denominator in the rise and decline in the power 
of the Finnish-speaking community in Karelia was the nationality policy. While it supported the 
improbable solidification of Finnish cultural norms before 1935, in the same way it contributed 
to the decline in the power of Finnish culture and language when the policy shifted to favor the 
Russian majority. In both cases, actors on grass roots levels used the dominant discourse to 
promote their own interests.  
This chapter adopts two theoretical frameworks in examining the multifaceted nature of 
the purge. First, as the famed Soviet dissident, Alexander Solzhenitsyn, once asked, was it the 
egg or the chicken? Was it the system or the individual that was responsible for the killing of 
millions during the purges?591 I suggest that both the state and the local populace were equally to 
blame for the persecution of North American Finns in Karelia. The governing discourses, 
although imposed through some form of terror, nonetheless required consent and support of the 
local population. And although human agency was constrained by “internalized, not necessarily 
                                                
591 See Alexander I. Solzhenitsyn, The Gulag Archipelago 1918-1956.Translated by Thomas P. Whitney. 
HarperCollins, 2002 (originally published 1974).  
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conscious, structures of knowledge (albeit discourse),”592 it, nonetheless, was able, as I will 
demonstrate below, to exert power and to modify and change the direction of the purge to satisfy 
personal and local interests. 
Second, the purge of national minorities, such as Finns in Karelia, was made possible by 
the modernization process of the nation state, in particular by the increase in its ability to 
exercise its control systems of power and knowledge through a growing bureaucratic state 
apparatus that tracked, recorded, and monitored population movements across national borders. 
Zygmunt Bauman wrote that one of the main preconditions for the modernization of a society 
was the removal of the unknown and the uncertain in an attempt to establish control over nature 
through hierarchical bureaucracies, rules, regulations, control, and categorization.593 However, in 
the process of making chaotic aspects of life appear regimented, familiar, and manageable, there 
was the inevitability of appearance of social groups who were difficult to administer, separate, 
and control. For Bauman, that social group consisted of strangers, persons who are present yet 
unfamiliar, the society’s “undecidables.”594  
Both Baumann and Michel Foucault held that in order to track and regulate “strangers,” 
they must be made visible, easily recognizable. The controlling systems of power and knowledge 
– often transmitted through main communication channels controlled by the state – allow the 
dominant power to rename and reframe identities of social groups to fit the goals of the state. For 
example, if the identity of a person, or of a group of people, is renamed and reframed so that it 
now presents real or imagined danger to society, the state in the process justifies and garners 
                                                
592 Nick Baron “Construction of Immigrant Identities in Stalinist Russia: Explorations in Theory and Practice,” 
iNtegraph: Journal of Dialogic Anthropology, vol 1 Issue 2 (2009). Accessed online July 10, 2013 http://intergraph-
journal.net/enhanced/vol2_1/baron/baronframes.htm. 
593 See Zygmunt Baumann, Modernity and Ambivalence. Cornell University Press, 1991. 
594 Ibid. 
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public support for the action needed to be taken to eliminate the danger emanating from such an 
identity shift. I suggest here that national communities regenerate the collective at the expense of 
the “other”, the foreigner, and the state has considerable influence not only in shaping the 
identity of the “other” in the public discourse, but radically changing its definition. 
In the end, the repression of North American Finns in Karelia was a result of human 
agency and the unrelenting forces of modernization of the Soviet society. It is easy to see the 
purges as a consequence of one man’s decisions, i.e. Stalin, or to blame the Soviet political 
system for its abject terrorophilia. While this explanation carries much resonance, it is often 
politically and discursively charged rather than historically accurate. The process of discursive 
identity formations in Soviet Karelia in the 1930s, where class and ethnicity reinforced the 
individual and collective positions in the hierarchies of power, can tell us a lot about the nature 
of the Great Purge. As we have seen in previous chapters, the transnational mobilization of 
ethnicity and its institutionalization in Soviet Karelia’s political, economic, and cultural 
institutions was made possible by the Soviet nationality policy, in the process of which scores of 
Russians were displaced from positions of power. The state moulds the nation, not the other way 
around.595 This holds true for interwar Karelia. The territorialization of ethnicity – a notion of a 
territory with a fixed ethnicity – in Soviet Karelia in the 1920s and the 1930s made ethnicity 
become subject either to privilege (Finnish experience 1922-1935), or discrimination (Finnish 
experience 1935-1938). The reversal of the indigenization policy had an immediate impact on 
the ethnic structure of power in the republic. As Finns were being displaced from positions of 
authority, Russians stepped in to fill the vacating roles. In this chapter I argue that purges in 
Karelia in 1937 and 1938 were a result of a cumulative process of modernization of the Soviet 
                                                
595 See Victor Kiernan. History, Classes and Nation-states, edited and introduced by Jarvey J. Kay. Blackwell 
Publishing, 1988.  
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state from above, and a local and opportunistic (heavily imbued with socio-economic motives) 
reaction that stemmed from below, conditioned by specific local and regional contexts. 
Consolidation of the Soviet State and Culture: 1935-1937       
   
 The rapid pace of industrialization and modernization of a largely agrarian Soviet society 
brought with it social and economic dislocation, which in turn intensified the centralization of 
political power.596 For Sheila Fitzpatrick, the Soviet Union in the 1930s was a ‘quicksand 
society”, where “workers, administrators, specialists, officials, party apparatus men, and in 
general, masses, were all moving around and changing jobs, creating unwanted surpluses in 
some places and dearth in others, losing skills or failing to acquire them, creating streams and 
floods in which families were destroyed, children lost, and morality dissolved.”597 Moshe Lewin 
calls the first part of the 1930s a period of social crisis.598 The industrial labor force tripled with 
8000 new enterprises created.599 And as new groups entered the industrial sector in a rush (North 
American Finns among them), social tensions ensued:  
…it was a time when semi-literate and illiterate peasantry and folk had to be 
brought into the industrial world and taught, simultaneously, to use machines, to 
get used to unfamiliar, complicated organization, to learn to read, to respect 
authority, to change their perception of time…it goes without saying that such 
tasks would take much longer than a decade, and they inevitably got complicated 
by a parallel effort in training, often from scratch…600 
 
In turn, the reversal of the indigenization campaign and the shift from internationalism to 
Russo-centric patriotism brought a change in the philosophy and methods of cultural 
modernization of the Soviet state. The cultivation of the Russo-centric national spirit along with 
                                                
596 Sheila Fitzpatrick, “Cultural Revolution in Russia,” Journal of Contemporary History Vol. 9, No. 1(1974), p. 56.  
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598 Moshe Lewin, The Making of the Soviet System: Essays in the Social History of Interwar Russia. New Press, 
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attempts to instill notions of discipline, patriotism, conformism, and orderly careerism now went 
hand-in-hand with economic modernization. As early as 1930 Stalin called Russians “the largest, 
the most cultured, the most industrial, the most active, and the most Soviet of all the nations.”601 
The end of affirmative action for national minorities, or the policy of Korenizatsia came in 1934 
when Stalin officially declared the end of backwardness in the Soviet Union.602 Stalin held that 
Lenin’s plan of bringing formerly underprivileged national minorities on par with the dominant 
group in the Soviet Union (i.e. Russians) was fulfilled. In practice, it meant that all affirmative 
action institutions were no longer needed.603 For example, social and national institutions, such 
as the Women’s department and the Jewish section, closed their doors, while the science of 
ethnology was banned altogether.604  
The Russian language came to dominate the public sphere. Between 1937 and 1939 
Cyrillic replaced Latin everywhere. In 1938 Russian became a mandatory language in all non-
Russian schools. Even the Soviet past was becoming more Russian, as were the top echelons of 
the party and the state. With the proliferation of libraries and movie theatres across the country 
and the growing capability of the state to control the means of communication, the state’s 
ideological control of the populace was also becoming more sophisticated.605 Coupled with the 
rise in literacy, and the analogous facility of the state to mass produce literature, the state could 
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much more easily facilitate the homogenization of the Soviet society and the consolidation of the 
body politic.  
 With the adoption of “socialism in one country” doctrine, the process of consolidating the 
Soviet state began in earnest. Andrei Zhdanov’s speech in 1935 was monumental in that it 
replaced the slogans of revolution and internationalism with ideas of socialism in one country, 
made possible by the defense of the fatherland around the core notion of Russianness. 
Metamorphosis in the Soviet domestic policy brought changes to its foreign policy goals, which 
shifted from igniting a world revolution towards safeguarding its frontiers to give the Soviet state 
an opportunity to consolidate itself from within. It was, for example, evident in the directives and 
dispatches of the Communist International (Comintern) to the communist parties in Western 
Europe and North America. The Comintern called on communists abroad to gather financial and 
political resources, and mount an ideological defense of the Soviet Union against the imminent 
aggression of western powers.606 Internally, the state engaged in a series of political and social 
purges, which left no layers of the Soviet society untouched. The intelligentsia, peasants, 
workers, national minorities, military establishment, party members, and the ruling elite, whether 
they represented a real or imagined danger were all potential strangers in the newly forming 
socio-political matrix of the Soviet state.  
The Ethnic Discourse 
 Although for the most part not expressed in virulent or violent terms, ethnic conflicts 
were a matter of everyday life in Karelia. The rise of Red Finns to power in the 1920s in the 
process of Korenizatsia made many local Russians and Karels unhappy. Reports of anti-Finnish 
                                                
606 NAC, MG 10 K 282. The Comintern Fonds. On the discussion also see “Introduction” in Vojtech Mastny, The 
Cold War and Soviet Insecurity: The Stalin Years. Oxford University Press, 1998.   
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sentiments date from the mid-1920s. There was in fact a continuous flow of grievances to local 
party cells complaining about ethnic discrimination in Karelia, where Russians and Karels 
protested against being marginalized by the ruling Finnish elite. For example, indigenous Karels 
believed their children would be disadvantaged in the Russian-speaking Soviet labor market if 
they continued to be taught in the Finnish language.607 
 The mass arrival of North American Finnish specialists in the republic in the early 1930s 
further exacerbated ethnic and national tensions. Immigrants’ privileged position in Karelia 
irritated local residents. The disparity between ethnic groups was manifested, for example, by the 
wage gap between Finnish immigrants and local Russian workers. In 1932 at the 
“Stroyobyedeniniye” construction trust North Americans’ wages (of 207 rubles per month) were 
on average 45 percent higher than those of Russians (143 rubles per month).608 Similarly, at one 
of the factories in Petrozavodsk, immigrant workers earned 180 rubles a month, while the locals 
received only 100 rubles.609 The attention North American Finns received in the press also 
seemed to have exasperated the local population. For example, in August 1932, a boat on Lake 
Onega capsized, causing six men to drown, including four Finns and two Russians. The 
government of Karelia however extended condolences only to the families of the Finnish men by 
publishing their obituaries in the leading Karelian newspaper, Punajnen Karjala.610  
North American Finnish immigrants often spoke with disdain about Russian workers, and 
on numerous occasions displayed overt superiority towards the local population. They regarded 
                                                
607 See И.Р. Такала "Финны в восприятии жителей Советской Карелии (1920-1930-е годы)." p. 275. 
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Russians as backward and barely capable of progress. It was also not uncommon for North 
American immigrants to promote their compatriots at work and disregard the experience and 
seniority of Russian workers. Immigrants who were used to a particular rhythm and style of work 
were not enthusiastic about cooperating with local workers, who practiced inferior work methods 
and ethic, lacked expertise, and training, and did not speak the Finnish language. For example, 
the piecework system that was commonly practiced in Karelia caused North American specialists 
to isolate themselves into separate work groups, because the superior technology and skills they 
possessed allowed them to produce, and, as a result, earn more than if they mingled with the 
unskilled local worker groups.611  
Russian workers and Finnish immigrants clashed in the aftermath of the pipeline accident 
on Lake Onega. A certain Zeleniuk, an assistant director of the Karelian section of the OGPU, 
headed the investigation. In his reports, he portrayed Russian engineers and management as 
“good party members and respected leaders” who were sabotaged by Finnish Americans.612 On 
the other hand, Kustaa Rovio came to the defense of North American Finns. He lashed out at 
Russian engineers and management, claiming they “could ruin any good project,” and argued 
that without Finnish-Americans, Russian workers would not have been able to make the pipes 
for the project in the first place.613 While Rovio tried to explain that if not taken care of, North 
American Finns could re-emigrate, the incident allowed many Russian workers to voice their 
displeasure at the preferential treatment of North American migrants. Local workers detested the 
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fact that foreigners received better pay, lived in better barracks, and had access to special stores 
(Insnab), a privilege not extended to local populace.   
 The watershed in interethnic relations was the reversal of the Korenizatsia policy in 1935 
and the consequent dismissal of the Finnish leadership from government posts. With the removal 
of Gylling and Rovio, a systematic deconstruction of the Finnish imagined community began. 
Letters written by North American Finns in the mid-1930s confirm the rising ethnic tensions in 
Karelia in that period. Many wrote back to Canada and the United States mentioning radical 
political changes and noted the disappearance of several North American Finns as early as 1935 
and 1936.614 Insnab stores were shut down, and passport offices began to inquire about the status 
and location of foreign nationals. One of the respondents mentioned that by 1936 more than one-
third of American loggers left Karelia, and those who were forbidden to leave, began slipping 
through the border.615 
 By 1937 verbal attacks on Finns at local party cell meetings became commonplace. 
Analysis of the minutes of the Lossosinskaya cell between 1937 and 1939 reveals an ethnic 
conflict between Finnish and Russian party members. These sources point to a different 
dimension of the purge, something that was not discussed even by Mayme Sevander.616 Party 
members from time to time, as if casually, mention episodes of ethnic hostility. These references 
are rare, and comprise about 2 out of the 250 pages of party cell minutes amassed between 1937 
and 1939. However, while it might seem that ethnic conflict was sporadic, the fact that no one 
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paid particular attention to the hostile outbursts against Finnish members, at time culminating in 
death threats, demonstrates that ethnic bigotry was a common everyday phenomenon. 
One party member, Buikov, called Finns fascists and accused them of killing Sergey 
Kirov.617 He claimed that if a Finn had done something wrong, everyone kept quiet;618 however 
if a Karel was at fault there was a lot of noise made about it and inquires were launched. Buikov 
also claimed that he could now kill all three Finns (whom he was addressing at the meeting) and 
nothing would happen to him.619 In 1938 attacks on Finns at the local party meetings intensified. 
A certain Erohin620 was quoted saying that all Finns would be fired from their jobs, and rightly 
so. The same Erohin occupied one of the Finnish worker’s places in the barracks and claimed 
that authorities would find him a suitable place in Petrozavodsk, implying an impending arrest of 
all Finns. In April of 1938 a certain Vankin spoke that Finns would not need boots in the near 
future because all would soon be removed and their apartments would be freed for Russian 
workers.621 One Russian firefighter claimed that all Finns, whom he labeled a convicted 
nationality, should be punched in the face.622  
                                                
617 On 1 December 1934, Sergei Kirov, head of the Party organization in Leningrad, and de-facto second most 
important person in the Soviet Union was shot and killed by a gunman at his offices in the Smolny Institute. Many 
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Given that party cell leaders recorded in the protocol that the final assessment of the work 
of the committee was satisfactory suggest that the aforementioned attacks against Finns were a 
normal occurrence, rather than an anomaly that shocked the participants. In fact there was no 
sign of excitement, stir, or a proposal for further discussion on the issue. More than that, attacks 
against Finns were not mentioned in the final protocols of the meetings, despite the fact that even 
the most minor events, such as lateness were well documented.  
The Foreigner: Visibility and Vulnerability 
 The reality of the nation as an imagined community lies in its social matrix. And given 
that the nation is limited, it is characterized by exclusion. The construction of ‘us’ is 
accompanied by a parallel construction of ‘them’ – the ‘others’ who do not fall within the 
boundaries of the nation.623 Since the Bolshevik revolution, Soviet leaders tried to convince 
people of the infallibility of the Soviet future and the inevitable collapse of the bourgeois west. 
While the west was always suspect in the Russian mind, with the rise of the Bolsheviks to power 
it became synonymous with capitalism, an economic system Bolsheviks ferociously tried to 
destroy. Throughout the 1920s and the 1930s, under intense Soviet propaganda, the term 
bourgeois, which in pre-revolutionary Russia simply meant a class of artisans and tradesmen, 
now came to denote foreign capitalists and enemies of the socialist revolution and of the working 
class. Bourgeois and foreignness, class and ethnicity became interconnected in the dominant 
public discourse, identified the other in the community, and, by association, encouraged 
suspicion of immigrants. 
Stalin’s efforts to root out last remnants of capitalism and nationalism in the Soviet Union 
became official when he declared that the greatest danger to external and internal security of the 
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Soviet state was bourgeois nationalism. The impending bolshevization and russification of the 
Soviet society that followed the reversal of Korenizatsia entailed a re-production of the society’s 
cultural norms to fit the contours of the new Soviet modernity. For example, fairy tales in the 
ABC books were replaced by stories with protagonists and antagonists played out in the form of 
the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, where villains were Kulaks and western capitalists.624 In 
Karelia, a border-republic next to “bourgeois” and “fascist” Finland, Bolshevization of schools 
became particularly important. For example, between 1936 and 1938 492 people were dismissed 
from teaching positions, of whom 72 for not possessing knowledge of Russian or Karelian.625  
 In 1937, Petrozavodsk was still a relatively small city, with only 15000 inhabitants, 
where people for the most part knew each other.626  North American Finnish specialists, who 
arrived in Petrozavodsk en masse between 1931 and 1934, comprised the cosmopolitan and 
intellectual part of the city. Native residents envied foreigners, did not understand them, often 
called them bourgeois; accused foreigners of eating their bread while Russian workers were 
starving. When immigrants complained about poor living conditions, local Russians and Karels 
urged them to “go back to Finland or America”627 and reminded them that “bourgeois have 
nothing to do here.”628 While the Karelian government, with Kremlin’s blessing, together with 
all major Karelian industrial trusts wholeheartedly supported American immigration, the local 
population often resented the presence of foreigners, whom they saw as “freeloaders” who stole 
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jobs from local workers. ‘Millionaires’, ‘capitalists’, ‘bourgeois’, ‘Amerikanski’ were commonly 
used insults directed at North American Finns. In the process, foreignness became clearly 
distinguishable by ethnicity, nationality, and social class in the public discourse. 
During the purges, foreignness made the individual visible, and as a result vulnerable. 
The national operations sanctioned by the Soviet government in 1937 and 1938 aimed at the 
arrest, imprisonment, and execution of enemies of the state, were subject to multiple 
interpretations. Measures adopted by local authorities in Karelia when dealing with alleged 
bourgeois nationalists were so broad they obliterated any differences that existed in the Finnish 
communities. For local authorities it often did not matter if Finns were born in Karelia, in 
Finland, or in North America, if they were in position of power, regular workers, or even 
unemployed. All were equally perceived as foreigners with social, economic, and cultural ties to 
bourgeois nations. The purge did not leave anyone untouched. Among the purged North 
American Finns were lumberjacks, drivers, mechanics, carpenters, accountants, engineers, 
actors, teachers, managers, seamstresses, cleaners, plumbers, welders, office workers, typists, 
barbers, cooks, artists, dancers, directors, kolkhoz chairmen, foremen, bakers, dentists, 
interpreters, radio workers, journalists, nurses, sports coaches, and athletes.629 
Possession of a foreign passport, as well as correspondence with Finland or North 
America, was enough to arouse the suspicion of local authorities.630 At a local party cell meeting 
in October of 1937631 a certain Vlasov, claimed: “I have no doubt that in Sovhoz No. 2 there still 
remain wreckers and saboteurs, for example in the Sovhoz there is a score of people with foreign 
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passports who are in constant contact with Finland. These people are not only wreckers in my 
opinion, but some of them are spies…We must watch these people very carefully.”632 At the 
same meeting a Finnish party member, Eminen, claimed that Luoma, a North American Finn, 
seemed to have been conspiring with other workers who also spoke English. As far as Eminen 
could say Luoma’s conversations in English carried a counter-revolutionary tone.633 Other party 
members looked to distance themselves from Luoma, who by that time had already been placed 
under arrest by the NKVD. They showered the latter with accusations; Luoma allegedly held 
petty-bourgeois views and built a house for himself in Petrozavodsk, and, it was not known, they 
claimed, where he took the money for its construction.634 Luoma was a suspect because he spoke 
foreign languages, and according to his former friends seemed to have had the determination of a 
bourgeois to acquire private property.  
Domestic discourse on foreignness and the dangers associated with it were directly tied to 
matters of national security and foreign policy. As mentioned previously, as early as 1932 the 
OGPU spoke against North American Finnish immigration to Karelia and warned against the 
settlement of North American Finns in the border regions of the USSR. It outlined 11 regions 
(including Kandalashskiy, Kestegenskiy, Uhtinskiy, Rebolskiy, Petrovskiy, Priazhinkiy, 
Olonetskiy, Louhskiy, Kemskiy and Kondopojskiy districts), as areas of strategic importance to 
the Soviet Union’s external security that contained important military strongholds, factories, and 
communication lines that could be sabotaged in time of war by the fifth column.635  
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The change in the nationality policy brought about a struggle for power between Russian 
and Finnish factions within the Karelian communist party.636 The local party cell in Padozero 
was no exception. At one of the meetings, a certain comrade Esaulenko observed that “not all 
spies are from abroad, and there might be some spies among the Russians and Karelians.”637 In 
this typical logic of the time, which subscribed to dominant discourses from the center, 
Esaulenko involuntarily assumed that all who came from abroad were spies. At the conclusion of 
the meeting a suggestion was made to keep close watch over all the “guests” – foreigners that 
come visiting the Sovhoz and Petrozavodsk in general.638 The brutal repression of North 
American Finns in 1937 and 1938 was a direct cause of their representation as foreigners in the 
public discourse. In those years the terms of immigrants’ self identification – Finns, workers, 
pioneers, socialists – were associated within the hegemonic Soviet discourse with an alternative 
set of referents – foreign, saboteur, spy, fascist.639  
The visibility of North American Finns, their names, the language they spoke, the way 
they dressed, and possession of American, Canadian or Finnish passports made them an easy 
prey for the local OGPU. Typical accusations against Finns were usually nebulous, and the 
vague parameters of article 58 of the Soviet criminal code resulted in numerous ludicrous 
charges. For example, subsection 58/10 called for an arrest with a sentence up to the death 
penalty for belonging to a counterrevolutionary nationalist organization.640 In practice it meant 
that if two people conversed in Finnish and criticized, in one way or another, the government or 
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the state, the duo was considered an organizational unit, and given the counterrevolutionary 
rhetoric of their dialogue, both could now be charged with belonging to a counterrevolutionary 
nationalist organization. In fact all socio-cultural or political contact between Finns could be 
interpreted as a “nationalist meeting.”641 Any mention of Greater Finland was grounds for arrest. 
One Finn, a physical education instructor, was fired because he was instructing youth using 
bourgeois-nationalist methods of physical training instead of Soviet ones.642 The political 
leadership was accused of ‘finnicization’ – a policy that was not only legal, but was also actively 
promoted by Kremlin bosses up to the mid-1930s. While being Finnish per se did not entail a 
crime, social and cultural contact with Finns in the past, present, or the future were sufficient 
grounds for arrest. As one Russian party member rightly noted, Finns were a convicted 
nationality.643  
Deconstructing an Imagined Community: Demoting Ethnicity 
The transformation and consolidation of the Russified version of the Soviet state in the 
second half of the 1930s invariably peripherized various social and ethnic segments of the 
society. Finns were one of the groups labeled and accused of bourgeois nationalism. What 
followed in Karelia was a frenzy purge driven from below and justified from above that resulted 
in a systematic removal of Finns from positions of power. It culminated in an ethnic purge, 
which among others included arrest, imprisonment, and, in many cases execution, of almost 800 
North American Finns.  
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The minutes of the party cells of the local VKP (b) in Karelia demonstrate the methodical 
and structural replacement of Finnish party members with Russian cadres. The party cells were 
important in that they had at their disposal all the functions needed to control all the industries 
and settlements in their jurisdiction. Thus when at their meetings, a person was blamed for 
“wrecking”, or “nationalism”, these records were immediately transferred to the NKVD, which 
in the vast majority of cases resulted in the arrest of the accused individuals.  
Physical repression was accompanied by a systemic deconstruction of the republic’s 
Finnish dominated political, social, and cultural norms. With Finnish politicians removed, the 
majority of Finns in managerial positions were dismissed, arrested, and charged with fictitious 
crimes of sabotage and espionage. In some cases, Finns who were born in Canada and the United 
States and could barely speak Finnish were accused of spying for Finland. All Finnish books 
were burned, Finnish language newspapers discontinued, as was in essence the public life of the 
Finnish language. In a letter sent to North America in 1938 one contemporary observed that the 
Russian language and the russified version of the Karelian language were being imposed on the 
society making most Finns practically illiterate.644 In fact, Finns as a nationality “ceased” to exist 
altogether by 1939, at least officially. Even the national census did not mention Finns.645 Both 
symbolic and tragic was the fact that Dom Kulturi (House of Culture) was one of the places 
where many North American Finns from Petrozavodsk were brought in for interrogations often 
accompanied by physical abuse, torture, and death.646  
In January of 1934 the VKP (b) declared local nationalism to be the main danger in 
Karelia. This heralded the beginning of the purges. Soon enough, local Russian and Karelian 
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authorities and community leaders seized the opportunity presented by Moscow and launched an 
attack against their neighbors. Karelian newspapers now echoed Moscow’s line and pointed to 
immigrant Finns as the cause of many of the republic’s misfortunes. The press blamed Finns for 
their disdain towards Russian workers and their methods of work. It emphasized that most, if not 
all Finns had bourgeois nationalist tendencies, which were evident in their references to the 
superior economic and social conditions they had enjoyed in the United States and Canada. 
Overt political repression of North American Finns began in 1935. The first to be arrested 
and removed from positions of power were the leaders of the Karelian government. They were 
charged with deviating from the Leninist-Stalinist line and gravitating towards Finland.647 The 
danger came from what was termed local nationalism, which supposedly covered-up a 
bourgeois-nationalist revolution in the making. Gylling and Rovio were accused of bringing 
North Americans into Karelia, who according to the NKVD had no other reason to come but to 
subvert the Soviet regime. It seemed strange to authorities that immigrants left their comfortable 
lives in the United States and Canada to come and toil in Soviet Karelia. All Finnish political 
leaders who were advocating the Finnicization of Karelia, or, in other words, those who adhered 
to the Leninist-Stalinist nationalist line, were being removed in 1935-36. In a symbolic 
demonstration of the change of the political guard in Karelia, in March 1937, all streets and 
public places in Petrozavodsk with Gylling’s name were renamed.648  
The purge also subsumed the committee members of the KTA. Matti Tenhunen, head of 
the immigrant recruitment offices in New York, was charged with espionage and 
counterrevolutionary agitation. The fact that he travelled to the United States several times was 
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enough evidence to convict him. Another member of the KTA committee, Arvo Kataja, who 
arrived in Karelia in October 1933 and worked as a lumberjack, was arrested in April 1938, 
charged with section 58/6, 9 and executed in October 1938.649 Similar fate awaited Arthur Kari, 
member of the Canadian and the Soviet communist parties, a recruiting agent from Port Arthur. 
Having arrived in Karelia in September 1932, Arthur worked as a team leader at a forest site in 
the Muyezersky district.650 In September 1938 he was arrested and charged with spying for 
Finland. Seven days later he was executed. Victor Rossi, also member of both the Canadian and 
Soviet communist parties, responsible for immigrant recruitment in Sault St. Marie, arrived in 
Soviet Karelia with his wife Ida in June 1932. In March 1938 he was arrested and charged with 
sections 58/10,2 and executed in October 1938.651 Another party member, Karl Tamminen, a 
recruiting agent in the Bruce Mines, was arrested in 1937-38.652   
Other KTA members, such as Alquist in Sudbury, John Stahlberg from Montreal, and 
Jussi Latva from Toronto, survived only because they remained in Canada. Sources suggest that 
had Latva arrived in the Soviet Union anytime after 1936 he would have been immediately 
arrested and most likely executed. Tenhunen and Latva in the eyes of the not farsighted local 
OGPU were the masterminds of North American immigration to Karelia, whose entire purpose 
was to send bourgeois agents, spies, and saboteurs to the Soviet Union. In several interrogation 
protocols those arrested mentioned being recruited by Tenhunen and Latva. For authorities this 
was sufficient to arrest and execute Tenhunen, while Latva who wisely remained in Canada, was 
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described in NKVD reports as the “president of the intelligence organization” who had to be 
located. 
The predominance of Finns in the intermediary and senior command positions in 
Karelia’s military infrastructure also did not go unnoticed. In March 1935, the military unit, the 
Karelian Egerskaya Brigade was dismantled. And once the Finnish political leadership in Karelia 
was removed, former members of the unit, whose command core was composed mainly of Finns, 
were extensively purged.653 First to be arrested in May 1936 was a former senior officer of the 
unit, Matson. In 1938 the NKVD would execute the last commander of the unit, a Latvian, 
Nikolai Kalvan.654 In total, of the 257 commanders and students of the Finnish section of 
Leningrad’s Infantry school, 225 were repressed, 90% of whom were executed or died in 
prison.655 The brigade once considered the pride of the republic, allegedly became a nest of spies, 
nationalists, and enemies of the state.  
With the change of direction in the nationality policy in the mid-1930s Finnish cultural 
producers in Karelia were among the first to come under public scrutiny. Already in 1934, Karlit 
(The Karelian branch of Glavlit656) criticized Luoto and other Finnish writers for paying too 
much attention to national elements and ignoring Russian themes in their narratives.657 For 
example Luoto’s plays The Old Horseman and The Forest Men at Play came to be seen as a 
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manifestation of local nationalism.658 Finns were now blamed and attacked for their efforts to 
create and propagate Finnish culture in Karelia. For example, Luoto in his Valkoisen Leijonan 
Metsastajat reflected his experiences as a miner in the United States, while Eemili Rautiainen’s 
Building the Soviet Land659 drew a comparison between the life of unemployed American miners 
in the United States and in Karelia. Luoto’s other work, Young Blood and Eking out a Life at Sea 
similarly discussed the struggle of miners, young communists, and the unemployed in America. 
With the change in the nationality policy, and with Gylling’s removal, the new Russian and 
Karelian elite, executing the new nationality (anti-Finnish) line of the center, now wanted to 
ensure that writers would produce the kind of work which would meet the new demands of the 
center, as well as the interests of the new regional leaders. After 1935, there was simply no place 
for Finnish cultural producers in Karelia.   
The change was abrupt. If in 1934 newspaper articles, such as the one by J. Petrov and 
comrade Hypponen, “Karjalan 15-vuotistaipaleelta” (Fifteen years of Soviet Karelia), praised 
American and Canadian Finns for their disproportionate input into the socialist and economic 
development of Karelia, by 1935 the same authors had to admit mistakes in not paying enough 
attention to the contributions from Karels and Russians to local economy and culture.660 In 
September 1935, the Karelian publishing house Kirya and its leading Finnish writers were 
accused of nationalism. Luoto was arrested and sentenced to a year in prison. Following the 
arrest Karlit confiscated many of the writers’ books from shops and libraries. Writers’ names 
were erased from theatrical productions. Many were accused of failing to generate Soviet 
Karelian culture and of orientating their works towards fascist Finland and bourgeois America. 
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By 1935, for the Soviet state and the new leadership in Karelia, Finnish oriented literature 
became incompatible with the new identity the state tried to promote and construct in the 
republic. With the advent of the purges the majority of North American writers in Karelia were 
accused with counter-revolutionary agitation, arrested, and in most cases imprisoned and 
executed.  
From 1935 Soviet authorities also began to reinstate the dominant position of the Russian 
language. Most languages across the country were converted from the Latin to the Cyrillic 
alphabet, with their vocabularies and grammars increasingly russified. In Karelia, Russian was 
re-introduced into the educational curriculum, while the Karelian language was russified to an 
extent that even Karels struggled to understand it. While in 1936 the Finnish language was for 
the most part outlawed, as late as 1935 it was still the language promoted and endorsed by 
central as well as regional authorities. Niskanen, for example, remembered that in the 
kindergarten all the instruction was in the Finnish language in 1935.661 Another survivor, Yrjo 
Makkinen claimed that until 1936 North American youth in Karelia socialized exclusively in 
Finnish and English.662 Russian was not really used until 1936. Niskanen claims that all 
instructors in the first part of the 1930s were Finns, and in addition to learning the Finnish 
language, they were even taught forms of traditional Finnish culture previously unknown to him. 
For example, they learned to make verilettu, in Finnish “bloody pancakes.”663 It was the first 
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time he learnt such a word. Even the cooks, claims Niskanen, were all Finns. And then, he 
recalled, all changed and Finnish instructors were replaced by Russians.  
 Next was the turn of the Finnish agricultural ‘elite’.  In 1935, following the death of a 
large number of pedigree cattle at the model Kolhoz Hiilisuo, the NKVD replaced the 
commune’s Finnish leadership with Russian cadres. In the same year, senior members of the 
Sade commune, Kalle Siikanen, Eelis Ahokas, and Juho Niemi among them, were arrested.664 
Since the mid-1920s the commune represented immigrants’ success story in Karelia. The 
removal of its North American leadership and the subsequent renaming of the community in 
1939 were symbolic of the shift of power in the republic in the second part of the 1930s. The 
NKVD also targeted the Radius commune, and in September 1935 arrested its two prominent 
North American Finnish farmers. Eelis Ahokas, who arrived in Karelia from Canada in 1926, 
was arrested, charged with section 58/10 and sentenced to 10 years of hard labor.665 Released 
ahead of time, Eelis was arrested once again in November 1937 and executed 2 months later. 
Karl Tamminen, a Canadian Finn and a party member, was arrested in April 1936, charged and 
sentenced to death in November 1937. Four days after the sentencing, Karl was executed.  
In October 1935, the NKVD arrested Aaro Holopainen, the chairman of a famous 
Petrozavodsk Soviet Farm – Sovkhoz No. 2. Charged with bourgeois-nationalism the Sovkhoz’s 
forty North American members were subsequently repressed and their local cell of the VKP (b) 
dissolved. The party cell, established in 1930, was composed largely of North American 
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Finns.666 By January 1937 it had 14 members, 8 of whom were Finns; among them were 
“Kulmanen, Prasolov, Pilstrem, Lilbok, Williama, Raatikainen, Luoma, Manninen, Tuominen, 
Menshikov, Golubov, Shishkin, and Plehotkina.667 Following the purges, by the end 1939, the 
party cell was re-staffed with new members. Only one Russian, Prasolov was spared; as for the 
Finns, they were all gone.668  
The trend was consistent throughout the republic. The numbers of Finnish members in 
the Karelian communist party steadily declined from 1326 (16.8 percent of total members) in 
1934 to 314 (or 5 percent) in 1939.669 In the local party cell in Matrossi in 1933 the vast majority 
of communist members were Canadian Finns. However, by the early 1950s almost all had been 
replaced by Russian party members and candidates. Records show that Canadians assumed 
membership predominantly in the early 1930s, which corresponded with the mass arrival of 
North American Finns in Karelia. Russians, however came to dominate party ranks in the early 
1940s, immediately after the purges (that oversaw the elimination of Finnish political and 
cultural influence in Karelia). Moreover, if the 1930s party cell’s documents were composed 
primarily in Finnish, by the 1940s Russian became the dominant language in official records.670 
As a result of emigration and the purges, the Finnish population in Karelia decreased 
from 12,088 in 1933 to 8,322 in 1939.671 This is an exponential decrease if compared to other 
nationalities in the republic. The number of Karels decreased from 109,046 to 108,571, while the 
number of Russians rose from 224,445 to 296, 529. As for North American Finns, their 
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communities were utterly destroyed by the Great Purge and then by the Second World War. 
Karelia’s Ministry of Defense recorded that in 1950, 405 American and 205 Canadian Finns 
lived in Karelia672, or roughly about 10-15 percent of the initial Karelian exodus.  
In the wake of the change in the nationality policy, North Americans were no longer 
welcome, and as of the early months of 1935, North American immigration to Karelia was no 
longer encouraged. A letter from Karelia’s Resettlement Agency dated May 28, 1935 informed 
SNK AKSSR that future recruitment of workers, particularly lumberjacks and other forest 
workers must be done only from other regions of the USSR.673 Officials called for the 
importation of labor from Ukraine and Belarus, given that recruitment in North America and of 
Tverian Karelles from the Moscow region had stopped.674 In August, the last six workers from 
North America arrived in Karelia.675  
Section 58 and the Purge in Numbers 
To conduct the vast majority of arrests and executions, the security organs employed only 
one of the 148 articles of the Soviet criminal code – article 58, suspicion of counter-
revolutionary activities.676 The article’s vagueness made it possible for authorities to interpret it 
in a multitude of ways. Sub-article 58/1 defined virtually any action, and even inaction, against 
state power as potentially counter-revolutionary. Sub-article 58/4 was reserved for those who 
provided some kind of aid to the “international bourgeoisie” in an attempt to overthrow the 
communist regime. In the end, the ambiguity of the criminal code allowed authorities to depict 
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virtually all activities of Finns in Karelia as potentially counter-revolutionary. None of the 
aforementioned sub-articles however could be interpreted as widely as subsection 58/10 – anti-
Soviet and counter-revolutionary agitation and propaganda. Any kind of criticism directed at the 
Soviet political, economic, or social system was interpreted as opposition to the VKP (b), thus as 
counter-revolutionary agitation. 
Sub-article 58/6, suspicion of espionage, was the most widely used charge. As Alexander 
Solzhenitsyn sarcastically noted, if one were to count all the people charged under this section, 
one could conclude that the majority of the Soviet population was not working on the land, or in 
the Soviet industries, but rather made a living by spying for foreign governments.677 The sub-
article could be interpreted in many different ways. One could be arrested not only for espionage, 
but also for suspicion of espionage; even for connections that could potentially lead to suspicion 
of espionage. In theory, any person who spoke the Finnish language, or knew a Finn, could be 
suspected of espionage. 117 Canadian Finns were charged under sub-article 58/6; another 78 had 
the espionage charge combined with others. As a result, more than 60 percent of the arrested 
Canadian Finns were so charged. More than 90 percent of them were executed. The ratio of 
American Finns charged with section 58/6 was slightly lower, at 52%. All in all 364 out of the 
399 North American Finns charged with espionage against the Soviet state were executed. Out of 
35 that were incarcerated, only 7 would survive the labor camps. Thus 392 out of 399, or 98.2 
percent of those charged with espionage died within 5 years of arrest.  
Statistical analysis of the North American Finns who were arrested during the Great 
Purge in Karelia reveals that the “cleansing” was methodical, conditioned by factors such as 
social class, gender, citizenship, and age. The purge lasted for 13 months, from October 1937 to 
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November 1938.678 Arrests came in waves and can be divided into two periods. The first wave, 
the winter purge, lasted from November 1937 to early March 1938, when more than 50 percent 
of the arrests took place. During this time, the authorities targeted mainly the elites and leading 
members of Finnish communities. Out of 43 Canadian Finnish party members and candidates 
taken away, 31 were arrested during the winter purge.679 More than 80 percent of the arrested 
party members and candidates received the death sentence. Party membership seemed to 
guarantee an earlier arrest: first because it signaled community leadership; second it was simply 
easier to find these people. The average age of the arrested in the winter purge was 39.4; 5 years 
younger than in the summer purge of 1938, where the average age of the repressed was 44.5.680  
At first, the state targeted the managerial elites as well as younger, more vibrant, 
politically and socially active leaders of North American Finnish communities. In July 1937, 
Kaarlo Bellman, Kalevala’s district consumer cooperative chairman, a party member who 
arrived from Canada in 1922, was placed under arrest, charged with section 58/10, and sentenced 
to 10 years of hard labor at the Ivdelin camp in Sverdlovsk oblast, where he succumbed to illness 
in October 1941. Also in July, Toivo Vakeva, Kondopoga’s hydroelectric power plant’s foreman, 
was arrested, charged with section 58/7, 11, and executed in October 1937. Kalle Lehtonen, 
Vilga district forest site instructor, was taken away and also charged with section 58/7, 11, and 
was executed in December 1937. Only two days later, the chairmen of the Radius Commune, 
Kaarlo Lahti and Kalle Siikanen, were arrested. Both were found guilty of counterrevolutionary 
activities and executed. In November and December 1937 the NKVD took away Oscar Corgan 
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and Matti Tenhunen, two of the main recruiters in North America. Both were soon executed. In 
the closing days of 1937, NKVD agents whisked away Osmo Jokinen, deputy director of the 
communication department in the Kalevala district; Johannes Tuominen, transport manager from 
the Kanussuo district, and Yuho Korhonen, Pryazha district Matroosa garage manager. The 
winter purge also swept away several actors and artists, an accountant, a dentist, journalists, and 
teachers.681  
After a period of relative calm, the next wave of arrests came in the summer months of 
1938, when 30 percent of all the North American Finns taken away throughout the second part of 
the 1930s were arrested, reaching a peak in July at 113 arrests. The roundups targeted largely the 
proletariat, such as forest workers, drivers, carpenters, and construction workers. By the time the 
second wave of purges swept the Finnish communities there were few if any Finns left in 
positions of power that could have helped slow the purges. In this way the purge was methodical. 
Finns were systematically eliminated from Karelia’s political and economic infrastructure. Most 
of the governmental and managerial posts were now staffed by Russians, some of whom called 
for extreme measures to be taken against the Finnish population. At his inaugural address Party 
Secretary Kuprianov boasted that he “will not sleep peacefully a single night until the last Finn 
has been banished from Petrozavodsk.”682  
The purge was felt everywhere throughout the society; it engulfed the political and social 
elite, cultural workers, skilled and unskilled workers, students, as well as the unemployed. The 
largest groups to be incarcerated were forest workers, carpenters and drivers, who together 
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comprised 52 percent of those arrested.683 The NKVD did not discriminate; lists of the arrested 
included electricians, musicians, accountants, masons, actors, cleaners, seamstresses, plumbers, 
typists, fishermen, a wrestling coach, teachers, barbers, cooks, students, peasants, mechanics, 
tailors, dentists, nurse, and an interpreter.684 The NKVD saw enemies of the state lurking 
everywhere, and reported in 1937 that every single village in Karelia had some form of counter-
revolutionary activity.685  
The target or the usual suspect during the purges was an adult male, between the ages of 
25 and 55, born in Finland. According to my calculations, at the very least 307 Canadian males 
and 12 Canadian females were arrested.686 More than half of the Canadian Finnish male 
population over the age of 18 in Karelia was subjected to purge. Nearly 75 percent of the purged 
males were between the ages of 27 and 46. The youngest was 18 years old and the oldest 64.687 
On the other hand, about 35 percent of the Finnish American male population was purged. The 
disparity in the ratio of Americans and Canadians purged is largely related to the fact that many 
more Americans were in possession of U.S, rather than Finnish passports. As a result they were 
less likely to be targeted by authorities. Nearly 70 percent of the purged American adult males 
were between the ages of 37 and 56. In contrast, only 12 Canadian and 32 American women, or 
5 percent of the adult North American population were arrested.688 In addition, 86 percent of all 
North Americans purged were born in Finland, while only 11 percent were born in the United 
States and 3 percent of the purged were born in Canada.  
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Once arrested, women had a better chance than men of avoiding the death penalty or 
surviving in the labor camp. 20 of 42 repressed women did not receive the death sentence, but 
were instead sentenced to hard labor. On the other hand, only 15 percent of men avoided the 
death penalty. Also worth noting is that an American male had a better chance of avoiding the 
death penalty (22%) than a Canadian Finn (9%). All women were arrested in 1938. The average 
age of the arrested women was 37, while for men it was 41. The youngest arrested was a 19 year-
old American Finn Helen Kallila, a music student who arrived in Karelia in 1932. She was 
arrested in July 1938, charged with subsection 58/6, 10 of the Soviet criminal code and executed 
in September of the same year. The oldest victim was a 60 year old Johana Karhinene. Johana 
had served as a Finnish member of parliament in 1914, 1917, and 1918, fled to Sweden after the 
Finnish civil war, and in 1920 left Sweden for the United States, where she stayed until 1926 
when she arrived in Karelia. She was a member of the CPUSA and the Soviet Communist party. 
In late June 1938 she was arrested and charged with subsection 58/6. She was executed in the 
Olonets region in September of the same year.689  
North American Finns charged with sub-section 58/10 of the criminal code (Anti-Soviet 
and counterrevolutionary propaganda and agitation) had a 50 percent chance of avoiding the 
death sentence, while those charged under subsection 58/6 had an 8 percent chance of survival. 
Only 20 of the 240 North Americans so charged did not receive the death sentence. From North 
American women, 23 of 28 were sent to prison with sub-section 58/10 in their charges. 9 of the 
13 who did get executed had subsection 58/6 in their criminal charges. All 5 Canadian women 
who did not get the highest penalties had the 58/10 charge laid against them. Espionage was a 
grave crime in the late 1930s and the penalty for it, according to the criminal code, was 
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equivalent to being found guilty of subsection 58/2 – armed uprising or intervention with the 
goal of seizing power – up to death with confiscation, including formal recognition as the enemy 
of the workers. On the other hand, the penalty for sub-section 58/10 charge was at least 6 months 
imprisonment, a very mild sentence in comparison. However, a separate clause stated that in case 
of war or unrest, the penalty should be equated to 58/2, thus almost certain death. This explains 
why so many were sentenced to death under subsection 58/10. What I make of the fact that the 
rate of survival for those charged with sub-section 58/10 was at 50 percent was that the OGPU 
and local officials did not understand whether or not it was a time of unrest, were confused as to 
the nature of the repressions, and sentenced to death only half of those arrested and charged with 
subsection 58/10.  
 Based on the statistical analysis of the arrested (location of arrests), North American 
Finns, by the late 1930s were spread out largely in the Prionezhskiy, Kondopoga, and Kalevala 
regions. The American and Canadian numbers are somewhat similar with the exception of 
Prionejskiy region, where twice as many Americans were arrested. It seems that more than 40 
percent of North Americans resided in the Prionejskiy district, mainly in Petrozavodsk and 
Matrossi, and about 20 percent lived in Kondopoga, and 15 percent in Kalevala. Notable places 
of mass arrests were forest sites in the Kalevala district, the Kondopoga paper factory, 
Petrozavodsk ski factory, the lumber camps near Matroosa, the Olonets lumber camps, Pryazha 
and Vilga lumber camps, and Kondopoga construction sites.690 
 All but five North American Finns were charged under article 58 of the criminal code. 
Five were charged with sections 19 (preparation of a crime) and 84 (illegal crossing of the 
border). Attempts at crossing the border were automatically considered traitorous and viewed as 
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conspiracy. Vilho Finnila, who arrived in Karelia in 1932, worked as a mechanic at a repair 
garage in Petrozavodsk. In June 1938, trying to cross the border to Finland, he was caught, 
placed under arrest, and charged with section 58/6 and 84 of the Soviet criminal code. On 
September 2, 1938 he was found guilty and 5 days later executed. Albert Hironen was born in 
Detroit Michigan in 1914. In 1931 he arrived in Karelia. Working as an electrician in 
Kondopoga, Albert tried to cross the Soviet border in July 1938. He was caught and charged with 
sections 19 and 84 of the RSFSR criminal code. In October of 1939 he was found guilty and 
sentenced to 5 years of hard labor. Lauri Kallio and his brother Urho Kallio arrived in Karelia in 
February of 1932.  Lauri, a forest worker, and Urho, a floating laborer, were both caught 
crossing the border on August 8, 1938. In October 1940 both were found guilty and sentenced to 
5 and 6 years accordingly. Solomon Laine, born in the United States, arrived in Karelia in 
October 1932. Working as a driver in the Kemi district, Solomon tried to cross the Soviet border 
and was caught in September 1937 and charged under 58/10,11 and 84. In November 1938 he 
was found guilty and sentenced to hard labor, where he died soon afterwards.  
Based on Eila Lahti Argutina’s statistics 727 North Americans were repressed in the late 
1930s – 408 American and 319 Canadian Finns. All in all, as a result of the repressions, 595 
North American Finns (81%) were executed, 50 (10%) were sentenced to 10 years in prison, 24 
(3%) – 5 years, 18 (2%) – 3 years, 12 (1%) – eight years. 5 others received 4, 6, 7 and 15 year 
sentences, and 1 was deported. Those who avoided the death sentence were spread around the 
country in the Soviet prison system – the Gulag.691 Prisoners were sent to camps in Komi ASSR, 
Kirovskaya oblast, Sverdlovskaya oblast, Kazakhstan, Magadan region, and Murmansk. 6 of the 
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7 people sent to Siberia died within the first 2 years of incarceration.692 About 65 percent of 
those sentenced to serve in the labor camps died within the first 5 years of their sentence. All in 
all, 682 of the 727 repressed North American Finns, or nearly 94 percent died, if not from a 
bullet in the back of their heads, then from malnutrition, disease, and inhumane conditions in 
Soviet labor camps. In the end, a large portion of the North American Finnish adult male 
population was arrested, imprisoned or executed, and the demographic structure of the North 
American Finnish communities destroyed.  
The purges in Karelia were made possible, on the one hand, by the growing ability of the 
state to observe and document its population and, on the other hand, by the eagerness of the local 
cadres to appropriate the official discourses and apply them to the local scene to satisfy 
immediate personal gains. Peter Holquist showed with convincing evidence that the lists and 
records composed and kept by the security organs in the 1920s and in the first part of the 1930s 
were subsequently used by the state to conduct mass arrests in the late 1930s. 693 For example, to 
locate national minorities during the purges authorities used census lists taken between 1926 and 
1937. The census, as mentioned in previous chapters, is not only an important organizing 
principle of society, but also assists the state in administrative and supervisory functions. During 
the purges, the census revealed to authorities where Kulaks and national minorities were located. 
Both had a special category on the census, which also made them automatically guilty by 
association. 
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The NKVD closely monitored North American immigrants when they arrived in 
Karelia.694 Each report concluded with a list of ‘political characteristics’ of migrants. The 
authorities also had a network of informants within the North American Finnish communities, 
who updated local agents on the political and moral moods in these communities. There were 
strong currents in the OGPU that were opposed to North American immigration already in the 
1930s. In a series of secret letters sent to Sergey Kirov, Leningrad OGPU officials, F.D. Medved 
and I.V Zaporozhets, urged Kirov to reconsider Karelia’s recruitment of North American labor, 
warning that many immigrants complain about the atrocious living conditions in Karelia, noting 
problems with housing, malnutrition, lack of public hygienic standards, low salaries, and absence 
of democracy.695 Given the frequency and the secret nature of such communiqués several things 
can be said. First, the OGPU was well informed of the immigrants’ living conditions, as well as 
of the grievances they had with local authorities and the Soviet state in general. Also, we can 
deduce that given that living conditions in North America were superior to those in Finland it is 
safe to say that North American Finns were the most dissatisfied with local socio-economic 
conditions. At the very least they had the most reasons to be upset. Thus, complaints by North 
Americans might have intensified the purge, as they attracted the attention of state security 
authorities, as well as neighbors and informants.  
The OGPU were convinced that Finland, as well as most of the Western world posed an 
external threat to the Soviet Union, while western national minorities found within Soviet 
borders, in particular Finns, constituted a fifth column. This official discourse, which was 
appropriated all the way along the Soviet chain of command to Karelian political authorities and 
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the security organs, was also embodied by the general populace. It is this process that made the 
purges appear as a rational and far from absurd development to many involved in the arrests. To 
the security organs and the local population, with limited information available, everything was 
open to wide interpretation. The scheme for the purges was developed from above; all they had 
to do on the local level was to fill in the blanks. 
When officials sifted through the documentation available to them, they interpreted it in 
light of the official discourses of the time – which depicted Finns as fascists and nationalists – 
and those hailing from North America as bourgeois. For example, in the case of Huuki Kalle, the 
only information available to authorities was that he was born in Finland in 1898 and that in 
1931 he migrated to Karelia from North America.696 The official discourse however allowed 
sufficient theoretical grounds for them to make the following conclusion: “Lived in 
Finland…there Huuki fell under the influence of Finland’s Intelligence Service and was packed 
off to America, where he continued working in its favor. In 1931 shipped to Russia with a 
special mission.”697 The interrogators did not possess any facts, nor could they explain why 
Huuki was shipped to the United States in the first place, nor why he resided there for a 
substantial amount of time. This however was already of no relevance to the authorities; they had 
established the probable cause and that was enough to put together a counter-revolutionary 
charge.  
On July 18, 1934 Toivo Vakeva wrote a letter to the Moscow Daily News. In it, he 
complained that he received 2 rubles to 1 dollar return on the 300 dollars he gave to the Machine 
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Fund upon departing Canada in 1932.698 Toivo also noted that he was not alone in being duped 
and that one of his friends gave as much as 4,000 dollars and received less than 2,000 rubles in 
return. Toivo felt he was misled by the Karelian and Soviet governments and asked if the 
authorities could fix the problem by offering him and his friend credit in Torgsin stores. Toivo 
was among the first to be swept in the purges. Working at a Kondopoga Hydroelectric power 
plant, he was arrested in July 1937 and charged with 58/7, 11. On October 26, 1937 he was 
executed at the age of 31.699  
In January 1938, Alexander Koskelainen, an American Finn, was arrested and charged 
with counter-revolutionary agitation, subsection 58/10, and executed 3 weeks later.700 The reason 
for his arrest was an incident which dated back to 1934. According to the OGPU in the summer 
of that year, Koskelainen, “while working at the Ilyinsky sawmill ruined the driving belt and thus 
put the sawmill out of operation for 15 days.”701 In addition, working as a shop steward at the 
Karelavto he “intentionally disrupted the transportation plan.”702 “Intentional” is the key word, as 
two-work related accidents were interpreted as counterrevolutionary activities almost 4 years 
after the incidents took place.  
 Born in Ontario, Helen Hill arrived in Karelia with her father Oscar at the age of 15. In 
February 1938 she was arrested, charged with sub-section 58/10, sentenced to 10 years of hard 
labor, and sent to the Karaganda labor camp. The NKVD accused her with “maintaining contact 
with relatives in the U.S. collecting information in favor of Finland’s intelligence service, 
praising life in capitalist countries, speaking of her intentions to cross the border, and fostering a 
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spirit of emigration among workers.”703 There seems to be no falseness in the accusations, except 
for her sending information to the Finnish Intelligence Service. On closer look, the accusations 
only summarize her daily activities, which before 1936 would not have aroused much suspicion. 
However with the call from above to unravel bourgeois nationalists all over the country, 
authorities interpreted her contact with relatives in North America as an attempt to collect 
information for the Finnish Intelligence Service. This episode suggests that the NKVD was 
following Helen for some time, and most likely had been screening her letters for at least several 
months, if not years, before arresting her. It is also obvious that Helen wanted to leave Karelia 
and discussed the option with her friends, relatives, co-workers, and possibly others in her 
community. The authorities however interpreted her rhetoric as counter-revolutionary agitation. 
In her work Skitaltsi Mayme Sevander mentions a pregnant woman who was incarcerated on a 
charge based on 6 year-old evidence. She apparently demanded a Canadian, instead of a Soviet, 
passport and expressed a desire to leave the Soviet Union.704  
 Maria Alfred, a member of the Petrozavodsk symphony orchestra, arrived in Karelia from 
the United States in October of 1931. In July 1938, she was arrested and charged with sub-
sections 58/6, 9. At the interrogation she revealed that she had been recruited by Matti 
Tenhunen.705 Given that Tenhunen’s name appeared in several interrogation reports as the 
bourgeois nationalist mastermind responsible for facilitating the arrival of North American 
Finnish spies, the NKVD assumed that Maria was one Tenhunen’s agents sent to Karelia. 
Charges of espionage were similarly brought against Oscar Maki, when at the interrogation he 
revealed that Jussi Latva recruited him in Canada. According to Soviet officials both Tenhunen 
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and Latva were among the most dangerous elements in Karelia, considered as the heads of the 
Finnish Intelligence Operation. As a result, anyone who in one way or another was associated 
with Tenhunen or Latva was a possible spy. According to this logic, all North American Finns 
were subject to repression and most likely execution, as section 58/6 of the Soviet criminal 
(espionage) in 95% of the cases meant a death sentence.  
 Vaino Finberg, head of the publishing house in Karelia, was arrested in December 1937. 
Accused of “increasing the publication of counter-revolutionary nationalist literature by cutting 
down Russian and Karelian language publications,”706 Vaino in effect was doing just what the 
state asked him to do before 1935. One of the first cultural producers to be arrested in the winter 
purges of 1937-1938, Finberg found himself caught between Korenizatsia, which encouraged 
Finnish cultural norms, and the Russification of the Soviet society in full swing in the second 
part of the 1930s. Ivan Chuhin writes that cases stored from as far back as 1919 served for 
repressions in 1937. He mentions a certain Alekseyeva who was arrested in 1919 because of her 
husband. The OGPU also happened to search her house in 1924. Records indicate the only items 
found were Finnish household products. These two incidents served as grounds for her arrest in 
1938 and her execution several weeks later.707 
Rewriting Discourses: The New Nationality Policy 
 Nationalism is a cultural script, a belief or a political ideology that engages a group of 
people in the collective discourses of a nation state.  Through this script, members of the nation 
conceive of social reality, frame their aspirations, and re-formulate existing national 
ideologies.708 In Soviet propaganda of the mid-1930s, Finland was portrayed as an enemy state. 
                                                
706 Ibid. 
707 Чухин И. Карелия–37: Идеология и практика террора [Karelia-37: Ideology and practice of terror]. 
708 See Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities. 
245	  
	  
Throughout the 1930s images of Finns in the press and popular culture went from sturdy and 
clean workers, into white bandits.709 With the rise of fascism in Europe, a new external threat to 
Soviet security was created. Imagined or real, it made Soviet security organs pay particular 
attention to ethnic populations living on the Soviet periphery. A radical shift in the official 
discourses occurred in 1935 when Stalin announced that the main task of the party was the 
struggle with bourgeois nationalism. In 1936 and 1937, during the Spanish Civil War Stalin’s 
fear of the “fifth column” only intensified.  
There is no doubt that the purge was directed at the elimination of the fifth column, the 
perceived internal enemy. Both Vyacheslav Molotov (Chairman of the Council of People’s 
Commisariat) and Lazar Kaganovich (Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist 
Party) later admitted that the chief reason for the purges was the removal of the fifth column.710 
Molotov went as far as to suggest that victory in the Second World War was due to the absence 
of the fifth column in the early 1940s.711 Statistics all too clearly show that several minority 
groups were in greater danger of being arrested than others. There was an exponential increase of 
ethnic populations in Soviet prisons. For example, the number of Germans in prisons rose by 18 
times during the purges.712 Similarly, Finns, who comprised only 2.7 percent of the Karelian 
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population at the time of the Great Purge, nonetheless constituted 22 percent of all the inmates in 
Karelia’s prisons.713  
With the passing of the so-called “national orders”, issued in July, under order 00439, the 
anti-Finnish campaign in the local communist party cells immediately intensified. Soviet 
newspapers began to publish articles on the “capitalist intrigues” within the country, boasting 
that enemies of the people all throughout the country were sabotaging large enterprises and entire 
industries. It seemed that all the ineptitude of the Soviet economy was being blamed on these yet 
to be visible enemies of the state. On the local level this dominant line was adopted in an 
awkward way. In their denunciation speeches, the accusers, who for the most part consisted of 
party members and cultural producers, as well as some common workers, referenced Stalin and 
the struggle with bourgeois nations, and then made a radical transition to the Kolhoz’ garages 
and the berry farms, where they vigorously tried to uncover wreckers and saboteurs. 
Adapting/Embodying Discourses: Manninen’s Case 
 The discussion about Comrade Manninen at the general meeting of the Sovhoz no. 2 
party cell in winter 1937 is typical of a trial of a Finnish party member who was condemned to 
arrest and expulsion from party ranks.714 Manninen, former head of the local communist party 
cell, was blamed for demonstrating a passive attitude towards public work, drunkenness, and 
favoritism towards Finnish members of the party. The new secretary of the party cell, 
Plekhotkina argued that Manninen was an ardent nationalist: “Manninen knows the Russian 
language, but deliberately avoids using it, despite being an editor of the party’s bulletin. 
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Manninen deliberately avoided the Russian language and, failed to prove himself to be an 
exemplary member of the VKP (b), and instead showed himself to be a self-seeker and a 
careerist, who always put purely personal selfish reasons ahead of public interests.”715 Another 
party member, Smirennov seconded Plekhotkina, arguing that Manninen’s tendency to speak in 
Finnish was sufficient evidence of his ardent nationalism.716  
 Following a lengthy description of Manninen’s mortal sins, Plekhotkina turned to two 
other Finnish members of the cell, Kolander and Luoma, and reminded them that the central 
committee of the party had repeatedly called on its members and candidates to be vigilant and to 
expose enemies of the state lurking everywhere in disguise. Plekhotkina proposed to exclude 
Manninen from the party. She also blamed the aforementioned Finns for failing to exert the 
needed vigilance to uncover Manninen as a spy who had infiltrated the local party cell in 1930. 
Given the absence of any evidence to sustain her accusations against Manninen, Plekhotkina’s 
rhetoric reflected almost in its entirety the dominant discourse, which called on the populace to 
“uncover” spies and saboteurs that supposedly infiltrated all segments of the body politic in the 
Soviet Union, allegedly even Karelia’s Sovhoz # 2.  
 Manninen’s tribunal is a great example of how people at the grassroots level adopted and 
appropriated the discourse on the enemies of the people which stemmed from above, and 
mechanically applied it to people who even remotely resembled perceived enemies of the people. 
There was only one piece of circumstantial evidence against Manninen in that he allegedly got 
drunk with people who were considered enemies of the people. Plekhotkina in turn composed an 
entire protocol, which had little if anything to do with the real accusations against Manninen. 
Reading the protocols one gets a sense that Plekhotkina believed everything she said, even 
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though this belief was based not on facts but on discourse that she borrowed from newspapers 
and other official sources. The main basis for the accusation, however, was the fact that 
Manninen was a Finn. 
Plekhotkina’s accusations did not stop at Manninen. As a proper communist, she saw 
enemies of the people everywhere, and accused mechanic Telli with bourgeois nationalism for 
radio talks with Finland.717 Telli also allegedly paid Finns 12 rubles for car repair, while a 
Russian only got 5 rubles.718  A Russian party member, a certain Kriakin, came to Telli’s 
defense, and for that was subsequently expelled from the party ranks.719 Together with Prasolov, 
Plekhotkina blamed “capitalist” Harju for conducting counter-revolutionary agitation in their 
Sovhoz.720 It was the same Harju, who only several years earlier, using his own American money 
and without any retribution, donated about 100 cows from Finland to the Sovhoz, in the process 
saving it from bankruptcy. In return, in 1937 he was christened a capitalist and then perished in 
the purges.721 At the same meeting, Prasolov blamed the head of the dining room, a certain 
Korka, for counter-revolutionary agitation, claiming that while there were enough food 
provisions, Korka allegedly told Russian workers that there was no food to go around.722  
Adapting/Embodying Discourses: Surviving the Purges 
Party cell meetings reveal all too clearly the way the official discourse was adapted in 
both theory and practice to the local level. For example, a meeting of the Interposiolok party cell 
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called for “every communist [my translation] on the site of his work to strengthen the 
revolutionary vigilance and repel all the class enemies, in whichever forms they appear.”723 At a 
party meeting in July of 1937 T. Nikiforov spoke of the wrecking caused by Trotskyites and 
Zinoviets, who murdered “our beloved Sergei Kirov… wreckers and saboteurs doing their best to 
destroy the Soviet Union, and so we need to arm ourselves politically, now more than ever and 
raise our cultural levels to the proper height…”724 
Class enemies and bourgeois nationalists could appear anywhere, in any form, and given 
the nature of the new nationality policy, class enemies in Karelia most likely would be Finns. A 
certain Kliukin reported at the Sovhoz no. 2 party cell meeting in October of 1937:  
I want to note one more time, that Harju often comes over to our Sovhoz, gets the 
workers drunk, lowers discipline levels at work cites…as well as Ahtola who conducts 
agitation among workers… I don’t know the Finnish language, and our party member 
Williama, and candidate Tuomi are never willing to find out what the former are talking 
about and report to the proper authorities…I think that Williama and Tuomi’s actions are 
not worthy of party members, as it signals nepotism and nationalist favoritism among 
Finns.725 
 
Any Finn could be accused of espionage and counter-revolutionary activity, or bourgeois 
nationalism. Sulo Kokko, a Finnish-Canadian wrestling coach, was arrested and tried on 
allegations that he made Finnish and Karelian children wrestle against each other, thus inflaming 
national differences among children.726  
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Amid the chaos, Finns began to blame each other. A certain Tuomi, for example, claimed 
that he previously reported to the party committee about the misgivings of certain Finnish party 
members, whereas Kriakin and Kulmanen sought to hide these “wrecking” activities.727 
Everyone seems to have been accusing each other. The same Plekhotkina, who blamed mechanic 
Telli for bourgeois nationalism, became the object of a denunciation protocol.728 Dated August 
1937, the protocol was composed by a member of the Sovhoz, Tolpov, who accused Plekhotkina 
of failing to report the wrecking activities of Finnish-nationalists. Tolpov claimed that the head 
of the kitchen at the Sovhoz no.2 bought 50 kg of meat with worms in order to foster workers’ 
animosity towards the Soviet state. In addition, Manninen allegedly hired only Finnish workers, 
in the process denying several Russian cooks a job in the kitchen. All this, said Topolov was 
obviously a sign of local bourgeois nationalism, headed by party member Manninen.729 
The state also encouraged the populace to participate in the rounding up of Karelia’s 
Finnish population. ‘Donositelstvo’ (whistleblowing) was an integral part of the communist 
ethic. In fact, sub-article 58/12 of the Soviet criminal code called for arrest and imprisonment for 
not reporting on counter-revolutionary activities. The minutes of the local communist party cell 
in Interposiolok730 demonstrate that by this time, a particular model of behavior was being 
constructed, as any shortcoming at any of the state enterprises was being labeled anti-Soviet 
behavior, either to be blamed on Trotskiyism or on foreign governments. Therefore it is not 
surprising that Finnish heads rolled in 1937 and 1938. The paradox is that Finns participated in 
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the “witch hunts” with the same, if not increased enthusiasm as the Russian population. A certain 
Sari, a Finnish member of the local party cell, was convinced that bourgeois nationalists had 
settled in Karelia and they “can be found even in local party organizations, and as a result of 
which regional production plans have not been fulfilled, especially in the lumber industry…”731. 
Another Finnish comrade, Yaspi complained that “in the mass art work industries similarly we 
can find scores of bourgeois nationalists. All the 23 sections work in the Finnish language…”732.  
It seems that everyone, including Finnish communists adhered to, and applied the 
dominant discourse in their denunciations. Following the arrest of Luoma in March 1938, the 
local party cell of Sovhoz no.2 met to discuss the arrest. One of the Finnish party members, 
Kolander commented: “If the NKVD arrested Luoma then I am sure there was sufficient reason 
for that.”733 This was the typical logic of the time. Alanen, another Finnish member added: 
“Luoma always had petty-bourgeois traits, was not raised on proper ideological values, and did 
not want to study them. Therefore he should be excluded from the party.”734 Then it was 
Eminen’s turn: “Luoma often talked, in a secretive fashion, with several workers who were 
fluent in English, and often shared with them his criticism of the existing regime.”735 One of 
Luoma’s friends, Williama, added: “Luoma built a house for himself in Petrozavodsk and had a 
desire to acquire private property, and where he took the money no one knows.”736 On top of all 
the accusations against him, Luoma’s wife was accused of planting vegetables in public gardens 
utilizing wrong techniques, and, as a result was declared a wrecker at the party meeting.  
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The Interposiolok party cell meeting in November 1937, headed by Amalainen and two 
other Finns, concluded that several individuals should be excluded from the party. Among the 9 
recommended, six were Finns by nationality. The party expelled two lumber industry workers 
accused of defending the previously arrested nationalist Jonsen.737 Storekeeper Helmi Jansen was 
to be removed because her husband was arrested and charged with anti-Soviet agitation and 
bourgeois nationalism.738 Mechanic Salo was to be fired from work because of his tendency to 
drink and skip work. Storekeeper Manti Ranta and mechanic Viesta were to be dismissed from 
their positions simply because they looked suspicious.739  
In one of the reports of the local party cell in Interposiolok, Lauri Kivintelo, a Canadian 
Finn, sought to blame every other Finn so he could just prove his own innocence and loyalty.740 
Kivintelo accused several Finns of nationalism, wrecking and sabotage, in the process claiming 
that local newspapers, run mostly by Finns, were in the hands of wreckers and spies. In the 
process they succumbed to the popular discourse from above. While Finns were trying to save 
their own skins by denouncing other Finns, the tendency did not go unnoticed by a Russian 
member of the party cell, Easaulenko who in response to Yuntunen and Pilhstrem’s accusations 
of Tuominen, claimed that  
…in my opinion, these addresses [by Yuntunen and Pilhstrem] are aimed at covering 
one’s own skin, but this will not save them. The party has spearheaded an 
uncompromising struggle before, and it would continue doing so in the future. I propose 
to expel this bloody fascist dog, enemy of the people Tuominen from the party ranks. 
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And those who recommended him for membership, Yuntunen, Pilhstrem and 
Kulmanen.741  
 
The questioning of a former secretary, Kulmanen, at the party cell meeting in October 
1938 demonstrates the degree to which the public discourse shifted in only 3 years. It also 
reveals the extent to which individuals at grass root levels, adopted new discourses, in many 
cases in order to survive. Following a series of accusations, and in order to stay in the party, 
Kulmanen had to apologize publicly and acknowledge his own political backwardness. In June 
1937, when his friend Luoma found himself in the hot seat for publicly criticizing the Karelian 
leadership, Kulmanen went on record to say that he heard from the worker Ahtola that Luoma 
had indeed dubbed the leadership as weak and inept.742  
Kulmanen and others like him eventually adapted to the dominant discourses and learned 
to survive, either by turning in their friends, lying to authorities, or finding loopholes in the 
system. In 1938, Kulmanen was brought in for questioning once again where he was asked as to 
the reasons he provided Tuominen (an expelled member) with a recommendation for party 
membership. Kulmanen, aware that the other two Finns, who also vouched for Tuominen – 
Yuntunen and Pilshtrem – have been both already expelled from the party for supporting the 
former, answered that he already then knew that Tuominen was a bad worker, but provided him 
with a recommendation in hope to  encourage him to work better.743 To prove his loyalty, 
Kulmanen boasted that he helped turn in several enemies of the people in Sovhoz 2, in particular 
those who had been in radio contact with Finland. When asked why he had not learned Russian 
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or Karelian, Kulmanen mentioned that he had already started to read Karelian newspapers and 
was studying the language. Further, when asked why in 14 years he has not learned the language, 
Kulmanen complained about his own illiteracy and difficulty learning a new language, but also 
claimed that he is trying really hard to learn the language now, by reading Karelian 
newspapers.744  
Purge from Below 
Oleg Khlevniuk, one of the few historians who has been allowed to examine the secret 
files of the Politburo, argued that the terror was not a culmination of forces from below, but was 
initiated and directed from above, with the main purpose of eliminating a potential ‘fifth column’ 
in anticipation of war. 745 Quotas for the arrested were indeed fixed in advance and then 
transmitted to administrative regions for fulfillment.746 However, one of the problems with the 
view from above is that it does not answer two main questions about the purges in Karelia. First, 
why were quotas exceeded in Karelia; why did local authorities persistently lobby the Kremlin to 
increase quotas? Second, why did Finns become the prime target in Karelia despite the fact that 
there was never an order from Moscow to target Finns, let alone North American Finns?  
North American Finns fit the profile of potential “internal enemies” as described by 
officials in Moscow: they were immigrants, national minorities from bourgeois nationalist states, 
and on top of that, they sustained systematic cross border contact. Internalizing dominant 
discourses that promoted conflict along class and ethnic lines, local authorities, site managers, 
and common workers aimed to displace North American Finns and Finns in general, from the 
privileged positions they occupied since the 1920s in Karelia. While staged from above by the 
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Soviet leadership, the purge was also driven from below, by the overzealous initiative of regional 
and local authorities, as well as by the masses themselves. This is not to argue that the entire 
society participated in the purges, which was definitely not the case, but to highlight human 
agency and responsibility in the ethnic cleansing that took place in Karelia in the late 1930s. 
 The purge was undoubtedly orchestrated from above. Order 00047, issued in July of 
1937, directed against ex-kulaks and other anti-Soviet elements, called for 268,950 to be 
repressed, with 75,950 to be shot. For its operations 75 million rubles were allocated from the 
state budget.747 In Karelia, the number was set at 1000, with 300 to be shot.748 In Karelia, 
however, by November 20, 1937, the Karelian Troika had already sentenced 1,690 people to 
death, thus far more than the 300 quota established by the center.749 During the four months 
(July-November) of the initial repression, the Central Committee of the VKP (b), and the NKVD 
of the USSR received numerous telegrams from Karelian authorities with requests to increase 
quotas for arrests, especially for capital punishment.750 Amid systematic lobbying by local 
Karelian authorities, in particular for those to be shot, coupled with decisions in the center to 
widen the scope of the national purges in January 1938, additional quotas were established in 
January 1938, with 700 to be purged, including 500 to be shot.751 In May, national operations 
were extended once again, this time until August 1. There was an exponential increase in the 
ratio of Karelia’s population to be repressed as in comparison to the rest of the country. While 
the number of people to be repressed in the country as a whole was reduced by 400%, the 
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numbers of people to be repressed in Karelia decreased by only 30%, while the percentage of 
people to be executed actually rose by more than 60%.  
 Local authorities in Karelia seem to have been very enthusiastic, and also opportunistic, 
about rounding up Finns. One official wrote to his superiors in 1938: “we are asking to be given 
sanctions to arrest 9 Finns, we have no evidence, but they seem like interesting fellas to us…we 
need to isolate them immediately.”752 Karelian NKVD chief S.T. Matuzenko (who replaced 
Mattison in 1938) wrote to Nikolai Ezhov (head of the NKVD) in 1938 that he discovered a 
major spy ring in Karelia involving North American immigrants.753 Matuzenko claimed that 
Gylling was the mastermind behind a North American Finnish spy ring in Karelia, and that 
Gylling and Rovio made the entire population of Karelia, including children, speak and learn 
“this strange language – Finnish.”754 Matuzenko asserted that the 1416 North American Finns 
remaining in Karelia were all under surveillance. In June 1938 he went on to ask for permission 
to remove all of them from the republic to Archangelsk and Omsk region, to be used as labor in 
the forest industry.755 In August, Matuzenko repeated his request to Moscow, however to no 
avail.756 
Conclusion 
 An imagined community is in many ways predicated on imagined threats. It is my 
contention that national communities regenerate the collective spirit at the expense of the 
“other”, the foreigner. It was not a coincidence that border minority populations were the first to 
be targeted in the Great Purge. To consolidate the regime from within amid the fast paced 
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economic and cultural modernization that shook the society to the core, Stalin’s government first 
created, and then moved to eradicate, imagined dangers to the Soviet regime in the name of 
security and unity. Anachronistically, looking back, one can argue that repression of Finns in 
Karelia was to an extent a necessary step in the preservation and promulgation of the Soviet 
regime. Following the Second World War, two of the leading Soviet politicians, Molotov and 
Kaganovich, were still convinced that the repression of national minorities glued the Soviet 
national community, making the Soviet victory in 1945 possible.  
The reversal of the policy of Korenizatsia in 1934-35 heralded the end of a “golden age” 
for Finns in Karelia. This affirmative action-like policy allowed some of the most powerful and 
organized “subaltern” groups of the former Russian empire to form national and autonomous 
republics. Finns in Karelia achieved dominant economic and political positions despite 
comprising only 1 percent of Karelia’s population in the early 1920s. Russians, who were 
considerably marginalized as a result of the policies promoted by the state, emerged in the 
second part of the 1930s, now backed by the state, to challenge the Finnish hegemony. 
Ethnic identity played an important role in Karelia during the purges. However, it was 
foreignness, as defined by ethnicity as well as social class, that made North American Finns 
stand out and become particularly vulnerable during the national repressions. An NKVD agent 
who interrogated Gylling, after a severe beating of Karelia’s former leader, referred to him as 
‘hromoi barin’ (the crippled master), which suggests that animosity was predicated on social 
class rather than on national or linguistic differences.757 Most of the party officials and NKVD 
agents in Karelia had limited, if any formal education. 758 As a matter of fact, most of the 
Karelian population at the time was illiterate. This was in contrast to the relatively well educated 
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Finnish and North American Finnish elite and rank and file in Karelia in the 1930s. Given that 
there were no official orders that sanctioned the arrests of Finns in Karelia, one can attribute the 
causes for the tragic fate of North American Finns to a socio-economic struggle, where the 
under-privileged non-Finnish, largely Russian group tried to displace the socio-economic and 
political Finnish elite in Karelia.  
The most stunning episode in the story of North American immigrants in Karelia is in the 
way they, virtually overnight, went from being seen as enlightening agents of modernity to being 
depicted as ‘dangerous foreigners’, “petty bourgeois”, “harmful”, potential agents provocateurs, 
spies, and wreckers. Once privileged as exemplary members of the international proletariat, after 
1935 North American Finns “officially” became foreigners. The rise and fall of the Finnish 
language and culture in Karelia in the 1920s and the 1930s was conditioned by the changing 
nationality policy in the Soviet Union. In both cases, however, it was the actors at the grassroots 
level that utilized the dominant discourses in their own personal interests, usually to gain some 
form of economic, social, or cultural power. The mass arrests and the decimation of the Finnish 
and North American Finnish communities in Karelia in the second part of the 1930s would not 
have taken place without the enthusiastic support of local actors, who internalized dominant 
discourses stemming from Moscow and applied them to local settings.  
It is also difficult to ignore the effect of modernization and abilities of the state to 
facilitate the purges. Control over the means of communication made it possible for the Soviet 
elite to dictate the terms and pace of Soviet industrialization and modernization. The subsequent 
cultural modernization and “enlightenment” of the “backward” population was also in many 
ways a process dictated from above. One of the preconditions of the modernization of a society 
is the removal of the unknowns and the uncertain. The cohesiveness of national imagined 
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communities however is often predicated on the degree of imagined threats to the collective. As 
a result, in many ways, the appearance of social groups who were to  become strangers, persons 
who are present yet unfamiliar, was an inevitable “byproduct” of a modernizing society, 
especially at the initial stages of its national identity formation. The state possesses the ability to 
reframe the identities of social groups in the public discourse to satisfy the goals of the state.  It 
regenerates national communities at the expense of the “other”, the foreigner. Finally, it has the 
power not merely to shape the identity of the “other” in the public discourse, but also to radically 
change its definition. 
With the shift in the nationality policy, the Finnish community in Karelia was 
“discontinued”. The removal of Finns from positions of privilege in Karelia was methodical. 
First targeted were adult males who wielded significant social, political, and economic influence. 
Based on a statistical analysis of the purged, the male population of North American Finnish 
migrants was severely decimated. Coupled with the arrests and deportation, and the ostracization 
of the wives and children of the enemies of the people, the cultural peculiarity of the North 
American Finnish Diaspora was virtually destroyed. The Karelian communist party was no 
longer dominated by Finns, the Finnish language, as well as Finnish cultural norms, first lost 
official status, then their prestige. With top Finnish industry managers, cultural producers, 
writers and journalists, educators and trainers, and the North American specialists dismissed or 
imprisoned, the imagined socialist-Finnish transnational community, actively constructed from 
the early 1920s to mid-1930s by the likes of Gylling and his supporters, was “discontinued” by 
1938. Although some elements of the Finnish and North American identities remained in 
Karelian folklore for some time, the Sovietization and russification of Finnish communities in 
Karelia was strong enough to virtually obliterate the presence of North American Finns from 
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Karelia’s history. In the early 1990s, when asked on a radio show the meaning of the name 
Interposelok, no one knew it meant an “international town”, established by North American 
Finnish immigrants.759  
In the end, the repression of North American Finns in Karelia was a result of human 
agency.  The reaction to the instructions from above was permeated with local socio-economic 
motives and was largely opportunistic. There is no question that Finns were targeted from below. 
Although there were never any directives from Moscow to target Finns per se, they became the 
main object of repressions in Karelia. In fact, Tenison, head of the Karelian NKVD, on 
numerous occasions wrote to Moscow complaining that there were no specific orders to deal 
exclusively with Finns, given that decrees 00047, 00439, 00485, 00593, were devised to deal 
only with Germans, Poles and the Chinese. At the same time, although the Soviet government 
never targeted Finns, it cultivated the context within which local authorities and the populace in 
general could justify their actions in removing a privileged group of “foreigners” from positions 
of power. Sources show that animosity towards Finns at the local level, although at times 
expressed in ethnic/national terms, was largely socio-economic in character, generated by the 
reality that “foreigners” occupied some of the most important positions in the society. Although 
Stalin’s regime cultivated a system that not only made possible, but also encouraged, popular 
compliance and even enthusiastic assistance during the purges, the Karelian case demonstrates 
that the direction the purges were taken was conditioned largely by local factors.  
 
 
 
 
                                                
759 Mayme Sevander, Skitaltsi [Wanderers] p. 92. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
____________ 
 At first glance, migration of North American Finns to Soviet Karelia in the 1930s might 
seem an anomaly, an aberration in the annals of 20th century immigration history – an exotic 
story about a group of radicals who left everything behind and ventured to the ‘promised land’ to 
build a better world. However, upon a closer look, the experiences of North American Finnish 
immigrants in Canada, the United States, and Soviet Karelia in the interwar period paint by far a 
more complex historical portrait. The initial point of departure of this work was the assumption 
that Canadian and American Finns were part of a transnational labor force on the move between 
national and diasporic centers of cultural production.  
I have situated these migrants at the center of the story, and used their experiences as a 
focal point of attention around which the process of individual, organizational, regional, and 
national identity construction gravitated. In part, their mass migration to Soviet Karelia, could be 
explained by economic factors, where socially and economically disadvantaged and at times 
oppressed workers chose to escape the depression-stricken North American continent in an 
attempt to secure livelihood in a place where many believed the future and progress lay. What 
politicized and “culturized” their movement was not their migration per se, as much as the places 
and people they encountered along the way. I have tried to argue that whereas the movement of 
people was physically and psychologically transnational, leaders of national and diasporic 
imagined communities on both sides of the Atlantic were engaged in perpetual “branding” 
efforts either to include, or in other instances reject, the cultural, social, economic, and political 
memberships of these migrants in their communities. This, in turn allowed, national, regional, 
and diasporic leaders to define and redefine the cultural and political borders of their imagined 
and re-imagined communities. 
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 It is the contention of this work that individual and collective subjectivities and identities 
were formed and shaped as much by nation states as by Diasporas. In the case of North 
American Finnish migration to Soviet Karelia there was, however, another dimension to the 
story. The transnational movement between radically different conceptions of modernity also 
allowed for fundamentally new ideas to penetrate Soviet society by way of immigrant human 
capital and experience. As a result, immigrants found themselves at the intersection of 
modernities. The present account depicted immigrants’ stories, experiences, and the process of 
collective and individual identity formation in a tri-dimensional light – the nation, the Diaspora, 
and alternative modernities. 
 I also tried to empower the common migrant as an agent in the historical process. Not 
only did the North American Finns make rational decisions in moving to the Soviet Union, they 
also became de-facto agents of cultural, social, and economic change, by fundamentally 
transforming certain elements of the Soviet Karelian economy, culture, and society in the 1930s. 
That said, agency and structure cannot be understood as separate from one another. I have argued 
that although immigrants were agents of change in their own right, their social identities were 
either appropriated or rejected by national and diasporic elites to advance their own goals and 
agendas, in the process fostering particular versions of local, regional, national, and transnational 
communities. In control of the means of communication, these symbolic elites could influence 
and, in some cases, dictate representations of immigrants’ identities in the public mind, by 
bestowing them with either positive, flattering interpretations – as we saw in Karelia in the first 
part of the 1930s – or negative connotations – as was the case during the purges in the second 
part of the 1930s in the Soviet Union, or throughout the 1930s in interwar Canada – all in an 
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attempt to foster a particular vision of their imagined community and advance specific goals and 
plans.  
 As a result, the only constant in this transnational narrative were the North American 
workers. What was changing, across time and space in North America and the Soviet Union 
throughout the 1930s, were their representations in the public discourse. In most cases, these 
representations reflected local, regional, and national interests rather than the real daily life 
experiences of the migrants in question. They were heroes and enemies, strangers and archetypes 
of an ideal citizen. At the same time, but in different places, and in other instances, in the same 
places but at different times, they were insiders and friends, or foreigners and outsiders. This 
research has demonstrated that the negative or positive representations of these migrants were 
often conditioned by the degrees of their individual and collective access to social and political 
power. Access to political centers of influence determined admittance to centers of cultural 
production; through mass communication systems cultural producers manufactured knowledge 
that usually favored one form of a cultural, social, political, or economic system over another.  
 The causes for migration among the rank and file of North American Finnish workers and 
their families are to a certain degree easy to discern. Various qualitative and quantitative sources 
show that many went in search of social and economic security, yet others followed their 
ideological convictions, while for others still proximity to Finland and the opportunity to live in a 
society dominated by Finnish language and culture proved to be too appealing to forego. To 
dissect and understand the interests of various states, organizations, and their leaders either to 
welcome or reject particular migrant groups is a more complicated task. The way symbolic elites 
and cultural producers treat and represent immigrants in the public discourse often reveals the 
social, cultural, and political contours of that regime. The entangling points of the interests of the 
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rank and file and of the symbolic national and diasporic leadership, and the analogous 
deciphering of this relationship completes, and then reveals, the dialectic historical process of 
identity construction and renegotiation. In other words, once the interests and motivations of 
both parties are understood for what they are in a specific historical context, it becomes easier to 
understand the fundamental issues at stake for individuals, organizations, and states in that space 
and place.  
 It is also my contention that historical narratives of immigration and ethnicity of the past 
two centuries operating exclusively within national frameworks are at best limited. A 
transnational lens and an inter-disciplinary approach illuminate trends, patterns, and stories 
otherwise undetectable. I by no means advocate that transnational theories and transnationalism 
per se obliterates the importance of the nation-state in modern history, or reduces the power it 
has. Rather, the work of an historian should be concentrated in this grey, in-between area where 
the process of state and Diaspora formation can be seen much more clearly, without the veil of 
political subjectivities obstructing the historian’s research and narrative.  
The problem with the subjective and exclusive nature of dominant national and diasporic 
narratives is that they further reinforce national and diasporic formation – simply reframing them 
in new, modern, or alternative terms. In this work, I mention the risks associated with special 
path approaches to history. The Sonderwegs and the Osobiy Put’s tend to reproduce the grand 
political narratives of the great men in history. These seemingly special national paths to history 
obliterate the importance of men, women, and children who have lived, acted, and died, but 
whose stories and identities were excluded from the dominant discourse of the day, and, as a 
result, were relegated to the dust bins of history. Greatness someone once said is often a result of 
good luck, and if you doubt this then ask any loser. The application of a transnational approach 
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to the proliferation of the subject of multiple modernities in today’s academia will allow 
researchers to move away from the archaic ways of considering national history as the epitome 
of the past, the present, and the future. Re-affirmation of special path national or diasporic-
oriented historiographies might as well be one of the greatest backward steps of modern social 
sciences. 
These issues are transparent in the historiography of the Karelian fever, which is 
permeated by two schools of thought, roughly divided along national/geographic lines. Those in 
the west tend to concentrate on the failure of the Karelian fever and the tragic fate of Canadian 
and American Finns in the Soviet Union. These writers emphasize the heroic nature of these 
hard-working, acute radical socialists who had nothing but the best and often selfless intentions 
of helping to build socialism in the Soviet Union. On the other hand, writers in Russia see the 
Karelian fever as a success story, where North American Finns are praised as champions of 
American modernity who had successfully, albeit for a short period of time, revolutionized 
Karelia’s economic, culture, and the society as a whole.  Both historiographical streams further 
perpetuate and reconstruct the diasporic myths of ethnic and national distinctiveness.  
The role of ethnic and national leaders in the story of North American migration to 
Karelia in the 1930s is too large to ignore. For example, the leaders of the FOC in Canada were 
instrumental in facilitating the migration of two thousands Canadian Finns to Soviet Karelia. 
Once they became convinced that the new center of the Finnish left-wing Diaspora could be 
established in Gylling’s Karelia, they wholeheartedly supported and promoted immigration to the 
Soviet Union. The fact that the FOC supported immigration to Karelia and was opposed to 
Finnish government initiatives to woo some of its former citizens back to Finland in the 1920s 
reveals a specific, ideologically driven agenda. The first step to “re-claim” Finland, the FOC 
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leaders believed, was to establish political and demographic dominance of Finns in bordering 
Soviet Karelia. When that would be achieved, the time would come to think about Finland and 
its future in the ideologically polarized world.  
Everything points to the reality that the Karelian fever was in many ways a Karelian 
project – a well organized and executed recruiting scheme. Given the central role played by 
diasporic leaders in the movement, I hold that the Karelian fever can be conceptualized in terms 
of ethnic or diasporic identity construction, where leaders of the North American Finnish left in 
concert with the Finnish leadership of Karelia aimed to sell Karelia to the North American 
Finnish public. The symbolic elites of the Finnish-left renegotiated a new ethnic and national 
identity, whose ideological center was supposed to become Soviet Karelia. The FOC with the 
help of recruiters managed to convince the public of the existence of an alternative Finnish-
socialist diasporic community, a Soviet type of Finland. In fact, the FOC gambled, and gambled 
heavily on the Karelian fever but, in the end, lost. Its best members left for the Soviet Union and 
most of the rank and file supported the initiative from North America. When the venture failed, it 
shattered the image of a new imagined community and with it the credibility of the FOC.  
By assuming control of the migratory movement, which was in many ways spontaneous 
and transnational from the early 1920s, the ethnic leadership appropriated the transnational 
phenomenon into its own diasporic narratives. Using mass communication, namely the press and 
recruiters’ public orations in the Finnish centers across the continent, they recruited, or rather 
generated ethnicity for a cause. I have shown the way the Finnish-socialist press in Canada and 
the United States became a virtual space	  where differing claims of belonging, and frameworks of 
identity were expressed and reformulated. In the hands of the symbolic elites and cultural 
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producers of the Finnish-left Diaspora, the ethnic press became a central means by which to 
produce seemingly commonly shared political, social, and cultural ideals and myths.  
The struggle over the rights of re-presentation of a dominant ethnic identity was also 
expressed in the struggle of right-wing and left-wing Finnish community leaders over the 
meaning of homeland and the place of North America Finns in it. Whereas in the 1920s 
conservative Finnish organizations were attacked by their socialist compatriots for support of 
return migration to Finland, in the 1930s it was the turn of the right-wing Finnish community 
leaders to oppose migration to the Soviet Union so ardently supported by the FOC. The 
conflicting communities conceived of the Karelian fever in opposing terms, one seeing it as an 
exodus to a ‘promised’ land, others as a doomed journey to the place of the ‘wretched’. Whereas 
for the conservative Finnish leadership and its audience, the Soviet Union and its Russian 
majority were enemies in cultural, ideological, and political terms, for the leaders of left-wing 
communities and its followers in Canada and the United States, Soviet Karelia of the 1920s and 
the 1930s became an alternative, a newer, and a potentially better version of Finland. 
Once in Karelia, North American Finns became a means in the hands of the local and 
national elites to foster specific representations of Karelian and Soviet imagined communities. 
Even before they arrived in Karelia en masse, Gylling and Kremlin leaders developed plans to 
make use of immigrants’ skills and cultural identities. For Gylling, immigrants would help to 
meet the Five-Year Plan quotas. More importantly they would strengthen the demographic 
position of Finns in Karelia, a matter that was important to Gylling long before he even reached a 
deal with the Bolsheviks to run Karelia in the early 1920s. Taking advantage of the all-Soviet 
nationality policy – a de-facto affirmative action initiative – Gylling fortified a regime dominated 
by Finnish language and culture. In other words, with the help of the Korenizatsia policy, 
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Gylling institutionalized ethnicity in Karelia in the 1920s and the 1930s. Finns comprised only 1 
percent of the Karelian population in the early 1920s. Yet, by the mid-1930s, the Finnish 
language reigned supreme in the republic, and Finnish immigrants found themselves in control of 
most of the public political, social, and cultural institutions. Given North Americans’ privileged 
economic status in the republic, ethnicity and class became virtually inseparable. Higher salaries, 
access to specialty stores, better working and living conditions, coupled with the support of the 
central and regional governments, as well as the government controlled media outlets, made 
North American Finns clearly privileged, and more importantly, distinguishable in Soviet 
Karelian society.  
North American immigrants played a central role in Gylling’s vision and attempts at 
creating a Finnish-socialist Soviet Karelia. Immigrants spoke Finnish and were well educated, 
and many assumed major positions in Karelia’s cultural production industry. They dominated the 
theater troupe in Petrozavodsk, the Karelian symphony, and the publishing house. They were 
also among the leading writers, journalists, teachers, and instructors in the republic. In addition, 
immigrants were highly skilled. The experience and technology they imported from North 
America revolutionized several sectors of the Karelian economy. Their success allowed Gylling 
to boast about the high productivity of foreign specialists and continue to lobby the central 
government to increase the number of immigrants from Canada and the United States to be 
allowed into the country. 
The arrival of Finnish-speaking specialists allowed Gylling to entrench the demographic, 
political, and cultural position of the republic’s Finnish-speaking minority. Assuming that 
immigration policies reflect the type of societies leaders try to create, the very fact that Gylling 
encouraged a solely Finnish skilled migration from North America testifies to the fact that he 
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envisioned the skilled Finnish male as the ideal citizen of the community he tried so zealously to 
build. More than that, he made sure that North American Finns were socially and economically 
the most privileged group in the republic. Promoted by the government, the press and other 
cultural producers, North American Finnish social and cultural norms became the standard by 
which everyone else had to measure up. Finnishness it seems became equated with social and 
cultural enlightenment. In the end, from the early 1920s to the mid-1930s the public discourse in 
Karelia was ethnicized. Soviet Karelia of the 1920s and the first half of the 1930s was in many 
respects an “artificial” community. 
Upon arrival many immigrants soon realized that Soviet Karelia was a distortion; some 
believed they were simply duped and were quick to leave. In fact, some left as soon as they 
arrived, without even unpacking their suitcases. Migrants who returned from Karelia found a 
cold reception in their former communities. Not many believed the returnees’ stories about 
appalling daily realities in Soviet Karelia. As a result, the returnees found themselves on the 
margins of this transnational community, ostracized for their “betrayal” of the Soviet Karelian 
cause. While some chose to remain quiet, others spoke out. In either case, the returnees found 
themselves excluded from the imagined collective. The belief in the ideals espoused by an 
imagined community can be binding. Even after the purges in the late 1930s, the de-Stalinization 
speech in 1956, and, in odd cases, even following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, some 
continued to believe in the infallibility of the Soviet regime, convinced that the arrests of the 
1930s were a mistake for which they blamed an invisible army of class enemies that sabotaged 
honest working people.  
In fact, the farther one is removed from an imagined community the stronger is its 
attraction (or repulsion – all depending on its representations in any given discourse). Finns who 
270	  
	  
arrived in Canada in the 1920s and in Soviet Karelia in the 1930s were dismayed (although to 
different degrees) to find that the images of Canada as a land of opportunity and of Soviet 
Karelia as a workers’ paradise were misleading, constructed representations of social, cultural, 
and economic realities. They traded one distorted reality for another. They hoped to find social 
and economic security, however in both places reality and the image advertised had little in 
common. For example, the left-wing press in North America depicted Soviet Karelia if not yet, 
then a soon to be utopia. For North American Finns who were far removed from the Soviet 
actualities it was difficult to know better.  
In the Soviet Union, North American Finns enjoyed a privileged status, and their ethnic 
and social identities, normalized in the public discourse, came to dominate the representations of 
the republic’s public identity. In Canada on the other hand, virtually the opposite was true. By 
constructing certain ethnic groups as foreigners and “outsiders”, Canadian public officials and 
cultural producers promoted a particular image of an “insider,” whom they envisioned as the 
ideal member of the community. I have demonstrated the way in which Canadian border 
officials, national security agencies, and the mainstream press documented and represented 
foreigners in the public discourse, revealing a specific image of the imagined Canadian identity 
in the 1930s.  
By the 1930s, the Canadian state developed an elaborate system that documented and 
classified its population according to ethnic, national, and racial criteria. I have shown that the 
identities border agents ascribed to the incoming passengers were often at odds with the way 
migrants and residents alike identified themselves. The Canadian state made its population 
recognizable by compartmentalizing it into easily identifiable social and cultural categories. 
What was also significant about the trend was that the Canadian government and its security and 
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border agencies in the 1930s came to see national and ethnic minorities not simply as foreigners, 
but as different kind of foreigners with varying degrees of potential, imagined, or real dangers to 
the overarching social formation.  
The state also played a considerable role in the formation of diasporic identities in 
Canada. Through the process of hailing and interpolation, particular identities were imposed on 
the Canadian population– something that has contributed to the discursive formation of 
individual and collective identities. The construction of ethnic and racial categories at Canadian 
ports of entry articulated categories that were not ‘natural’, but rather imaginary and symbolic, 
re-produced to reflect the dominant ideologies shared by the Canadian political, economic, and 
cultural elite. The process was not simply discursive and it served a specific purpose for the state. 
When the population became ‘knowable’ it also became visible, accessible, and thus more easily 
traceable and manageable. In the end, it allowed the Canadian bureaucracy to draw cultural 
contours around the concept of Canadian national identity, an essential component of any 
modern nation-state.  This was in fact Canada’s hidden, unofficial nationality policy. The 
Canadian state, with the help of its bureaucracy, security forces, and cultural producers 
facilitated the designation and redistribution of specific ethno-social roles, which reformulated 
subjects’ identities along the lines of political, social, and cultural values of the dominant groups 
in Canadian society.  
The concept of otherness on the basis of ethnicity was nurtured and utilized both in 
Canada and the Soviet Union in the 1930s to solidify, develop, and promote national 
consciousness. While in the Soviet Union the nationality policy was official, in Canada it was 
invisible, where the state and authorities subscribed to a particular anglo and franco-centric 
discourse. The emphasis in Canadian historiography on the “founding nations” is in fact a sort of 
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a national Canadian sonderweg. Ethnicity, race, and ideology were closely interlinked in the 
public discourse, and in the 1930s European immigrants were conventionally seen as bearers of 
foreign ideologies. Ethnic management techniques allowed the state to maintain the ideological 
status quo and foster a unified vision of Canada despite the many social, economic, and political 
divisions within the country.  
In this period ethnicity and ideology reinforced each other, in the process mapping out 
borders of imagined national, but also diasporic communities. I have demonstrated that in 
relation to the Finnish Diaspora, the “Great Divide” in the community was a result of internal 
dynamics, but was also conditioned by the varying degrees of marginalization of Finnish 
socialist and conservative groups by the Canadian government. Unfavorable public policies and 
the anti-immigrant public discourse of the 1930s were significantly more biased against the 
socialist immigrant communities than the conservative, loyalist Finnish groups. Unlike 
organizations like the FOC, right-wing Finnish community leaders preached loyalty to the crown 
and shared a common religion – Protestantism – with one of the societies’ dominant groups. 
More importantly both despised communists.  
The phenomenon of the Karelian fever also provides a unique opportunity to study the 
convergence points of Soviet socialist and western capitalist modernities. The movement of 
North American Finnish human capital and experience, as we have seen, had inoculated 
elements of western modernity into everyday life patterns of the local population as well as into 
the Soviet society and economy at large. North American Finns brought western modernity to 
the Soviet Union. In turn, immigrant experiences were extrapolated and appropriated on local, 
regional, and national levels. North American Finns’ success stories became the means by which 
the political and symbolic elites tried to cultivate and promote an ideal type of a modern soviet 
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labor force. I have argued that Finnish migration from North America to the Soviet Union was 
initially a spontaneous phenomenon that was only later, opportunistically, utilized by Gylling 
and Soviet leaders to promote their own interests. 
Soviet journalists and scientists were quick to study Canadian and American Finns at 
work. In a short period of time they generated scientific literature in the form of books and 
academic and newspaper articles, where they outlined the ways the modern worker should 
emulate immigrants’ methods of labor organization, work routines and techniques. In this 
context, North American immigrants became the epitome of cultural and economic 
modernization in Karelia. Their unrelenting work ethic, innovative technologies, and their 
disciplined, self-regulatory behavior (both during and after work) was credited with their high 
performance rates and, as a result, came to serve as a model to be emulated to produce an 
experienced, disciplined, and efficient soviet labor force. Soviet elites and cultural producers 
appropriated migrants’ socio-cultural identities into the Soviet dominant discourses. For 
example, they were often careful to omit that the new working techniques and technology were 
American or Canadian. Instead, they claimed that immigrants’ high production rates were a 
result of a patriotic commitment of international labor force to the Soviet cause.  
The North American Finnish presence in Karelia fundamentally shaped and reconstituted 
the Soviet Karelian path to modernization, and it demonstrated the convergence of the local, the 
national, and the modern (global). North American Finns stood out from the general population 
not only in Karelia, but also in Finland, where a large number of them returned throughout the 
1920s. I have shown that returning Finns in Finland and in Soviet Karelia were distinguished less 
by their ideological or ethnic attributes than by their “peculiar” attitudes and behavior at work 
and in everyday life in general. The values they embodied by coming into contact with western 
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modernity in fast-paced industrializing and urbanizing North America was the only aspect that 
was universal to all North American migrants on the move across the Atlantic. While they might 
have differed on what defined ethnicity, nationality, political ideology, and so on, they more 
often agreed on what attributes constituted a good worker and a productive member of the 
society.  
 In 1935, however, immigrants’ fortunes were abruptly reversed. The transformation in 
the nationality policy heralded the end of Finnish cultural dominance in the republic. The 
representation of North American Finns in the public discourse changed from archetypical to the 
foreign dangerous bourgeois. With the help of the state they became ‘strangers’ in Karelian 
society virtually overnight. The strategic displacement of Finns from a position of power, and 
their absence from Karelia’s public life was methodical. In top down fashion, the first to go were 
the Karelian political leadership and the republic’s Finnish army command. Cultural producers 
and senior management followed, with low level management and rank and file workers and 
specialists eliminated mostly in 1938. The imagined socialist-Finnish transnational community, 
actively constructed from the early 1920s to the mid-1930s was deconstructed and destroyed by 
1938. 
 An imagined community is often predicated on imagined threats. Anachronistically, 
repression of Finns in Karelia was to an extent a necessary step in the preservation and 
promulgation of the Soviet imagined community. Years after the Second World War had passed, 
two of the leading Soviet politicians, Molotov and Kaganovich, were still convinced that 
repression of national minorities glued the Soviet national community, making the Soviet victory 
in 1945 possible. National communities regenerate collective identities at the expense of the 
“other”, the foreigner. North American Finns became foreigners both ethnically and socially. 
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The Soviet government’s call to eradicate bourgeois nationalism within the country put Finns in 
a particularly vulnerable position. Bourgeois and foreignness, class and ethnicity became 
interconnected in the dominant public discourse, identified the other in the community and, by 
association, encouraged a suspicious attitude towards immigrants. 
 From this aspect, the purges in Soviet Karelia were generated from below, although still 
situated within the discursive framework dictated from above. The Soviet government did not, at 
least officially, brand Finns as enemies of the state. It was the local authorities and the common 
populace that adapted the official discourse and applied it to local conditions in ways that both 
benefitted their own immediate interests and protected them from the purges. The purge had a 
clearly ethnic, class, and gender dimension to it. A statistical analysis of the purged North 
American Finns demonstrated that the primary target during the cleansing were male Finns of a 
particular age and social status in the society. 
Primary power relations in the modern state are between the state and the individual. 
Migrants on the move between Europe and the Americas in the 1930s became agents of change, 
local to global, but at the same time, also subjects of contention between different visions of 
Diasporas, nations, and modernities. Migration is a dynamic and a fluid process. However, once 
on the move, in between various centers of cultural production, the agency of the individual 
begins to lose autonomy, and the identity of the migrant begins to change. For the social 
scientist, migrant movement allows witnessing the in-betweenness between diasporas, states, 
modernities, or any other social formations, and provides ample room for analysis of the hybrid 
space, and the construction/fortification of representations of social realities on its margins.  
Migration allowed me to delve into several historiographical streams, among them the 
Karelian fever, Stalin’s purges, national building in Canada, transnationalism, North American 
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immigration and ethnic history, and alternative modernities. Engaging in such a broad field of 
analysis allowed me to sway from special path national historiographies and simple explanations. 
In fact, the term immigration in recent years has become discursively charged, and in many ways 
politicized in today’s academic and public discourse in general. The reproduction of national 
historiographies with powerful celebratory and filiopietistic narratives, be they anglo-centric, 
franco-centric, or depicted through the charade of multiculturalism, reveals a historian’s 
background, political views, and ideological creeds instead of producing an analysis that shows 
the obvious and hidden human agendas and motivations in generating different social, political, 
and cultural relations and forming institutions and organizations. Immigration/migration then is a 
highly contested terrain – where national, diasporic, and other social identities take form. In fact, 
migration is a fundamental aspect that shapes social formations, as it makes possible discerning 
social, economic, political, cultural and ideological shifts across time and space.  
One of the most significant findings of the research was the apparent shakiness, the 
fluidity, and the non-persistence of ethnic identity as a marker of self-identification. In the 
present story I have traced the way ethno-national identity changed like a chameleon. Individuals 
trying to adapt to different situations and certain environments, or organizations and national 
leaders trying to promote specific political goals and cultural agendas, twisted and modified 
ethno-national representations in the public sphere to survive, struggle, and persevere. The way 
people adapted to new technologies, new forms of labor and labor organization, or in other 
words, to specific modes of modernity, was however much more consistent that the changing 
representations of specific forms of ethnic identities. In other words, adapting to specific forms 
of modernity fostered many more similar shared daily life experiences, than the constantly 
changing abstract notion of ethno-national identity.   
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Ethnic identity is unstable, inconsistent, and open to multiple interpretations. As I have 
demonstrated, migrants’ identities were contested by various forces in Canada and the Soviet 
Union – in some place they were rejected, in others accepted – the goal was the solidification of 
specific ideas, ideals, and representations, in this case Diasporic and national ideintities. The 
modern state posseses the necessary resources, and is in a position to significantly alter, or 
rebrand, public representations of ethno-national identities. The ability to either shape, or create 
ethno-national identities, serves specific goals for Diasporas and states. For example, the facility 
to classify into distinct ethno-national categories provides the state with the tools to monitor and 
control its subject populations. Ethnicity in other words is a brand, and more in the modern world 
it has become highly politicized and contested terrain, locally, nationally, and internationally.  
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